Quantum eMotion Corp. (TSXV: QNC | OTCQB: QNCCF) has spent the last 90–120 days acting less like a “quantum curiosity” ticker and more like a company trying to translate a physics advantage into something a CISO can budget for. The Montreal-based issuer is leaning into a thesis public markets veterans understand: post‑quantum security is moving from academic inevitability to a compliance program, and weak randomness is the kind of hidden flaw that can make even “strong” encryption unexpectedly brittle. In its own messaging, the company points to electron tunneling as the foundation of its QRNG and has even nodded to the year’s Nobel spotlight on quantum tunneling in circuits as a reminder that this isn’t marketing magic—it’s measurable quantum behavior.

September’s releases were pragmatically commercial. Through its U.S. subsidiary, QeM America, Quantum eMotion invested USD $400k in blockchain-security partner Krown Technologies via a convertible debenture, explicitly framing it as a deeper strategic collaboration rather than a one‑off pilot. Two weeks later, the partners announced completion of Qastle, a quantum‑safe hot wallet that integrates QeM’s ultrafast QRNG entropy with post‑quantum encryption to harden private‑key generation and storage against both classical threats and future quantum attacks. By early November, the companies were describing Qastle’s global launch as a commercial milestone and a first cash‑flow channel tied to the partnership—exactly the kind of phrasing that tends to separate a narrative from a business model.

The most strategically durable announcement landed September 29, when Quantum eMotion and Taiwan’s Jmem Technology unveiled plans to co-develop a full‑stack quantum‑resilient security System‑on‑Chip. The architecture is legible to anyone who has watched secure hardware evolve: combine true quantum entropy (QRNG), silicon-rooted device identity (PUF), and NIST‑aligned post‑quantum cryptography in a single CMOS‑compatible SoC. The financial-market translation is simple: if QeM can move from “entropy component” to “hardware root of trust,” it changes pricing power, integration friction, and the competitive set. October was about credibility gates and product framing. Quantum eMotion engaged Lightship Security to pursue FIPS 140‑3 validation of its Quantum Crypto Module, calling it a milestone on the road to NIST certification—the kind of checkbox that turns regulated-sector conversations from “interesting” to “send the paperwork.”

In the same period, management rolled out a refreshed brand and a broadened lineup that frames QeM as a full stack, naming software offerings like Sentry‑Q, eFlux‑Q, eCrypto‑Q, eBlock‑Q and eHot‑Q alongside a hardware roadmap that includes eCore‑Q, eCMOS‑Q, eSOC‑Q and eVault‑Q. And in a move designed to be seen by exactly the right room, the company billed itself as the exclusive Diamond Sponsor at ISC2’s Security Congress in late October.

Another motif has been “quantum security goes physical.” On October 14, Quantum eMotion, Energy Plug and Malahat Battery Technology signed a joint development agreement to integrate QeM’s QRNG-based security into energy storage and defence systems for critical infrastructure, with language that touched everything from remote installations to smart‑grid architectures. By November 13, the partners said a steering committee had already defined integration pathways to embed QeM’s QRNG chips directly into next‑generation storage systems and targeted prototype work and 2026 field trials. In December, the storyline gained a product-shaped reference point when Aegis and Quantum eMotion announced Tough Bhoy, a rugged energy solution pitched at harsh-environment and defence-adjacent use cases.

The balance sheet helps explain the pace. In late November, Quantum eMotion reported $24.7 million in cash at September 30, 2025, a cushion that can fund certification work, partnerships, and the unglamorous work of commercialization. December broadened the funnel further with an initiative with Exascale Labs to explore quantum‑secured AI compute infrastructure, participation in Quebec’s Kirq quantum communication testbed, and a U.S.-focused partnership with Greybox and Vigilant Care Monitoring tied to reimbursed senior-living care workflows and an Irvine, California footprint. The company also announced earlier today that it had became the top holding in the Defiance Quantum ETF. As of December 22, 2025, Quantum eMotion’s market cap is about C$1.12 billion and primary-source disclosures and materials may be accessed here: www.quantumemotion.com/investors. This column is informational and not a recommendation to buy or sell securities.

Over the last week the critical minerals narrative was set by a sequence of government actions, corporate financing and M&A steps, and nuclear level milestones. China confirmed the issuing of a new, streamlined category of rare earth export “general licenses” while the Chinese courts handed down 27 sentences in an antimony smuggling case. In China’s lithium hub of Yichun, local authorities signaled a mining‑license cleanup that triggered a sharp move north in domestic lithium prices. In North America, the White House reiterated that it intends to pursue more government-backed “deals” with the mining sector, Korea Zinc Co., Ltd. (KRX: 010130) advanced plans for a 7.4Bn U.S. refinery project with Washington’s support and Graphite One Inc. (TSXV: GPH; OTCQX: GPHOF) disclosed an impressive loan upgrade from the Export‑Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) Canada.

Beijing’s rare earth policy adjustment remains the most immediate operational variable for manufacturers. On December 18th, China’s Ministry of Commerce confirmed it has begun issuing “general licenses” for rare earth exports—an administrative change intended to speed approvals relative to transaction‑by‑transaction licensing. Some suppliers to Ford Motor Company (NYSE: F) were among those receiving the new license category, while EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič said European reports are still being clarified.

The licensing change is landing alongside an observable recovery in China’s outbound rare earth flows after earlier disruptions. Customs data cited by Reuters showed China’s rare earth exports rose 26.5% month‑on‑month in November to 5,493.9 metric tons, with year‑to‑date exports at 58,193.1 tons (up 11.6% year‑on‑year). That does not resolve the broader question of how quickly licenses can be expanded or narrowed by end‑use and customer category, but it does provide a near‑term indicator that the administrative pipeline is moving (Reuters).

