

Critical Minerals Report (07.22.2026): China Determines the Critical Minerals World Order as Trump Raises the Stakes

written by Tracy Hughes | July 22, 2026

China does not need to stop a Western factory to control it. It needs only to decide whether the small quantities of rare earths on which that factory depends will arrive, when they will arrive and at what price. The [International Energy Agency](#) has now put a number on that leverage: \$6.5 trillion in annual production outside China could be exposed if Beijing's announced export controls were implemented in full. This is not a forecast of \$6.5 trillion in lost gross domestic product; it is a measure of the industrial activity resting on materials used in minute quantities but exceedingly difficult to replace. More than \$3 trillion of automotive production, over \$600 billion of defense output and more than \$350 billion associated with data centres fall within the modelled exposure, while the United States and Europe each account for more than \$1.5 trillion. A rare earth market worth only several billion dollars now stands between the West and factories, weapons systems and digital infrastructure worth three orders of magnitude more; this is no longer merely a commodity story, but a [measure](#) of industrial power.

The danger has also changed in character. China's [April 2025 controls](#) covered seven heavy rare-earth elements, related compounds and magnets. Measures [announced](#) in October widened the element list and proposed licensing requirements for foreign-

made parts, components and assemblies containing Chinese material or produced with Chinese technology. Several of those October measures were suspended for one year, until November 2026, but the underlying architecture remains available. The November 10th deadline should therefore not be described as the date of an automatic worldwide embargo; it is the point at which a suspension may expire unless the rules are extended, altered or replaced. **The more important instrument is the licence rather than the ban.** A licensing system is selective, reversible and capable of distinguishing among countries, companies and end uses. It can release enough material to prevent indiscriminate economic damage while preserving leverage over individual customers and collecting detailed information about where strategically important inputs are going...Jack Lifton has been quite prolific on this on [InvestorNews.com](https://investornews.com), I urge you to review his latest columns listed below.

Japan now provides the clearest evidence that this leverage has moved from scenario analysis into corporate accounts. A Nikkei Asia survey of 400 Japanese manufacturers found that rare earth procurement costs had risen by an average of 22% over the previous year. Roughly a third of respondents reported increases of 20–29%, while about a fifth faced increases of 10–19%. More than 40% had absorbed at least half of the additional cost, while more than one company in ten had been unable to pass any of it to customers. [Corporate warnings about rare earth exposure have also multiplied](#). Chinese customs data initially showed no terbium or dysprosium oxide shipments to Japan from November through May and only negligible yttrium oxide flows after December; [the June figures subsequently showed no shipments of dysprosium, terbium, or yttrium to Japan](#). The first industrial consequence is therefore not always an empty production line. It is compressed margins, precautionary inventory, and delayed capital spending; shutdowns arrive later, after buffers have

been consumed.

The second consequence is a transfer of competitiveness. [Chinese manufacturers have begun to exploit the price divide created by restricted exports](#), particularly in yttrium-intensive products in which Japanese companies have traditionally held high-end positions. According to commodities data provider Baiinfo, as reported by the *Financial Times*, yttrium oxide was recently quoted at about \$7.88 per kilogram in China and \$1,175 per kilogram in Europe—a disparity too large to attribute to ordinary freight, conversion, or quality differentials. By comparison, our partners at the [Critical Minerals Platform \(CMP\)](#) currently list their yttrium benchmark at \$18.54 per kilogram. CMP describes its benchmark as a volume-weighted FOB assessment denominated in U.S. dollars and, for rare earths, primarily reflecting Asia-Pacific market conditions. Its full pricing methodology is [available here](#). Domestic Chinese users gain access to an input at a fraction of the price paid by overseas rivals, while foreign buyers confront licensing risk as well as scarcity premiums. Whatever Beijing's stated diplomatic or security rationale, the industrial effect resembles a domestic input subsidy combined with an export tax. It encourages Chinese companies to invest further downstream, bid aggressively for overseas orders, and replace foreign products rather than merely supply their raw ingredients. The strategic prize is not the rent earned on rare earth oxides; it is the migration of advanced manufacturing towards the jurisdiction where those oxides remain cheap and dependable.

