

The Critical Minerals Report (02.09.2026): Project Vault and the West's Scramble for Rare Earths and Price Power

written by Tracy Hughes | February 9, 2026

The past two weeks have laid bare a quickening scramble for control of critical minerals. In Brazil, officials touted the nation's status as holding the world's second-largest, rare earth reserves, as the United States and China jostle for access and the European Union increasingly joins the fray. Domestic Brazilian mining ventures, flush with ionic clay rare earth deposits, are urging Brasília to back homegrown processing and value-add projects. Indeed, companies have sought government and multilateral support to develop Brazilian critical minerals infrastructure, aiming to convert buried wealth into industrial strength. That imperative has only grown as foreign powers circle: a Financial Times report notes the US, EU, and China are all eyeing Brazil's rare earth bounty. In a sign of how geopolitics and industry intertwine, Washington just agreed to finance Brazil's first rare earth oxides producer – privately-held Mineração Serra Verde – with a \$565 million package and even an option to take an equity stake [\[Source\]](#). The deal, announced by U.S. Vice President JD Vance, comes as part of a broader push to create a “preferential trade bloc” for critical minerals and establish price floors to counter China's market sway [\[Source\]](#). Serra Verde's heavy rare earth mine, now ramping up output, offers a Western alternative to Chinese supply chains, especially after the firm cut short its processing contracts with China to free up output for new buyers. By bankrolling Serra Verde's expansion, the U.S. is effectively

buying a foothold in Brazil's rare earth sector – and by extension, tilting the global balance of these strategic elements back toward the Americas.

Parallel efforts to fortify non-Chinese supply networks unfolded across multiple fronts. In Washington, a high-profile **Critical Minerals Ministerial** convened delegations from 54 countries to coordinate strategy [\[Source\]](#). As part of that summit, the United States inked a flurry of bilateral agreements – *11 new critical-mineral accords* – including a framework with the United Arab Emirates to accelerate secure supply chains [\[Source\]](#). Under that UAE–US framework, American strategic stockpiles and Emirati reserves will be leveraged to speed up production and processing, buttressed by public-private investment to expand refining capacity [\[Source\]](#). The message: supply security is a shared priority. A similar Memorandum of Understanding was signed with the United Kingdom to “intensify cooperative efforts” in mining and processing, aligning economic policy tools and coordinated investment to build diversified, resilient markets [\[Source\]](#). Across the Atlantic, Canada's western provinces and northern territories struck their own pact – a **Western Canada Critical Minerals Strategy** – pledging to make the region a global hub of sustainable critical mineral development and to co-invest in infrastructure for new mines and processing plants [\[Source\]](#). And in North America's southern flank, the U.S. and Mexico rolled out a 60-day action plan to harmonize critical mineral trade policies, including exploring *border-adjusted price floors* for imports [\[Source\]](#). This U.S.-Mexico plan will identify specific mining and processing projects for joint support, aiming to shore up vulnerable supply chains without explicitly naming China. Taken together, these alliances – from London to Abu Dhabi to Mexico City – underscore a rapidly coalescing Western front in the minerals race.

No initiative, however, has drawn as much debate as Washington's

flirtation with price controls. In early February, Vice President Vance stood before ministers in D.C. and floated a bold vision: a critical minerals trading bloc “protected from external disruptions through enforceable price floors” [\[Source\]](#). Under this plan, allied nations would jointly guarantee minimum prices for key minerals at each stage of production, preventing state-subsidized competitors from undercutting producers and then “jacking up prices to a completely unfair level” later [\[Source\]](#). The price floors would be upheld via adjustable tariffs, effectively insulating mines and refiners within the bloc from the boom-bust swings of a China-dominated market. It was a striking proposal – but one that came just days after signs of internal hesitation. On January 29, Reuters reported that the Trump administration was quietly stepping back from plans to fix minimum prices for U.S. projects, citing lack of congressional funding and the complexity of setting fair benchmarks [\[Source\]](#). At a closed-door meeting with mining executives, officials bluntly said companies must prove financially viable *without* government props: “We’re not here to prop you guys up... Don’t come to us expecting that,” a Department of Energy official was quoted as saying [\[Source\]](#). Instead, Washington indicated it might use trade tools – such as Section 232 tariffs – to impose broader market-wide price floors on imports [\[Source\]](#). That nuance suggests a pivot from individual backstops (company deals like one granted last year to MP Materials) to a collective mechanism via a trade alliance. Allies appear amenable: prior to Vance’s February pitch, Group of Seven partners had been discussing joint price-support measures of their own [\[Source\]](#). Australia, for one, took the U.S. wavering in stride. Canberra’s resources minister affirmed that America’s retreat from guaranteeing prices “won’t stop Australia pursuing our critical minerals strategic reserve programme” [\[Source\]](#). **Australia is plowing ahead with a A\$1.2 billion strategic stockpile – prioritizing metals like**