If the rare earth story this week was “procedural acceleration,” the antimony story was “procedural enforcement.” A Chinese court imposed jail sentences and fines on 27 people for shipping antimony ingots out of the country without export licenses. Reuters reported that the case involved more than 166 metric tons of antimony, with Chinese customs seizing more than 96 tons; the main defendant, Wang Wubin, received a 12‑year sentence and a 1 million yuan fine. The ruling also underscored the post‑2024 framework: even after Beijing said it had suspended a U.S.-specific ban on exports of antimony, gallium and germanium, the materials remain subject to broader export controls requiring licenses.

China’s lithium market delivered the week’s most immediate illustration of how administrative actions can move pricing even when near‑term physical supply is not clearly impaired. Reuters reported that lithium prices in China surged after the Bureau of Natural Resources in Yichun, Jiangxi province announced plans to revoke 27 expired mining licenses. The most‑active lithium carbonate contract on the Guangzhou Futures Exchange rose as high as 109,860 yuan per metric ton intraday—its highest since June 2024—and settled up 7.61% at 108,620 yuan. Reuters noted that many of the targeted licenses were long expired and not necessarily tied to currently active producing sites, but the announcement nonetheless shifted sentiment around supply discipline in one of China’s best‑known lithium jurisdictions.

Outside China, the demand side of the battery metals complex continues to be shaped by policy choices in the auto sector—particularly in Europe. The European Commission has proposed dropping its planned 2035 ban on new internal combustion engine car sales, replacing a full zero‑emissions mandate with a framework aiming for a 90% reduction in CO₂ emissions from 2021 levels by 2035, while allowing continued production and sale of plug‑in hybrids, range extenders and other low‑emission internal combustion vehicles subject to offset mechanisms such as low‑carbon steel and sustainable fuels. The proposal still requires approval from EU member states and the European Parliament, but the policy direction introduces additional flexibility in compliance pathways and will no doubt impact interest in lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite and rare earth magnets.

In the United States, the week reinforced the extent to which critical minerals policy is now being executed through capital formation as much as regulation. On December 15th Jarrod Agen, executive director of the White House’s National Energy Dominance Council, said the Trump administration plans additional “historic deals” with the U.S. mining sector, after earlier government equity stakes in MP Materials Corp. (NYSE: MP), Lithium Americas Corp. (NYSE: LAC; TSX: LAC) and Trilogy Metals Inc. (NYSE American: TMQ; TSX: TMQ). Adding that the administration’s focus is on advancing mining initiatives in Alaska and Arizona, including a major copper project backed by Rio Tinto Group (NYSE: RIO; LSE: RIO; ASX: RIO) and BHP Group Limited (NYSE: BHP; ASX: BHP; LSE: BHP).

That policy backdrop is directly relevant to Korea Zinc Co., Ltd. (KRX: 010130), which disclosed plans to build a $7.4 billion critical minerals refinery in Tennessee this week. Reuters reported the facility is intended to produce major non‑ferrous metals (including zinc, lead and copper), precious metals, and strategic minerals including antimony, germanium and gallium, with commercial operations expected to come online progressively following construction from 2027 to 2029.

Separate coverage this week highlighted a governance overlay: MBK Partners and YoungPoong Corp. sought a court injunction to block a share‑sale plan that Korea Zinc is using to raise funds for the project, arguing the financing structure is designed to entrench management control. Media also noted Korea Zinc’s earlier agreement with Lockheed Martin Corporation (NYSE: LMT) to work toward producing germanium from non‑Chinese sources by 2028, a timeline that aligns with the longer‑dated nature of most U.S. processing buildouts.

On the financing side, Graphite One Inc. (TSX.V: GPH; OTCQX: GPHOF) said EXIM increased its non‑binding Letters of Interest to a combined $2.07 billion for the company’s proposed Alaska mine and Ohio processing/manufacturing buildout. The company reported the LoI associated with the Graphite Creek Project north of Nome, Alaska was upsized from $570 million to $670 million, while the LoI for its planned Ohio advanced graphite materials plant was upsized from $325 million to $1.4 billion, with a 15‑year tenor under EXIM’s “Make More in America” initiative. Graphite One also described a phased ramp for the Ohio plant in 25,000‑metric‑ton increments up to 100,000 metric tons per year of anode active material. The disclosures are non‑binding and the company said it expects to submit formal applications in 2026, but the scale of indicated financing is a notable marker of how U.S. policy institutions are prioritizing anode and graphite supply chains (Graphite One).

Canada’s policy messaging split into two channels: accelerating domestic project timelines while emphasizing that resource access is strategic. In a report carried by The Associated Press, Prime Minister Mark Carney warned that U.S. access to Canada’s critical resources—including critical minerals—is not “guaranteed,” even as the two countries prepare to launch formal talks in mid‑January to review the United States‑Mexico‑Canada Agreement (USMCA) ahead of its 2026 review deadline. The comment landed in a week when Ottawa and Ontario were also pushing to reduce duplication in project assessments—an indication that Canada is simultaneously trying to increase the pace of development at home while preserving leverage over how and where supply chains are anchored (AP News).

Yesterday, the Prime Minister’s Office announced a new Co‑operation Agreement between Ontario and Canada on Environmental and Impact Assessment that is intended to implement a “one project, one review” approach for major projects in Ontario, allowing either reliance on Ontario’s process or a coordinated federal‑provincial approach on a case‑by‑case basis. The release explicitly referenced the Impact Assessment Agency of Canada’s role in providing federal expertise on environmental protection and Indigenous engagement, and framed the agreement as part of a broader “Major Projects Office” agenda created under the One Canadian Economy’s Building Canada Act (in force as of June 26, 2025) (Source: Prime Minister Canada).

Ontario paired that process reform with targeted industrial funding. Through Invest Ontario, the province formally launched a C$500 million Critical Minerals Processing Fund (CMPF) on December 12th, designed to provide financial support for projects that expand processing and refining capacity and strengthen domestic supply chains. The province’s published materials emphasized keeping more value‑added processing in Ontario—explicitly positioning the fund alongside efforts tied to the Ring of Fire and Northern Ontario more broadly—and noted the CMPF was first announced in Ontario’s 2025 budget (Invest Ontario).