CMP VERIFIED PRICE



Yttrium Oxide 99%

▲ 2.10%

vs last month

\$18.54

per kg

TYPE
REE

DUAL USE
Yes

PRICE BASIS
FOB Asia
Pacific



PRICE CONFIDENCE
A

Price as of
Tue, 14 July, 2:00 pm (GMT +8)



Asia Pacific Volume Weighted Average Price (USD)

[Download chart](#)[CSV](#)

52-WEEK HIGH
\$19.02

52-WEEK LOW
\$8.87

12-MONTH
AVG PRICE
\$15.66

12-MONTH
CHANGE
+143.16%

3-MONTH
AVG
\$18.25

3-MONTH
TREND
+2.77%

MONTHLY
VOL. \$ ⓘ
\$3.23

MONTHLY
VOL. ⓘ
11.37%

ANN. VOL. ⓘ
39.39%

CV ⓘ
20.65%

MIN DEV
FROM AVG ⓘ
-43.35%

MAX DEV
FROM AVG ⓘ
+21.48%

This is why the new era of critical-minerals diplomacy is broader than a contest for mines. Export controls, stockpiles, price floors, tax incentives, state equity, concessional loans, offtake contracts and investment screening are becoming parts of a single industrial-policy toolkit. [Public financing commitments for critical-mineral projects more than quadrupled between 2023 and 2025, reaching approximately US\\$65 billion](#), yet critical-mineral investment declined by 9% in 2025 and concentration increased across several refining markets. The Group of Seven has responded with a [Critical Minerals Resilience and Production Alliance, data-sharing and stockpiling commitments, and 195 announced projects representing €64 billion of investment, equity participation and offtakes](#). The capacity arithmetic

remains uncomfortable. According to the [IEA's Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026](#), even if existing and announced projects proceed, diversified regions in 2035 would satisfy only about half of non-Chinese magnet-rare-earth mining demand, one-quarter of refining demand and well below one-fifth of magnet demand. Full coverage would therefore require roughly twice the planned mining capacity, four times the refining capacity and six times the magnet capacity.

Those ratios explain why Western coordination is beginning to fracture precisely as the case for cooperation strengthens. According to the [WSJ](#), the United States has committed roughly US\$46 billion through grants, loans, tax incentives and strategic transactions to secure critical materials—approximately eight times the scale of comparable European support—while pursuing deals and investments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ukraine, Brazil and Angola. European officials increasingly worry that Washington will outbid their companies for the same non-Chinese tonnes and reserve production for American defence and manufacturing. The European Union is assembling an [emergency task force to prepare for potential rare-earth supply disruptions](#) and has adopted the [RESourceEU Action Plan, which will mobilize up to €3 billion over 12 months](#) to accelerate alternative supplies and reduce dependence on individual countries. These are rational national responses, but their interaction creates a collective-action problem. The allied world does not lack mineral partnerships; it lacks a common rule for allocating scarce output when several governments have subsidised the same project, several manufacturers require the same specification and national-security contracts contain competing priority claims.

The destination of newly produced American material illustrates the problem. [MP Materials Corp. \(NYSE: MP\)](#), [Energy Fuels Inc. \(NYSE American: UUUU; TSX: EFR\)](#) and privately held Phoenix

[Tailings have been selling—or preparing to sell—rare-earth products into Japan and South Korea](#) despite substantial United States government support for a domestic supply chain. This is neither irrational commerce nor necessarily a failure of policy. Japan and South Korea possess customers, qualification expertise and magnet-manufacturing capacity that the United States is still building. Material naturally moves to the factories able to turn oxides and metals into components at commercial scale. Yet the trade flows expose the gap between resource security and industrial security: financing a mine or separator does not guarantee a domestic buyer, and a domestic buyer does not exist merely because a government prefers one. Until American magnet plants and their customer-qualification programmes mature, allied Asian demand may be essential to keep American upstream assets operating.

Washington is increasingly trying to fill that middle of the chain rather than simply finance extraction. The United States Department of Defense has committed \$25 million to [ReElement Technologies](#), a portfolio company of American Resources Corporation (NASDAQ: AREC), to expand refining and recycling capacity for rare earths, germanium and gallium in Indiana. The Defense Logistics Agency is separately seeking up to \$300 million of battery-grade [lithium carbonate](#)—more than 35 million pounds over five years—for the National Defense Stockpile. The distinction between the two measures matters. Stockpiles purchase time during an interruption and may provide a dependable customer for allied producers, but they cannot manufacture technical competence. Separation plants, metalmaking, alloy production and component qualification create capacity, though they take longer and carry execution risk. A resilient strategy requires both; substituting inventory for industry merely postpones the same vulnerability.