antimony, gallium and rare earth elements – and even contemplating its own price-floor schemes through offtake agreements [Source]. By week's end, it appeared the U.S. had not fully abandoned the concept so much as re-scoped it: the preferential trade zone floated by Vice President JD Vance would shift price support from a unilateral backstop to a multilateral framework, enforced through coordinated trade measures rather than direct subsidies. Whether the proposal ultimately hardens into policy or remains diplomatic signaling, Washington's posture—seeking to catalyze new mines while resisting the perception of underwriting them—highlights the narrow path between industrial strategy and market discipline.

We also spoke with Critical Minerals Institute (CMI) Co-Chair Jack Lifton in an interview whose title stands on its own: *Trump's Critical Minerals "Project Vault": Jack Lifton Calls It "Theater"* <https://bit.ly/4a8RZ4U>

Even as governments hash out rules and alliances, industry players are repositioning for this new era. In a notable reset of the electric-vehicle supply chain, automaker **Stellantis N.V.** (NYSE: STLA) agreed to sell its entire 49% stake in a Canadian battery plant joint venture to partner **LG Energy Solution Ltd.** (KRX: 373220) – for a nominal \$100 [\[Source\]](#). The Windsor, Ontario "NextStar Energy" factory, a C\$5 billion investment launched in 2022 to supply EV batteries, will now be wholly owned by LG, which says it will repurpose the site to focus on energy storage systems while continuing to supply Stellantis and other automakers. Stellantis, for its part, is taking a massive €22.2 billion charge and scaling back its EV ambitions amid faltering demand [\[Source\]](#). That demand slump is directly tied to politics: EV sales have stagnated after the Trump administration scrapped consumer purchase incentives last year [\[Source\]](#). The Stellantis-LG disentanglement thus signals a strategic retreat – one accelerated by shifting U.S. policy – even as overall

battery investment in North America remains high. Meanwhile, in the energy sector, a new dynamic is unfolding at the intersection of digital infrastructure and power supply. **NextEra Energy, Inc.** (NYSE: NEE), the largest U.S. utility, revealed it is in advanced talks to deliver up to 9 *gigawatts* of electricity to data centers by expanding its nuclear fleet [\[Source\]](#). With Big Tech's ravenous data centers driving U.S. power demand to record highs, NextEra has even moved to restart a previously shuttered reactor (Iowa's Duane Arnold plant) to serve Google's servers [\[Source\]](#). On an investor call, NextEra said it could add about 6 GW of new nuclear – potentially including small advanced reactors on existing sites – and is considering *greenfield* sites for more, all aimed at tech clients [\[Source\]](#). **This marks a revival of nuclear energy's fortunes, framed not only as a clean energy move but as critical infrastructure for the information age.** It's no coincidence that the U.S. Department of Energy is simultaneously hustling to rebuild the nuclear fuel supply chain. On January 28, DOE invited states to host new "Nuclear Lifecycle Innovation Campuses" – essentially one-stop hubs for uranium enrichment, fuel fabrication, reprocessing and even advanced reactor deployment – in a bid to modernize the full nuclear fuel cycle domestically [\[Source\]](#). Energy Secretary Chris Wright cast it as unleashing a "next American nuclear renaissance" to meet future power needs and regain technological leadership [\[Source\]](#). Yet even as the administration promotes nuclear growth, investigative reports reveal it has also been quietly loosening safety rules to speed things along. NPR broke the news that last year the Department of Energy **secretly rewrote** its nuclear safety and security directives, "**slashing hundreds of pages of detailed requirements**" and replacing them with vaguer standards that give reactor developers more leeway [\[Source\]](#). This stealth deregulation – done without public announcement – was intended to fast-track an experimental fleet of reactors for AI data centers and other uses. Watchdogs like

the Union of Concerned Scientists warn that gutting decades-old safeguards in the name of expedience is a risky gambit [\[Source\]](#). For the companies poised to benefit, however, time is of the essence: the race to build next-generation nuclear (and secure the uranium to fuel it) is now part and parcel of the critical minerals contest, intersecting with the tech industry's hunger for reliable, carbon-free power.