Corporate consolidation remained part of Canada’s week as well. Teck Resources Limited (NYSE: TECK; TSX: TECK.A; TSX: TECK.B) said it and Anglo American plc (LSE: AAL; OTCQX: NGLOY) received Government of Canada approval under the Investment Canada Act for their proposed merger of equals. Teck disclosed binding commitments including at least C$4.5 billion of spending in Canada within five years—linked to the Highland Valley Copper mine life extension, processing capacity at Trail, and advancement of the Galore Creek and Schaft Creek copper projects—with a pathway to at least C$10 billion of spending over 15 years. Teck also reiterated that completion remains subject to additional regulatory approvals in other jurisdictions (Teck Resources Limited).

The nuclear and nuclear‑fuel side of the critical materials landscape also moved materially. Reuters reported that India’s parliament approved a landmark atomic energy bill that opens the nuclear power sector to private participation, requiring private companies to obtain licenses to operate plants and allowing foreign firms to participate through partnerships with Indian companies. Reuters framed the legislation as a step toward India’s stated goal of reaching 100 gigawatts of nuclear capacity by 2047 (from roughly 8.8 gigawatts currently operated by the Nuclear Power Corporation of India).

In the United States, Urenco USA reported a fuel‑cycle milestone: it produced its first LEU+ material—uranium enriched above 5% and below 10% U‑235—completing an initial production run at 8.5% U‑235 on December 11th. World Nuclear News reported the NRC authorized Urenco USA earlier in 2025 to enrich up to 10%, and Urenco’s own release said a third new cascade of enrichment capacity is now online as part of a plan to add capacity between 2025 and 2027, ahead of expected commercial deliveries in 2026.

By Friday morning, metals pricing underscored how quickly physical‑tightness narratives can reassert themselves into year‑end. Reuters reported LME three‑month copper was up 0.5% at $11,837 per ton, close to the previous week’s record of $11,952, and up more than 35% year‑to‑date. The same Reuters report noted nickel rising to $14,770 per ton on indications Indonesia may propose a one‑third output cut next year, and aluminium at $2,943 per ton—its highest since May 2022—after South32 Limited (ASX: S32; LSE: S32; JSE: S32) announced it would place its Mozal aluminium smelter in Mozambique under care and maintenance from mid‑March 2026 following failed power‑supply negotiations. Reuters

Finally, Chile added a governance checkpoint to one of the world’s most closely watched lithium partnerships. Reuters reported on December 19th that the Comptroller’s Office will conduct an “unprecedented” audit of the lithium production agreement between Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile (Codelco) and Sociedad Química y Minera de Chile S.A. (NYSE: SQM; Santiago: SQMA), following complaints from members of parliament about process and transparency. Codelco said it would cooperate and pointed to due diligence supported by Morgan Stanley (NYSE: MS), and noted the agreement remains pending final approval from the Comptroller’s Office, alongside related lease reviews involving Corfo.

It is tempting to read these developments as a messy overlap of unrelated stories—rare earth licenses in Beijing, environmental approvals in Ontario, enrichment milestones in New Mexico, and parliamentary votes in New Delhi. But together they sketch a coherent pattern: governments are building “optionality” into mineral and energy supply chains by controlling choke points (licenses), compressing timelines (permitting reforms), and underwriting capex (public finance and equity stakes). For operators and investors, the implication is sobering but navigable. Technical execution remains necessary, but it is no longer sufficient. The investable advantage increasingly comes from anticipating where policy will create scarcity—of permits, of licenses, of financing windows—and positioning assets to be the easiest ones for governments to say “yes” to when supply chains become a matter of state.

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The Critical Minerals Report (CMR) is the Critical Minerals Institute Board of Directors’ hand-picked digest of the week’s most consequential developments. Receive each edition straight to your inbox by becoming a Critical Minerals Institute member—click here. And mark your calendars for the CMI Summit V on May 13-14, 2026, in Toronto, with the theme — The New Critical Minerals Economy.

InvestorNews Critical Minerals Institute (CMI) Directorial Headline Picks for the Week:

• December 18, 2025 – China says it is granting new, streamlined rare earth export licences (Source)
• December 18, 2025 – U.S. access to Canada’s critical minerals not ‘assured,’ Carney says (Source)
• December 18, 2025 – Urenco USA produces first LEU+ fuel (Source)
• December 18, 2025 – Indian parliament approves landmark atomic energy bill to open nuclear power to private sector (Source)
• December 18, 2025 – EXIM Bank Increases Letters of Interest for the Graphite One Supply Chain to $2.07 Billion (Source)
• December 18, 2025 – China jails smugglers of weapon metal antimony, taking tough stance on critical minerals (Source)
• December 17, 2025 – Lithium surges in China after local authorities announce plan to revoke mining licences (Source)
• December 17, 2025 – Retreat by U.S. and Europe from electric cars risks ceding race to China (Source)
• December 15, 2025 – Korea Zinc to build $7.4 billion US minerals refinery with Trump’s support (Source)
• December 15, 2025 – Teck and Anglo American receive Government of Canada approval for merger of equals under Investment Canada Act (Source)
• December 15, 2025 – White House plans more ‘historic deals’ with mining sector, official says (Source)
• December 12, 2025 – Ontario Launches $500 Million Critical Minerals Processing Fund (Source)

InvestorNews.com Media Updates:

• December 17, 2025 – Hallgarten Report: How China Controls the Cesium Supply Chain https://bit.ly/3L55pXa

InvestorNews (YouTube) Interview Updates:

• December 17, 2025 – Eight Metals, One Story: Inside Renforth’s Polymetallic Ambition https://youtu.be/5yVjqGKYPY0
• December 16, 2025 – Homerun Resources Brian Leeners on High Purity Silica in Brazil and Antimony-Free Solar Glass https://youtu.be/VMOyd-T10yQ
• December 16, 2025 – Grid Metals CEO Robin Dunbar on Record Cesium Intercepts in Manitoba https://youtu.be/_aSwDKFnSOg
• December 15, 2025 – Jack Lifton with Defense Metals’ Mark Tory on Building North America’s Rare Earth Breakout Project https://youtu.be/r1Msn6gkN2Y