The same drive for integration is now reshaping corporate

leadership. USA Rare Earth, Inc. (NASDAQ: USAR) announced a [leadership transition](#) on July 20, under which CEO and Board Director Barbara Humpton will retire on October 1. Thrass Moraitis, who has led Serra Verde Group since January 2023, will succeed her following the anticipated completion by the end of August of the companies' combination, while USA Rare Earth Chairman Michael Blitzer has become Executive Chairman with immediate effect. Under Humpton, the company secured major public-private partnerships and assembled a footprint spanning processing, metals and magnet capabilities; Serra Verde, meanwhile, became the only large-scale producer outside Asia of all four magnetic rare earths. The transition therefore represents more than a change of personnel. An American-backed supply-chain platform is moving from portfolio construction towards integration and execution under the leader of its Brazilian producing asset, demonstrating again that Western industrial security will depend on combining capital, operating expertise and facilities across national borders.

Malaysia shows how quickly an allied industrial project can become a sovereignty question. Lynas Rare Earths Limited (ASX: LYC) has faced [parliamentary scrutiny](#) over a four-year, US\$96 million supply arrangement with the United States Department of Defense, with Malaysian legislators seeking clarity on national policy, local benefits and the political implications of supplying the American military. The same company has agreed to invest A\$50 million in [JS Link](#), Inc. (KOSDAQ: 127120), which plans a 3,000-tonne-a-year neodymium-iron-boron magnet factory near Lynas's Kuantan processing complex under a supply arrangement extending to 2038. [Carester SAS](#) and Malaco Mining Group are also proposing a 13,000-tonne-a-year rare-earth separation facility in Perak. The three developments cannot be separated. Malaysia is willing to host more of the value chain, but it does not intend to remain a toll-processing platform

whose output and strategic alignment are determined elsewhere. Security deals signed in Washington still require political legitimacy in Kuantan and Kuala Lumpur.

Canada's latest intervention is more narrowly designed and, for that reason, potentially more consequential. Teck Resources Limited (TSX: TECK.A; TSX: TECK.B; NYSE: TECK) has reached a [strategic investment agreement](#) under which Canada Growth Fund Inc. could make an equity-like investment of up to C\$400 million directly into projects at the Trail metallurgical complex in British Columbia. The arrangement would constitute the inaugural transaction under Natural Resources Canada's [Canada Critical Minerals Accelerator](#). Teck is considering as much as C\$850 million of investment that could double germanium and antimony production and establish gallium output, while the federal government would secure offtake rights over a portion of future production. Trail matters because it is an existing integrated smelting and refining complex, not a remote deposit awaiting permits, infrastructure and a process flowsheet. The arrangement therefore directs public capital at by-product recovery and refined materials that can reach customers sooner. The offtake rights also reveal the emerging logic of allied policy: governments are no longer content to subsidise capacity; they want contractual claims on what that capacity produces.

Australia is applying the same security logic to ownership and governance. Northern Minerals Limited (ASX: NTU), developer of the Browns Range heavy rare earth project in Western Australia, disclosed [interim directions](#) restricting voting and other shareholder rights attached to holdings associated with three foreign investors, following earlier orders requiring six shareholders to divest approximately [1.68 billion shares](#). Browns Range is strategically unusual because its mineralisation includes dysprosium and other heavy rare earths needed for high-performance magnets, the segment in which Chinese concentration

is hardest to displace. The intervention demonstrates that diversification policy is no longer confined to grants and loans. Governments also care who can influence boards, delay transactions, access information or benefit from public support. A mine may sit within an allied jurisdiction and still fail the emerging definition of an allied supply chain if its control, financing or offtake creates a competing strategic dependency.

Private capital is beginning to place the same geopolitical value on established allied production. EQ Resources Limited (ASX: EQR), which operates the Mt Carbine tungsten mine in Queensland and the Barruecopardo mine in Spain, [announced](#) on July 20 that Wonongarra, an investment vehicle wholly owned by Australian mining entrepreneur Andrew Forrest, would acquire Oaktree Capital Management's entire holding of 862.1 million shares and 35.6 million options. The position represents approximately 16.8 per cent of EQ Resources' issued capital and was valued at about A\$189.7 million at the previous closing price; the company's shares rose by more than 34 per cent when the transaction was disclosed. EQ Resources said the change of cornerstone shareholder would not alter its strategy, management or day-to-day operations. The strategic signal is nevertheless clear: capital is attaching a security premium to operating Western tungsten capacity, not merely to undeveloped deposits. Forrest's investment is not a grant, stockpile purchase or government offtake, but it responds to the same scarcity created by concentrated Chinese supply and the search for production that already exists inside allied jurisdictions.