Commodity markets have registered these strategic undercurrents in real time. **Copper**, often dubbed "Dr. Copper" for its economic barometer role, suddenly spiked to an **all-time high** above \$14,000 per metric ton in late January [\[Source\]](#). In a single session, LME copper jumped 11% – the biggest one-day leap in 15 years – hitting \$14,527 before profit-taking pulled it back to a still-record \$13,612 [\[Source\]](#). Traders described a frenzy of speculative buying, stoked by expectations of robust demand from electrification and data infrastructure, plus a weaker U.S. dollar and a backdrop of geopolitical tension. The rally defied soft physical demand in China (Chinese copper premiums have sunk to two-year lows) and high inventory levels in U.S. warehouses [\[Source\]](#), suggesting financial flows – perhaps betting on longer-term supply tightness – drove the surge. Analysts noted a "dilemma for investors" as such prices far outstrip current fundamentals [\[Source\]](#). By contrast, **tungsten**, a niche but vital metal, has been on a more fundamentally driven tear. Prices for tungsten's main intermediate, ammonium paratungstate (APT), rocketed to record highs around \$1,125 per metric ton unit in China and \$1,100 in Europe [\[Source\]](#). The catalyst is clear: China, which produces the lion's share of the world's tungsten, imposed export controls a year ago that have slashed its overseas shipments by ~40% [\[Source\]](#). With ex-China production fragmentary and unable to fill the gap, consumers from aerospace to tooling are scrambling for supplies in what was already a tight market [\[Source\]](#). "There are a lot of reasons for tungsten

to go up,” one trader noted – strong demand from defense and industrial sectors, declining ore grades at mines, and on top of that, China’s export permits squeezing availability [\[Source\]](#). Beijing recently moved to centralize tungsten export licensing to just 15 companies, reinforcing an expectation that overseas buyers will face continued scarcity [\[Source\]](#). The tungsten pinch illustrates how export policy is now a strategic lever – a mirror image of Western stockpiling or trade agreements – with immediate impacts on prices. Each spike in these markets, whether speculative or supply-driven, underscores the stakes: critical minerals can swing wildly in value when nations and investors play tug-of-war with access.

As the U.S. retools its own supply lines, it is also striking new deals to “friend-shore” minerals from abroad. On January 29, Washington signed a reciprocal trade agreement with El Salvador that, for the first time, opens the tiny country’s mining sector to U.S. companies [\[Source\]](#). **El Salvador had banned metals mining for years on environmental grounds, but under President Nayib Bukele the ban was lifted in 2024, and now a 10-year critical minerals pact is on the table.** The deal will allow U.S. firms to explore for and extract lithium, rare earths and more in El Salvador, with the Salvadoran side agreeing to provide necessary energy and infrastructure support on terms at least as favorable as those offered to other investors [\[Source\]](#). In return, El Salvador gains better access to U.S. markets and a commitment of U.S. collaboration on export controls and defense trade [\[Source\]](#). Bukele hailed it as the Western Hemisphere’s first “reciprocal trade” deal of its kind, emphasizing it aligns his country with U.S. standards on everything from vehicle emissions to mineral sourcing [\[Source\]](#). Farther afield in Africa, a major coup was announced: the **Democratic Republic of Congo** will ship 100,000 metric tons of copper to the United States this year from its Chinese-operated Tenke Fungurume mine [\[Source\]](#). The