InvestorNews.com News Release Updates:

• December 19, 2025 – Energy Fuels’ US-Produced “Heavy” Rare Earth Oxide Successfully Qualified for Use in Permanent Magnets https://bit.ly/3MCD239
• December 18, 2025 – Scandium Canada presents its annual review https://bit.ly/3Y0jAjd
• December 18, 2025 – American Tungsten Grants Incentive Stock Options https://bit.ly/3YBhYfX
• December 18, 2025 – Silver Bullet Mines Signs Agreement to Direct Ship Material from Major Offtake Client https://bit.ly/3KPtVLV
• December 18, 2025 – Spartan Metals Provides Encouraging Drill Assay Results for Tungstonia Tailings at its Eagle Project, Nevada https://bit.ly/4oZPHKM
• December 18, 2025 – Homerun Resources Inc. 100% Owned Subsidiary Homerun Energy SRL Recognized as Key Innovator by European Commission’s Innovation Radar https://bit.ly/4ajGpWt
• December 18, 2025 – American Tungsten Intersects Hubnerite-Scheelite Mineralization in Initial Drillhole at IMA Mine Project https://bit.ly/3L9uznx
• December 18, 2025 – Ontario Minister and Nipissing First Nation Chief Visit Volta’s Springer Rare Earth Project, Advancing Indigenous Partnership and Critical Minerals Development https://bit.ly/48N6IDm
• December 17, 2025 – Happy Creek Intercepts 1.18 m of 6.83% WO3 from 31.2 m DH Depth at the Fox Tungsten Project in British Columbia https://bit.ly/4pRXgok
• December 17, 2025 – Western Uranium & Vanadium Announces Normal Course Issuer Bid https://bit.ly/4qkpnfH
• December 17, 2025 – Volta Metals Announces Upsizing of Previously Announced Offering https://bit.ly/4j0X3fR
• December 16, 2025 – Rockland Resources Closes Private Placement https://bit.ly/45elq3L
• December 16, 2025 – Rare Earths Oxide Produced From Halleck Creek Ore https://bit.ly/4oXhxHK
• December 16, 2025 – Homerun Resources Inc. Announces Advancement of Road Improvements Servicing Santa Maria Eterna Silica and Solar Glass Hub https://bit.ly/48QRvQk
• December 16, 2025 – American Tungsten Announces Strategic Investment in Viking Mines https://bit.ly/4aCdld1
• December 16, 2025 – Nano One Receives C$10.9M from Financing and Government Programs https://bit.ly/3MFh3IH
• December 15, 2025 – Volta Metals Announces Private Placement Financing for Proceeds of up to $1,500,000 https://bit.ly/4j0aLQ4
• December 15, 2025 – Romios CEO Letter to Shareholders Recaps Progress and Presents Case for Share Rollback in Support of Financing the First-Ever Drilling of the Trek South Porphyry Copper-Gold Prospect, in 2026 https://bit.ly/4rYfS7o
• December 15, 2025 – Homerun Resources Inc. Announces Signing of Definitive Surface Rights Agreement for the Installation of Its Industrial Projects in Santa Maria Eterna, Belmonte, Bahia, Brazil https://bit.ly/48VlPsW
• December 15, 2025 – ReeXploration Announces $1,000,000 Private Placement https://bit.ly/4rYy0xX

About the Critical Minerals Institute (CMI):
The Critical Minerals Institute (CMI) (CriticalMineralsInstitute.com) is a brain trust for the global critical minerals economy, serving as a hub that connects companies, capital markets, and policymakers. Through CMI Masterclasses, the weekly Critical Minerals Report (CMR), bespoke research, and board-level advisory services, CMI delivers actionable intelligence spanning exploration finance to geopolitics. CMI also organizes the flagship Annual Critical Minerals Institute Summit, a global gathering of government leaders, institutional investors, and industry executives. The next event, CMI Summit V, will be held May 13–14 in Toronto, Canada; for more information, visit CriticalMineralSummit.com.

An element that can melt near room temperature, ignite in air, and react explosively with water isn’t the sort of commodity most investors expect to sit at the center of a geopolitical chokepoint. Yet that is the thrust of Hallgarten + Company’s December 2025 Metal Review, Cesium (Cs): Breaking the Chinese Stranglehold: cesium is chemically exotic, commercially narrow, and—most importantly—strategically “cornered” by a supply chain that has become unusually concentrated. As the report puts it, “Cesium remains an obscure object of desire.” That line is more than rhetorical flourish: it captures a market where end-use importance is real, but transparency, liquidity, and alternative sourcing are not.

The report’s primary contention is that effective supply is far tighter than typical critical minerals narratives assume. It opens with the blunt observation that production has effectively ceased from one of the two major mines, while the other is reportedly subject to intermittent ore export restrictions. Against this backdrop, the paper argues that a “tight (to non-existent)” market is precisely the environment where credible new deposits—paired with a viable commercialization path—can become strategically valuable. In other words: in cesium, proof of geology alone isn’t enough; investability requires an operational route through handling constraints, processing know-how, and customer acceptance in small, specialized end markets.

A second, and arguably more consequential, pillar is the report’s emphasis on China’s dominance of both above-ground stocks and downstream processing/distribution, particularly via Sinomines. The memo highlights that cesium formate—today’s most commercially important non-radioactive cesium product—is under exclusive control, and it frames this as the key lever through which the market is “managed.” This matters because cesium formate’s principal role is not a niche laboratory application: it is used in high-density drilling and completion fluids, especially for workovers in high-pressure gas wells. Hallgarten makes the practical point that any move to break Chinese dominance would be welcomed by major drillers, suggesting the strategic incentive is not purely governmental—it is also commercial and operational, rooted in procurement risk and market power.