Producer countries are asserting a different form of control. A [proposed revision](#) of the Democratic Republic of the Congo's mining law would amend more than 40 articles, expand state powers over minerals designated strategic or reserved, create scope for strategic stockpiles, strengthen local-content and community obligations and increase penalties. Industry

representatives have warned that a rapid process and uncertain rules could weaken investor confidence, while [President Félix Tshisekedi](#) has urged revenue authorities to avoid enforcement that undermines legal certainty. The tension is not peculiar to Congo. Governments that supply cobalt, copper or rare earths have watched consuming nations deploy subsidies, stockpiles and export restrictions in the name of security; they are responding by seeking greater control over rents, processing and destination. Western diversification strategies will therefore have to offer credible local value creation, not merely replace Chinese buyers with Western ones.

China is also steering its own industrial base with more discrimination than a simple policy of maximum production. From September 1, 2026, Beijing will impose a 2 per cent [consumption tax](#) on lithium primary batteries and lithium-ion batteries, rising to 4 per cent in September 2027; solar cells will face a 2 per cent tax from April 2027 and 4 per cent a year later. Sodium-ion batteries, solid-state batteries, fuel cells and specified advanced solar technologies will remain exempt through 2028. The structure is a map of policy preference. Mature sectors that have accumulated excess capacity begin to bear a fiscal cost, while technologies Beijing wants to commercialise receive additional room to scale. This is not retreat from clean-technology industrial policy but an attempt to shift capital from commoditised volume into the next generation of products. Western governments focused narrowly on matching subsidies for today's lithium-ion and solar supply chains risk competing against the installed Chinese system while Beijing is already shaping the successor system.

The [temporary Chinese ban](#) on helium exports, effective July 10, offers an important qualification to the weaponisation narrative. Helium is indispensable to semiconductor manufacturing, scientific equipment and several defence and

medical applications, but China imports roughly 85 per cent of its own requirements. Qatar supplies more than half of Chinese imports and about one-third of global supply, making the Middle East conflict and transport disruption a direct threat to Chinese availability. Restricting re-exports is therefore primarily defensive inventory management rather than an attempt to exploit Chinese dominance. Yet its international effect may be less modest than China's limited production share suggests. China has become an important [transit route](#) for Russian helium entering Europe since the European Union prohibited direct Russian helium imports, meaning the ban closes an indirect supply channel while Qatari and Russian supply is also under strain. The episode shows how conflict can propagate through overlooked inputs. Sulphur, aluminium and helium disruptions arising around the Strait of Hormuz can affect mineral processing, chipmaking and fertiliser production far beyond the energy market, widening the list of materials governments may decide to reserve.

The fortnight's events thus mark a transition from diversification as a general ambition to allocation as the central political problem. Chinese licences allocate scarce exports among foreign customers. American, Canadian, Japanese and European offtakes allocate non-Chinese production before it reaches an open market. Defence contracts allocate material to strategic uses; stockpiles allocate protection across time; investment reviews allocate control; and Chinese tax exemptions allocate future capital among technologies. Each instrument is individually defensible. In aggregate, however, they are replacing a global commodity market with overlapping systems of managed access. That evolution may improve security for the best-financed countries while raising costs for smaller allies and making producer governments more determined to retain value at home.

China's advantage is therefore not simply geological abundance or low-cost processing. It is the ability to coordinate trade policy, industrial finance, domestic pricing, technology priorities and downstream manufacturing across the chain. The Western response is now large enough to create real mines, refineries and magnet plants, but not yet coherent enough to prevent allied bidding wars or guarantee that each new tonne reaches the manufacturing system that financed it. The recurring CMR proposition that national security has moved downstream now requires a refinement: downstream security is an allocation problem as much as a capacity problem. The International Energy Agency's [\\$6.5 trillion estimate](#) should be read less as a prediction of catastrophe than as a measure of the leverage produced by that institutional gap. The decisive question is no longer whether the United States, Europe, Japan, Canada and Australia will spend money on critical minerals; they already are. It is whether they can treat one another's processing plants, customers and stockpiles as components of a shared industrial system before national competition reproduces the fragmentation that Chinese controls are designed to exploit.