arrangement, coordinated via DRC's state miner Gécamines, essentially redirects a chunk of Congolese copper – currently produced under Chinese investment – toward U.S. supply chains. Congolese officials cast it as part of a plan to diversify partnerships and strengthen ties with Washington [\[Source\]](#). The move is telling: for years China has had a lock on DRC's copper-cobalt output through long-term deals, but now Kinshasa is leveraging that output as a bargaining chip with the West. It mirrors an overall “friend-shoring” strategy where the U.S. is using offtake agreements and financing to pry resources away from China's orbit [\[Source\]](#). Indeed, a new **U.S.-Africa minerals strategy** seems to be emerging. At the D.C. ministerial, African mining powers – from Morocco and Guinea (key bauxite sources) to Zambia and the DRC (copper-cobalt) – were prominently represented [\[Source\]](#). And in Latin America, a quiet realignment is afoot: **Bolivia's** new government just **cancel**ed a \$350 million zinc smelter contract that had been awarded to a Chinese consortium, citing “terrible overpricing,” and is demanding a Chinese firm remedy serious flaws at a recently built steel mill [\[Source\]](#). The Bolivian mining minister bluntly said Chinese partners failed to meet commitments and that “China's prestige is at stake” in these projects [\[Source\]](#). La Paz's pivot reflects not only frustration with project performance but a broader openness to non-Chinese investors; officials there hinted they want to court companies from Canada and Australia to replace “looting” deals with more equitable partnerships [\[Source\]](#). Even U.S. allies are diversifying supply: Canada is reportedly close to finalizing a *C\$3 billion (~\$2.8 billion) uranium supply agreement* with India, a ten-year deal likely to be signed in March when Prime Minister Mark Carney visits New Delhi [\[Source\]](#). That pact would secure a new long-term export market for Canadian uranium (beyond its traditional buyers like the U.S.), while helping India fuel its expanding nuclear reactor fleet. It shows that critical mineral diplomacy isn't strictly a West-vs.-

China game; it increasingly involves a mosaic of bilateral tie-ups linking resource-rich nations with high-tech and energy-importing economies across the globe.

All these strands – geopolitical deals, corporate shifts, market gyrations – weave into a common narrative: the world's industrial powers are repositioning supply chains in real time, and the critical minerals sector is in the throes of rapid strategic change. A few years ago, China's dominance in rare earths, battery metals, and processing capacity seemed unassailable. Now, each week brings announcements aimed at chipping away at that dominance, whether through U.S.-led alliances, huge public-private investments, or policy gambits like stockpiling and price floors. (Notably, President Trump is launching a \$12 billion strategic mineral reserve called "*Project Vault*," pairing \$1.67 billion in private capital with a \$10 billion Export-Import Bank loan to procure and store supplies of cobalt, gallium and more [\[Source\]](#). The idea is to buffer U.S. manufacturers against supply shocks and reduce vulnerability to Chinese export bans [\[Source\]](#).) It is an environment of both unprecedented collaboration among allies and fierce competition between rival spheres of influence. For investors and industry professionals, the implications are profound. We are likely to see continued government intervention – in financing, regulation and trade – as well as heightened market volatility whenever policy shifts catch the market by surprise. But in the medium term, these maneuvers could begin to alleviate the West's import dependence. New production projects from Saskatchewan to South Africa may get the political tailwinds they need, while once-skeptical financiers take comfort in guaranteed offtakes or insurance-like price floors. Already, rare earth magnet factories are springing up outside China, and idled mines (for instance in the U.S. and Australia) are being reconsidered for reopening. In short, the critical

minerals ecosystem is being rewired. And the coming months will test how effectively the emerging partnerships and initiatives can translate talk into tonnage – and whether the delicate balance of market forces and government support can ultimately deliver the stable, diversified critical mineral supplies that the green and digital transitions demand. All that is certain is that the race is on and accelerating fast.

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**InvestorNews Critical Minerals Institute (CMI) Directorial
Headline Picks for the Past Two Week:**

- February 7, 2026 – The three-way race for Brazil’s rare earths heats up ([Source](#))
- February 6, 2026 – UAE and US sign critical minerals and rare earths framework ([Source](#))
- February 6, 2026 – Stellantis selling its stake of Ontario battery factory to South Korea’s LG Energy Solution ([Source](#))
- February 5, 2026 – US provides rare earths miner Serra Verde with \$565 million financing, stake option ([Source](#))
- February 5, 2026 – UK and US sign Memorandum of Understanding on critical minerals ([Source](#))
- February 4, 2026 – US proposes critical minerals trade bloc aimed at countering China ([Source](#))
- February 4, 2026 – US, Mexico to develop coordinated trade policies on critical minerals ([Source](#))
- February 4, 2026 – Vance says US will establish price floor system for critical minerals ([Source](#))
- February 4, 2026 – US nuclear power regulator plans changes in line with Trump’s goals on reactors ([Source](#))