Where the report is particularly strong is its insistence on economic humility. It repeatedly returns to a core constraint for investors: pricing information is opaque, and attempts to pin down true mining costs and profitability are “elusive.” Rather than hand-waving this away, the analysis treats opacity as a defining market feature that distorts capital allocation. The inclusion of the most recent USGS pricing commentary the authors could locate (from 2022) is useful not because it provides a full price curve (it doesn’t), but because it shows how fragmented and product-specific the available datapoints are—from gram-scale metal ampoules to small chemical lots and lab-standard solutions. The report even contextualizes the quoted cesium formate pricing into a per-tonne figure, underlining the magnitude of value and the difficulty of mapping those catalog-style prices to industrial-scale economics.

Operational realities also receive appropriate weight. Cesium’s extreme reactivity drives storage and transportation complexity, which acts like a “hidden tariff” on new supply chains. The report connects this to the broader theme: concentrated downstream control is easier to maintain when a product is hazardous, specialized, and logistically sensitive. It also introduces a practical dynamic often overlooked in critical-minerals discussions: cesium formate brines are typically leased and recycled, with the report citing nearly 85% recovery and implying ~15% attrition per cycle. If accurate, that attrition becomes a quiet but powerful argument for why above-ground inventories can degrade over time, reinforcing the need for primary replenishment.

The memo’s most thought-provoking “what if” is its consideration of rubidium—a close chemical cousin—as a potential substitute or competitive pressure point. Rubidium is framed as a lower-cost but less accurate alternative in atomic clock contexts and as a conceptual challenger in drilling formates, even if the report notes that rubidium formate is not commonly cited for gas-well workovers. This is analytically important: it introduces substitution risk and technological optionality without diluting the central thesis that today’s cesium market is unusually controlled.

The concluding recommendation is clear-eyed and pragmatic: the most attractive route for a cesium (or rubidium) entrant may be downstream integration—becoming its own offtake solution—because the bottleneck is not just ore, but conversion, qualification, and market access. For InvestorNews.com readers, this report is worth your time because it treats cesium as a real market (with hazards, contracts, recycling, and substitution), not just a “critical mineral” slogan. It’s a compact, analytically grounded guide to why cesium’s supply chain is so politically consequential—and where the investable seams might emerge if non-Chinese alternatives can actually be built. Click here to access.

A mineral deposit that can pay you eight ways is no longer just geology — it’s risk management, and Nicole Brewster wants investors to hear that as plainly as possible. In an interview with InvestorNews.com host Tracy Hughes, Brewster — President, CEO and Director of Renforth Resources Inc. (CSE: RFR) — speaks from the particular perch of a junior explorer in Québec’s Abitibi mining district: close enough to established infrastructure to feel the pull of development, small enough to live and die by timelines, assays and retail conviction. Renforth’s story, as Brewster tells it, is deliberately split between two kinds of appetite: gold, with the wholly owned Parbec Gold Deposit beside Agnico Eagle’s Canadian Malartic mine, hosting 265,800 ounces in Measured and Indicated and 97,000 ounces Inferred in an open-pit scenario using US$2,100 gold; and “critical minerals,” with the district-scale Malartic Metals Package and its Victoria polymetallic deposit, where the company has reported an initial NI 43-101 inferred resource of 125 million tonnes grading 0.15% NiEq.

Hughes, who says she recently saw Brewster in London “really talking about nickel and zinc and your polymetallic deposit,” asks the practical question first: “Where should we start?” Brewster steers the conversation to the latest update. “We announced that the nickel-zinc polymetallic resource calculation excluded platinum and palladium,” she says, describing geologists “in the field pulling witness core for testing for platinum and palladium, which we know to be present.” The point is not decorative: “the value of those metals — any occurrence — does have a material effect on the value per tonne of the mineralized package that is Victoria,” she adds, promising that “the next MRE will reflect those PGE metals as well.” The company’s December update similarly says Victoria drilling core is being reviewed for PGE assaying, noting that prior work confirmed platinum and palladium, but that sampling density was insufficient for inclusion in the initial NI 43-101 mineral resource estimate, with the expectation those metals will be included in the next technical report.

What Brewster calls “of great significance” is the mechanics of credibility: an NI 43-101 technical report that “speaks to the entirety of the property,” and places Victoria inside a larger, older district narrative. Renforth has said the NI 43-101 technical report supporting the initial Victoria inferred resource has been filed on SEDAR+ and made available through the company’s materials. Brewster’s tour through the package is brisk and map-like: “In the north, we have our Beaupré Copper proximal to the Cadillac Break,” a central “Lac Gold Zone” with “relatively low-grade but long-interval gold intercepts,” and then the southern structures — Lalonde and Victoria — that she suggests are “probably arms of a fold whose nose is right off our property on our neighbour Agnico Eagle’s Canadian Malartic ground.” The technical report itself describes the Malartic Metals Package as 426 map-staked claims totaling 24,143 hectares — the footprint for the next set of drill pads.

Victoria, in Brewster’s telling, is both early and already burdened with arithmetic. She calls it “20 kilometres long,” says only 2.5 kilometres of strike has been drilled, and emphasizes how little the company has had to do to declare what it has: “a maiden resource… over 2.5 kilometres, with only about 10,000 metres of drilling.” The NI 43-101 report’s pit-constrained estimate gives the headline: 125 Mt grading 0.12% Ni, 0.02% Cu, 0.01% Co, 0.08% Zn and 0.38 g/t Ag, or 0.15% NiEq, all Inferred, with 413 Mlb NiEq, and it notes the estimate is derived from ~2.5 km of strike with 10,317 metres completed in 44 drill holes and ~180 metres trenched and exposed on surface. “The mineralization is on surface,” Brewster says, “it extends below the open pit, but the current resource is entirely within the open pit.” In the report’s own language, “the Mineral Resource occurs in an ~20 km long structure” and remains “open to expansion by drilling,” a phrasing that turns a geologic suggestion into a budget line.