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- July 22, 2026 – Lynas says China's export curbs pushing up costs of Malaysia expansion ([Source](#))
- July 21, 2026 – America Cannot Order a Supply Chain into Existence ([Source](#))
- July 20, 2026 – USA Rare Earth Announces Leadership Transition ([Source](#))
- July 20, 2026 – Dr Andrew Forrest A0 to Acquire a 16.8% Interest in EQ Resources from Oaktree ([Source](#))
- July 17, 2026 – Lynas' Pentagon Rare-Earth Supply Deal Draws Malaysia Scrutiny ([Source](#))
- July 17, 2026 – Rare-earth costs surge over 20% for Japanese firms, survey shows ([Source](#))
- July 17, 2026 – China to levy consumption tax on lithium-ion batteries and solar cells ([Source](#))
- July 16, 2026 – China's rare earth curbs endanger \$6.5 trillion of Western industry, IEA says ([Source](#))
- July 16, 2026 – The U.S. Is Trampling Allies in the Global Hunt for Rare Earths ([Source](#))
- July 15, 2026 – China and the new era of critical minerals diplomacy ([Source](#))
- July 14, 2026 – Congo's planned mining law reform could dent investor confidence, industry warns ([Source](#))
- July 13, 2026 – EV battery recycling has a math problem ([Source](#))
- July 13, 2026 – Nexon Geochem And Russia's Giredmet Forge Rare Earth Partnership ([Source](#))
- July 13, 2026 – Australia Curbs Rights of China Investors in Rare-Earths Miner ([Source](#))
- July 10, 2026 – China issues temporary ban on helium exports as Iran war weighs on chip supply chain ([Source](#))
- July 9, 2026 – Australia Agrees to Sell Uranium to India During Modi Visit ([Source](#))

- July 9, 2026 – China Is Weaponizing Fertilizer Against American Farmers ([Source](#))
- July 9, 2026 – China now has 7 of world's 10 biggest banks as Beijing's financial ambitions grow ([Source](#))
- July 9, 2026 – Rio Tinto steps back from one of the world's biggest critical minerals projects as Malawi targets U.S. supply chains ([Source](#))
- July 8, 2026 – US Defense Agency Seeks to Buy Up to \$300 Million of Lithium ([Source](#))
- July 8, 2026 – Rare earths from Trump-backed US mines sold to Asia ([Source](#))
- July 8, 2026 – Chip worker shortage puts U.S. semiconductor boom on the brink ([Source](#))
- July 7, 2026 – Canada bets \$400M on B.C. critical minerals in push to strengthen domestic supply chains ([Source](#))
- July 7, 2026 – Canada tells UAE it is not ready for its C\$70bn investment ([Source](#))
- July 6, 2026 – Chinese companies use rare earths ban to squeeze out foreign rivals ([Source](#))
- July 6, 2026 – Corporate Japan's rare-earth warnings get louder as China keeps the spigot closed ([Source](#))
- July 6, 2026 – Malaysian lawmakers to hold hearing on Lynas-U.S. rare earths deal ([Source](#))
- July 6, 2026 – French firm Carester to build rare earths separation plant in Malaysia's Perak ([Source](#))
- July 6, 2026 – Australia's Lynas, South Korea's JS Link sign deal for Malaysia magnet factory ([Source](#))

InvestorNews.com Media Updates:

- July 22, 2026 – Jack-in-the-Stox: Almonty and Betting on the Metal That Never Went Away <https://bit.ly/4b56lEK>
- July 21, 2026 – America Cannot Order a Supply Chain into Existence <https://bit.ly/4femnPd>

- July 21, 2026 – The Tungsten Lesson <https://bit.ly/4wTcUmf>
- July 21, 2026 – Capacity Is Not Capability <https://bit.ly/4yAleZP>
- July 20, 2026 – Germany's Automotive Reckoning and America's Industrial Illusion <https://bit.ly/4wjDHx8>
- July 20, 2026 – Lanthanum and Cerium: The Rare Earths Everyone Ignores Are the Ones America Uses the Most <https://bit.ly/3T5wqNX>
- July 18, 2026 – Malaysia: A Quiet Center of Gravity in the Next Rare Earth Supply Global Ordering <https://bit.ly/4pv1wdN>
- July 17, 2026 – China's Rare Earth Endgame: What Happens After November 10? <https://bit.ly/4ystj0f>
- July 15, 2026 – The Perception of China's Policies and Actions, and the Reality of Western Indifference <https://bit.ly/4gBPblN>
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- July 10, 2026 – What Makes a Material Critical? <https://bit.ly/4f9Nf1k>