- February 2, 2026 – Trump to Launch \$12 Billion Critical Mineral Stockpile to Blunt Reliance on China ([Source](#))
- February 1, 2026 – Canada Nears \$3 Billion Uranium Deal With India, May Be Inked In March ([Source](#))
- February 1, 2026 – US, UK, EU, Australia and more to meet to discuss critical minerals alliance ([Source](#))
- January 30, 2026 – Australia says US price floor backdown won't derail its critical minerals strategy ([Source](#))
- January 29, 2026 – US moves away from critical mineral price floors, sources say ([Source](#))
- January 29, 2026 – US to Seek Rare Earth Price Mechanism During Meetings With Allies, Official Says ([Source](#))
- January 29, 2026 – Tungsten rises to record highs as export curbs turn up supply heat ([Source](#))
- January 29, 2026 – Copper hits record high above \$14,000 as speculators pile in ([Source](#))
- January 29, 2026 – US, El Salvador sign trade agreement to boost critical minerals investment ([Source](#))
- January 29, 2026 – DR Congo set to export 100,000 tons of copper from Chinese-run mines to the United States ([Source](#))
- January 29, 2026 – Critical minerals projects in Brazil seek governments support ([Source](#))
- January 28, 2026 – The U.S. at a Strategic Crossroads with China – and the Industrial Policy Lifeline (and Relationships) That Could Save Us. ([Source](#))
- January 28, 2026 – Department of Energy announces new efforts to boost nuclear fuel supply chain ([Source](#))
- January 28, 2026 – The Trump administration has secretly rewritten nuclear safety rules ([Source](#))
- January 27, 2026 – Bolivia Cancels Chinese Zinc Project, Demands Steel Plant Fixes ([Source](#))
- January 27, 2026 – NextEra eyes nuclear power expansion as data center pipeline grows ([Source](#))

- January 27, 2026 – Western provinces and territories sign pact to develop critical minerals strategy ([Source](#))
- January 26, 2026 – US–China mineral race heats up as Africa’s top mining nations head to Washington ([Source](#))

InvestorNews.com Media Updates:

- February 8, 2026 – Follow the Money: The U.S. Government Funding Hit List for Critical Minerals Companies (2023–2026) <https://bit.ly/4cfe9Fb>
- January 28, 2026 – The U.S. at a Strategic Crossroads with China – and the Industrial Policy Lifeline (and Relationships) That Could Save Us. <https://bit.ly/4riWoJx>

InvestorNews (YouTube) Interview Updates:

- February 04, 2026 – Trump’s Critical Minerals “Project Vault”: Jack Lifton Calls It “Theater” <https://youtu.be/uN3-WYNQouc>
- February 03, 2026 – Jack Lifton with Guy Bourassa on North America’s Largest Primary Source of Scandium https://youtu.be/knaZ59En_es
- February 03, 2026 – How Wicheeda’s Progress Positions Defense Metals in the Global Rare Earth Supply Chain – Mark Tory with Jack Lifton <https://youtu.be/IG5b04nh7B0>
- February 02, 2026 – CMI Masterclass: The Global Economic War for Rare Earths <https://youtu.be/UzX6KNCzgao>
- February 02, 2026 – Homerun’s 582-Hectare Bet: Turning a Brazilian Silica District Into a Solar-Glass Stronghold <https://youtu.be/lC7TygYFADM>
- January 29, 2026 – The Critical Minerals Blind Spot Between Washington and Canada <https://youtu.be/8xt2L5szvKo>
- January 27, 2026 – The Silver Market Bull Run – Silver

Bullet Mines' Peter Clausi Reveals What's Driving the Market <https://youtu.be/95olje59M-Q>

InvestorNews.com News Release Updates:

- February 6, 2026 – Oreterra Announces Engagement of Generation IACP Inc. to Provide Market Making Services and Engagement of Investing News Network to Provide Advertising and Investor Awareness Services <https://bit.ly/3NYgJWc>
- February 5, 2026 – Spartan Metal's New Land Package includes Past Producing Yellow Jacket Tungsten Mine <https://bit.ly/4ajWJVD>
- February 5, 2026 – Silver Bullet Mines Corp. Announces Major Acquisition of Two Past Producing Mines <https://bit.ly/4tySG0q>
- February 4, 2026 – Trinity One Metals Closes Acquisition of "Silver-1" Historic Silver Mine in Southern Ecuador <https://bit.ly/4a00rVi>
- February 4, 2026 – Scandium Canada Announces that Mr. Jeff Swinoga has Joined its Board of Directors as Chairman <https://bit.ly/4ti17wM>
- February 3, 2026 – Happy Creek Announces Intended Name Change to Fox Tungsten Ltd. <https://bit.ly/4abF8yL>
- February 3, 2026 – Antimony Resources Corp. (ATMY) (ATMYF) (K8J0) Discovers New Massive Stibnite Mineralization at the Marcus (West) Zone and Have Exposed the Mineralization in Bedrock over a Distance of 25 Meters <https://bit.ly/4rxcbEP>
- February 3, 2026 – Grid Metals Continues to Expand Cesium Mineralization at Falcon West <https://bit.ly/3Zh5RoN>
- February 2, 2026 – Homerun Resources Inc. Completes District Control Strategy with Purchase Agreement for 582 Hectares of Land and Surface Rights over Santa Maria

Eterna High Purity Silica Sand District, in Belmonte, Bahia, Brazil <https://bit.ly/4qWJFMW>

- January 30, 2026 – Silver Bullet Mines Corp. Announces First Payment From Arizona Operations <https://bit.ly/3M8jZgW>
- January 30, 2026 – Australian Strategic Materials Limited: Quarterly Activities Report to 31 December 2025 <https://bit.ly/4qVGR2G>
- January 29, 2026 – Romios to Commence Trading Post Consolidation as Oreterra Metals Corp. Under Ticker OTMC on Monday, February 2, 2026 <https://bit.ly/3Md9dGj>
- January 28, 2026 – Homerun Resources Inc. Announces Five-Fold Increase in Solar Glass Offtake with Sengi Solar from 20,000 to 100,000 Tonnes per Year Priced at USD 750 per Tonne <https://bit.ly/4rifLCo>
- January 28, 2026 – American Rare Earths Limited: Quarterly Activities Report for the Period Ending 31 December 2025 <https://bit.ly/4t9Y6yM>
- January 27, 2026 – Quantum Secures Claim Covering Historic Silver Workings at Babine South, British Columbia <https://bit.ly/45yAf1z>
- January 26, 2026 – West High Yield (W.H.Y.) Resources Ltd. Advances Processing Pilot Program, and Announces Permitting Advancement and Closing of Non-Brokered Private Placement <https://bit.ly/4qA2qWa>
- January 26, 2026 – Antimony Resources Corp. (ATMY) (ATMYF) (K8J0) Reports More Massive Antimony-Bearing Stibnite (“Sb”) of 5.10% Sb over 4.0 meters, 2.15% Sb over 6.85 meters and 2.38% Sb over 9.60 meters <https://bit.ly/49Fg6Jx>
- January 26, 2026 – Homerun Resources Inc. 100% Owned Subsidiary Homerun Energy Reaches Stability Breakthrough in Large-Area Perovskite Modules Retaining More than 95% Efficiency After >5000 Hours <https://bit.ly/4r5AlWs>

- January 26, 2026 – Allied Critical Metals Launches 20,000 Meter 2026 Drill Program at its Borralha Tungsten Project in Northern Portugal <https://bit.ly/3ZuV8XN>
- January 26, 2026 – Volta Intersects High-Grade Gallium Mineralization at the Springer REE Project in Ontario, Canada <https://bit.ly/3ZjvbKZ>

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The [Critical Minerals Institute](#) (CMI) is a global brain trust for the critical minerals economy, serving as a hub that connects companies, capital markets, and policymakers. Through CMI Masterclasses, the weekly *Critical Minerals Report (CMR)*, bespoke research, and board-level advisory services, CMI delivers actionable intelligence spanning exploration finance, supply chains, and geopolitics.

CMI also convenes the flagship [Annual Critical Minerals Institute Summit](#), a global gathering of government leaders, institutional investors, and industry executives. The next event, [CMI Summit V](#), themed “The New Critical Minerals Economy,” will take place **May 13–14, 2026**, in Toronto, Canada. For more information, visit CriticalMineralsInstitute.com or contact **CMI Executive Director Tracy Hughes** at +1 **647-289-7714** or tracy@criticalmineralsinstitute.com.