She is careful to describe Victoria not as a single-metal bet but as an interleaving of systems: “an ultramafic providing nickel, cobalt, platinum and palladium, interlayered with a VMS ‘black shale’ providing zinc, copper, silver and gold.” The payoff, she implies, is optionality in a market that can punish monocultures. But the operational reality comes through in the details she lingers on: drill spacing “widely spaced,” “deepest pierce points only slightly below 200 metres,” and the kind of needle-in-the-map intercepts that force a company to choose between patience and pursuit. “It’s early days,” she says, and then, like someone who’s been forced to defend a line item, adds: “With 10,000 metres over 2.5 kilometres, our drill footprint didn’t allow us to follow up on some very interesting results, such as 3.4% nickel or 0.94% copper.” One hole, she notes, “actually ended in mineralization.” The December update sets the near-term frame more plainly: Renforth plans ~10,000 metres of drilling at Victoria and a new technical report incorporating additional drilling and platinum/palladium assay results, alongside ore-sorting and processing work.

That word — timeline — shows up again when Hughes pivots to Parbec, the gold project that sits beside a mine so large it makes junior projects look like annexes. “Parbec is an open-pit gold deposit,” Brewster says, and she makes the adjacency do narrative work: it is “next door to Canada’s largest open-pit gold mine, where a fill-mill strategy has been announced.” Her view of the endgame is blunt: “Ultimately, I think it’s safe to say Parbec will go through the Canadian Malartic infrastructure — they need the ounces.” Before that, she sees optional outcomes: “the opportunity to add value or monetize it,” either by selling or by advancing the work that makes a sale easier to price. In Renforth’s December update, the company says it has kicked off permitting for an underground bulk sample program for metallurgical testing at Parbec, including rehabilitating an existing decline originally sunk in the 1980s to about 100 metres depth, with initial permitting submissions expected to be approved by late Q1 2026.

Gold, of course, is never just a metal price in these conversations; it is a permission structure for exploration. “It’s hard not to in a US$4,200-per-ounce gold environment,” Brewster says, before reminding listeners that “our resource was calculated at US$2,100 per ounce,” and that “roughly 79% of the ounces are measured and indicated in an open-pit scenario.” In the same December release, Renforth repeats the baseline numbers — 265,800 ounces Measured and Indicated and 97,000 Inferred at Parbec, using a US$2,100 gold value in the open-pit scenario — as if to anchor the ambition to a filing-friendly metric. On the ground, she describes stripping that has “uncovered a fault into the Pontiac sediments,” and calls it “a smaller analogue of what’s next door.”

Then there is the administrative metal: permitting. “The permitting process moving forward,” Brewster says of the upcoming quarter, warning that “it’s not terribly exciting — it’s just reality.” She mentions Québec’s Bill 5 as a possible accelerant. The province tabled Bill 5 on Dec. 9, 2025, describing it as legislation intended to expedite major projects of “national interest,” with the government able to amend the application of provisions across multiple laws to speed authorizations — a proposal that has also drawn public debate about oversight and scope.

Brewster is cautious in her own claim: she doesn’t yet have a legal opinion on whether it will help Parbec, but she suggests it could matter “when we get” to Victoria. As she lists what comes next, the cadence shifts back to the work itself: more stripping at Parbec “once the ground thaws,” continued drilling at Victoria to “fill in the 2.5-kilometre footprint,” and a closer look at the metals that weren’t counted the first time. “We’ve sent that off to the lab,” Brewster says of the platinum and palladium testing, “and we’ll know in the new year what sort of numbers we have.”

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The energy transition’s next choke point may be a sheet of glass.

Homerun Resources Inc. (TSXV: HMR | OTCQB: HMRFF) is trying to make that glass story legible to investors by starting where glass begins: silica. The company describes itself as “building the silica-powered backbone of the energy transition” across four verticals—Silica, Solar, Energy Storage and Energy Solutions—anchored by a “high purity low iron silica resource in Bahia, Brazil,” and a plan to turn raw material into the quieter components that let clean power scale.

In a recent interview with InvestorNews.com host Tracy Hughes, the tone was set by velocity. “You have literally put out half a dozen news releases in less than 12 days into December,” she told Brian Leeners, Homerun’s chief executive. Leeners didn’t apologize for the pace; he framed it as operating discipline. “The news releases are really just a demonstration that we’re not capital-dependent relative to moving the company forward,” he said, arguing that the constraint is “brain power relative to execution and planning,” not whether the company can “wait for money to drill holes.”

The money, though, is part of the proof. Leeners walked Hughes through a $6 million financing that he called “a first of its kind relative to the TSX Venture Exchange,” describing a process that took Homerun “almost six months”—and, he suggested, may have quietly improved the path for whoever tries it next. “I’m actually expecting a fee from any other TSX Venture company that follows us,” he joked, before noting the follow-on $3 million placement and a second tranche of about $1.5 million. The point, he insisted, was sequencing: “Now we’ve closed both of those and are moving forward.”

Underneath the financings is a pitch that sounds deceptively simple until you spend time with it: silica is not one market. “Silica is a pyramid-priced, pyramid-quality product,” Leeners said, separating it from the metals investors instinctively compare it to. And it is, he added, “very logistically intense,” because unlike a high-value concentrate, “you’re moving the entirety of the resource.” Logistics isn’t an afterthought; it becomes a competitive barrier, a cost structure, an argument about whether a deposit is merely large or actually useful.

It is also, in Leeners’ telling, the overlooked critical input hiding in plain sight. “Silica is probably the most unrecognized critical material,” he said. “It’s a key component in solar—not only the glass, but also the silicon, which is the essence of solar,” and increasingly relevant to batteries and high-end technology, “including high-end optical uses like optical fiber.” Then he sharpened the idea into something closer to a thesis: “It’s a key component of the electrification of the planet.”