- July 10, 2026 – Why China's Rare Earth Magnet Advantage Is Difficult to Replicate <https://bit.ly/4vXJTpC>
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- July 06, 2026 – The Mine to Magnet Rare Earths Mania <https://bit.ly/44a20wh>

InvestorNews (YouTube) Interview Updates:

- July 21, 2026 – Nord Precious Metals Builds a New Silver Strategy at Gowganda <https://youtu.be/g8JSqgysy0w>
- July 20, 2026 – Quantum Critical Metals Targets Critical Minerals Recovery from Mica <https://youtu.be/-XXYl8N7Hog>
- July 17, 2026 – American Rare Earths Advances Its U.S. Mine-to-Magnet Strategy <https://youtu.be/tqVVZva8jg8>
- July 17, 2026 – First Phosphate's C\$17.7 Million Raise Shifts Focus to Execution https://youtu.be/T9oRm0_onRA
- July 10, 2026 – Jack Lifton with Pat Ryan on Ucore Leading the Western Rare Earths Separation Race https://youtu.be/sy0bT_dHqoA
- July 09, 2026 – Fox Tungsten Advances One of the World's Highest-Grade Tungsten Projects as Market Fundamentals Strengthen <https://youtu.be/QZoluuajB4o>
- July 07, 2026 – CMR Podcast: Why Industrial Expertise Is Becoming the West's Greatest Critical Minerals Asset <https://youtu.be/P5WYH08u9rg>
- July 06, 2026 – Australian Rare Earths Targets a New Generation of Ionic Clay Rare Earths Production in Australia <https://youtu.be/VYl5xtBEYkQ>

InvestorNews.com News Release Updates:

- July 22, 2026 – Element One’s Magnesium Project Supports the Onshoring of North American Critical Mineral Supply Chains <https://bit.ly/45fZ3dT>
- July 22, 2026 – Volta Enters Agreement to Acquire Remaining 20% Interest of Its Flagship Springer Rare Earth and Gallium Deposit in Ontario, Canada <https://bit.ly/4yRX5yf>
- July 22, 2026 – Renforth Resources Updates Victoria Polymetallic Drill Program and Parbec Gold Deposit <https://bit.ly/4vJ9otS>
- July 21, 2026 – Media Advisory – Neo Performance Materials Inc. Second Quarter 2026 Earnings Release & Conference Call <https://bit.ly/4hr7Cdb>
- July 21, 2026 – Trinity One Metals Identifies Historic High Grade Silver Intercepts at Silver-1 Including 2.60 m at 1,240 g/t Silver <https://bit.ly/4pwZeuA>
- July 21, 2026 – Volta Extends Land Position at Springer Top-10* North American Rare Earth Deposit; Historical Drilling on New Ground Returns up to 1.97% TREO – Remains Open for Expansion <https://bit.ly/3Tg3NgW>
- July 20, 2026 – Grid Metals Enters Into Joint Venture Agreement with Avenir Minerals for Falcon West Cesium Project <https://bit.ly/4fvq6Xy>
- July 20, 2026 – Quantum Critical Metals Strengthens Technical Leadership with Appointment of Dr. Rob Bowell to Board of Directors and as Chair of International Technical Advisory Council (ITAC) <https://bit.ly/4pxqx8g>
- July 20, 2026 – American Rare Earths Appoints Andrew Conover as Chief Development Officer <https://bit.ly/4fu97EV>
- July 17, 2026 – Voyageur Pharmaceuticals Announces the Engagement of Red Cloud Securities as Market Maker <https://bit.ly/4vCTUHy>
- July 17, 2026 – Resolution Secures White House FAST-41