The most concrete version of that thesis, for Homerun, is antimony-free solar glass—and the company’s insistence that its Brazilian silica can reach solar-glass specifications with unusually modest processing. Hughes brought up the company’s recent “positive results,” and Leeners pointed to third-party confirmation work by Minerali Industriali Engineering in Italy. “It was really exciting to get them to confirm what we already knew—that we have incredibly high-quality silica sitting in the ground,” he said. What mattered, he argued, was the pathway: “washing, sorting, and agitating the product” to get “to solar glass.” Agitation, he explained, is “simply rubbing the grains against each other,” a plain description for an industrial truth: sometimes scale is just repetition plus control.

The company’s disclosures around that testing read like a lab report with a business plan embedded in it: raw silica sand characterized at 99.7% purity and 24 ppm iron, with processing steps reducing iron further—down to single-digit ppm in a more complete treatment flow—while meeting contaminant ranges for solar glass manufacturing. Leeners translated that into a competitive claim: “It’s probably the only silica on the planet that has that pathway to scale relative to the solar glass space.”

Scale is also the word that keeps Homerun’s story from breaking into separate companies. The firm says it is developing Latin America’s first dedicated 1,000 tonne-per-day high-efficiency solar glass plant, and Leeners spoke about the Bankable Feasibility Study like someone eyeing the moment a project stops being an idea and becomes financeable infrastructure. “The biggest milestone in Q1 will be the Bankable Feasibility Study,” he said. “We’ve spent 18 months crossing what I call the valley of death. The BFS is the transition point on the Lassonde Curve.”

From there, Hughes pushed the conversation toward Homerun’s other bet: silica not just as feedstock, but as a storage medium. Leeners described two years of work alongside the National Renewable Energy Laboratory that began with a silica purification opportunity—calcination, “heating it to around 1,000 degrees Celsius”—and has expanded into a global intellectual property license signed through Alliance for Sustainable Energy LLC, the entity that operates NREL on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy. “When we sign agreements, we don’t sign directly with NREL—we sign with Alliance,” he said. “It’s simply their corporate structure.” The first commercial focus, he said, would be modular systems around one megawatt, with a longer horizon for manufacturing and larger deployments, and the appeal of thermal storage where it can deliver both heat and electricity: “That’s where efficiencies north of 90% are achieved.”

Commercialization, Leeners suggested, is why the company has been adding talent—like Yuri Skopetsky, whom he called “a godfather and rockstar in the energy space.” “His job is to identify low-hanging-fruit use cases to commercialize and monetize the system,” Leeners said, naming data centers as an obvious starting point because the system can handle heat and electricity efficiently—and because, in his telling, the energy constraint is becoming existential. Utilities are “tapped out,” he said, and data centers are drifting toward “self-generation behind the grid.” In that context, he added, the real money is moving toward infrastructure: “As was said by a BlackRock executive, they’re investing in the picks and shovels of AI, not AI itself.” Homerun has also moved to broaden its market footprint, recently announcing a listing on Tradegate in Germany. But Leeners kept circling back to the near-term proof point that, for a vertically integrated story, is supposed to turn narrative into numbers: “The biggest milestone in Q1 will be the Bankable Feasibility Study,” he said. “We’ve spent 18 months crossing what I call the valley of death.”

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Cesium is what happens when a “minor metal” stops behaving like a footnote and starts acting like a constraint.

On InvestorNews.com, host Tracy Hughes opened her conversation with Robin Dunbar—President, CEO, and Director of Grid Metals Corp. (TSXV: GRDM | OTCQB: MSMGF)—by placing the company where it actually operates: Manitoba, with a portfolio that spans nickel-copper-PGMs at Makwa (under an option and joint venture agreement with Teck Resources Limited, which can earn up to a 70% interest by spending and paying a total of CAD$17.3 million), copper-nickel at Mayville (with an NI 43-101 open-pit resource of 32 million tonnes grading 0.61% CuEq), lithium at Donner (an NI 43-101 resource of 6.8 million tonnes grading 1.39% Li₂O, with Grid holding 75%), and the lithium–cesium story now pulling attention toward Falcon West, about 110 kilometres east of Winnipeg along the Trans-Canada Highway.

Hughes didn’t waste time getting to the point. “In our InvestorTalk earlier today, you were talking about cesium,” she said, noting the “huge following” Grid has drawn on short-form video explaining why it matters. Dunbar’s answer came out with the kind of practiced urgency that suggests he has had the same conversation with end-users, financiers, and skeptics—often in the same week. “Cesium is a fascinating metal and an opportunity in the critical metal space,” he said, before narrowing the market to a startling scarcity: “There have only been three producing deposits of cesium ever globally, and there are currently only three juniors with active drill programs… globally.”

The scarcity, in Dunbar’s telling, isn’t merely academic. Cesium’s best-known public-facing role is invisible: atomic clocks that underpin global positioning. But he framed it as an enabling material with both mundane and strategic pull—“high-tech and military applications,” plus drilling fluids for deep wells, and “a growing array of uses in optical and solar.” And then the line that matters most in a market built on continuity of supply: “We’re seeing interest from end users because there’s a huge shortage of cesium feedstock in the world right now.”

From there, the interview snapped into geology and economics—the two languages junior miners must speak at once. Grid’s recent work at Falcon West has focused on a flat-lying pegmatite system where cesium occurs alongside lithium and rubidium. “The zone we’re drilling starts at about 20 metres down,” Dunbar explained, describing “a 1 to 3 metre zone of the mineralization we’re looking for.” The target mineral is pollucite, the principal host of high-grade cesium. “When we drill and we get pollucite, the grades we’re getting are as high as 27% over a metre,” he said, pausing just long enough for the number to register. “Globally, to find pollucite, there are just a few occurrences—it’s very hard to find.”