Transparency Coverage for Golden Gate Tungsten-Gold Target
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- July 16, 2026 – Scandium Canada Provides Activities Update on Alloy Commercialization, Crater Lake Drilling, and Record Q3 Financial Results <https://bit.ly/3RIJFUE>
- July 16, 2026 – Oreterra Starts Drill Camp Construction at the Trek South Porphyry Copper-Gold Prospect, Golden Triangle, BC <https://bit.ly/4pnMIxz>
- July 16, 2026 – American Tungsten Advances Metallurgical and Infrastructure Studies at the IMA Mine <https://bit.ly/4fCWUyS>
- July 16, 2026 – Spartan Metals Expands Past-Producing Tungstania Mine Mineralization Footprint More Than 13-Fold, Defining 5.7 km² of Tungsten-Silver Veins with Assays up to 5.18% W03 <https://bit.ly/4vEoLnF>
- July 15, 2026 – Nord Precious Metals to Present in the Emerging Growth Virtual Conference at 11:25 am ET July 16, 2026 <https://bit.ly/4ylNpf3>
- July 15, 2026 – American Tungsten Corp. Announces Results of Annual General and Special Meeting of Shareholders and Provides Management Update <https://bit.ly/4foECjN>
- July 15, 2026 – Nord Precious Metals to Participate in CEM's 100th Capital Event, Presented in Partnership with TMX Group <https://bit.ly/4w8YEPA>
- July 15, 2026 – Power Metallic reports New Lion drill intercepts of 36.42 Meters of 2.83% CuEqRec1 in Hole 26-116 including 6.00 Meters of 12.38% CuEqRec1 and Announces AGSM Meeting Results <https://bit.ly/4bp0eLA>
- July 14, 2026 – Western Uranium & Vanadium Provides Update on Mill License Application <https://bit.ly/3RcRhhu>
- July 14, 2026 – Antimony Resources Corp. (ATMY) (ATMYF) (K8J0) Appoints Former Director and Professor of the United States Military Academy as Advisory to the Board of Directors <https://bit.ly/4wHnFrR>

- July 13, 2026 – Homerun Resources Inc. Formally Included in “Programa Desenvolve” Tax Incentive Program to Support Industrial Development and Economic Integration in the State of Bahia, Brazil <https://bit.ly/44r4kiA>
- July 13, 2026 – Deep Sea Minerals Corp. Commissions Documentary-Style Video on the Deep Sea Mining Industry <https://bit.ly/4fvMvoK>
- July 13, 2026 – Nord Precious Metals Outlines Gold Potential Along the Ridout-Tyrrell Corridor at Castle-Gowganda <https://bit.ly/4wD8QXd>
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- July 9, 2026 – Homerun Resources Inc. Confirms Optimized +4N Purification Plant Pathway and Advances CAPEX Configurations for the SME High-Purity Silica <https://bit.ly/3Tbm27b>
- July 9, 2026 – Renforth Resources Commences Drill Program On Wholly Owned Victoria Ni/Cu/Co Polymetallic Open Pit Deposit In Quebec <https://bit.ly/44kysw2>
- July 8, 2026 – Neo Performance Materials Raises Full-Year 2026 Adjusted EBITDA Guidance <https://bit.ly/3SQi43W>
- July 8, 2026 – Homerun Resources Inc. Announces up to \$15 Million Convertible Security Financing with Lind Partners Under Engagements with Benchmark/Stonex <https://bit.ly/4friR3T>
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- July 8, 2026 – Discovery of Niobium-Rare Earth Carbonatite System Identified at Overland Project <https://bit.ly/4f5KJte>
- July 7, 2026 – Stakeholder Launches Next Phase of Growth


at Ballarat: Class 3 Permit Application Filed to Unlock Expanded Drilling in the Heart of Yukon's White Gold District <https://bit.ly/4p5aA90>

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- July 7, 2026 – Allied Critical Metals Confirms New High-Grade Tungsten Mineralization at the Venise Breccia with 13 Metres of 1.00% W03 including 3 Metres of 4.15% W03 <https://bit.ly/4h4Myca>
- July 6, 2026 – West High Yield Resources Announces Extension of Current Private Placement Offering <https://bit.ly/4gqXZL9>
- July 6, 2026 – Deep Sea Minerals Corp. Signs MOU with Impossible Metals to Evaluate Autonomous Robotic Nodule Collection Technology <https://bit.ly/4vZddf6>
- July 6, 2026 – Antimony Resources Corp. (ATMY) (ATMYF) (K8J0) Reports High-Grade Assays of Up To 33.40% Antimony (Sb) At Its Bald Hill Antimony Deposit <https://bit.ly/4aE7MtL>



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