A December 4, 2025 Grid Metals news release put those kinds of numbers into market-standard intervals, reporting high-grade intercepts including 3.45 metres grading 16.8% Cs₂O (LU25-09) and 4.0 metres grading 10.4% Cs₂O, with a 1.2-metre sub-interval at 27.1% Cs₂O (LU25-08)—results the company described as “amongst the highest Cs₂O drill intercepts reported globally, in recent years.”

Hughes, speaking for an audience that lives somewhere between capital markets and chemistry, asked Dunbar to “dumb down rubidium.” He obliged by placing it in the family: rubidium is “a sister metal to cesium,” with overlapping physical properties—“very high conductivity, photovoltaic properties”—but a very different extraction reality. Cesium can occur in pollucite at extraordinary concentrations, he said, while rubidium typically sits dispersed in lepidolite and mica, “and tends to only get to a maximum of 2% to 3% in very high-grade materials.” In other words: interesting, potentially useful, but rarely the main event—unless new applications and new processing routes change the equation.

The money question arrived quickly. Hughes recalled that Dunbar had said earlier that Grid is “fully funded into next year” for developing the cesium project. Dunbar confirmed it and supplied the detail investors always want but rarely get cleanly: “Yes. We just raised CAD$4 million. Most of that was from a strategic investor—a very sophisticated mining investor—who likes what we’re doing, particularly in the cesium space.” He described the cadence of the work: 67 holes completed, initial results released, and “another 50-odd holes” expected to deliver assays in January. In the background is the milestone that turns “interesting” into “bankable”: “We hope to be able to get a resource sometime in the first half of next year. That would be one of the very few cesium resources out there globally.”

In the company’s December 4 release, those operational details were framed with the specificity the market demands: 67 drill holes totaling 3,035 metres in phase one, assays pending on the remainder, and high-grade cesium now outlined over “approximately 100 metres” of strike, with the enrichment trend “open in multiple directions” and a second phase expected to begin in mid-January 2026.

Dunbar’s most compelling explanation, though, wasn’t about grade—it was about pathway. He made the case that cesium is not just rare; it is operationally unusual in a way that changes the financing math. “The development path for cesium is also unique because you don’t need a lot of capital,” he said. You mine shallow material, crush it, and use ore sorting—technology he called “very well established” for cesium ore. “For crushing and ore sorting, you don’t need a plant, you don’t need tailings, you don’t need water,” he said, describing a flow sheet that reads like a rebuke to the multi-year, multi-permit reality of conventional milling. “So capex is very low, and permitting is much faster because you don’t have tailings or a mill.”

That same theme appears—more formally—in the company’s disclosure around Falcon West, which describes cesium-rich pollucite ore as amenable to crushing and ore sorting to create a high-value pollucite concentrate, potentially avoiding the need for a conventional mill and tailings facility and lowering capital intensity.

Then came the pricing comparison—the one that turns heads even among hardened commodity investors. “If you look at cesium carbonate on a chemical basis, it’s about 20 times the price of lithium carbonate,” Dunbar said, offering a shorthand for value density. Grid’s December 4 release cited a benchmark cesium carbonate price of US$218,000 per tonne, “approximately twenty times” lithium carbonate, underscoring why a small tonnage story can still matter if the product is the right one.

Hughes pressed on a point that often separates credible discoveries from lucky anecdotes: how do you find something this rare in the first place? Dunbar’s answer was equal parts method and contingency—the real story of grassroots exploration. Grid’s core focus has long been the Bird River Greenstone Belt in southeastern Manitoba. In the process of base-metal work, the company identified lithium pegmatites and built a lithium resource between 2019 and 2022, while keeping an eye on regional infrastructure and nearby processing history. But Falcon West emerged from a different kind of evidence: old logs, half-forgotten holes, and a local geologist with core “in his garage.”

“In our research, we found the next greenstone belt about 100 km to the south,” he said. “One report from around 2000… had drilled some holes, and in the logs there was some cesium.” The clue mattered because of pegmatite fractionation. “As a pegmatite gets more complex, you get lithium and then rubidium and cesium and tantalum—cesium is the last one,” he explained. “So if you have cesium in the system, you probably have lithium somewhere.” Grid acquired the showing, recovered the stored core, and assayed it. “We got some high-grade cesium hits,” he said. “So we said, okay.”

The market context arrived in the same breath: comparable valuations, visible scarcity, and what might be the most persuasive sentence a junior miner can hear from industry. “We started talking to people and hearing, ‘If you have cesium, we’ll buy it from you,’” Dunbar said. That was the “go” switch. Grid began drilling tightly—“similar to drilling high-grade gold,” he said—aiming to define what could be a starter open pit, the kind of footprint that fits both the geology and the permitting logic.

At that point in the interview, Dunbar explained that there are broader pegmatite targets in the district and that longer-term exploration will come. But, he said, “first things first: we want a resource and then potentially some cash flow going forward as a number one priority.”

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Power, in the rare earth business, isn’t found in the grade in the ground—it’s found in what you can turn that rock into, reliably, at scale, in a jurisdiction that wants the mine built.

That framing is why Jack Lifton’s conversation with Mark Tory—President, CEO, and Director of Defense Metals Corp. (TSXV: DEFN | OTCQB: DFMTF)—lands with unusual clarity. Tory is not a newly minted executive discovering the critical minerals script in real time. He has “over 30 years in resources,” he told Lifton, “cutting my teeth at some big companies like Homestake and Anglo American before going into the junior sector.” He spent roughly a decade at Northern Minerals in Australia’s Kimberley region, focused on heavy rare earths, and he has done the kind of work that separates rare earth rhetoric from rare earth reality: “I’m probably one of the few people, Jack, who can say they’ve built and operated a rare earth processing facility.”

Defense Metals’ story is anchored at its 100% owned Wicheeda Rare Earth Element mineral deposit in British Columbia—about 80 kilometres northeast of Prince George—where the company is advancing a development plan that increasingly reads like a North American counterpoint to the usual dependency narrative. The project is “readily accessible by a paved highway and an all-weather gravel road,” and it sits near power and transport infrastructure that includes hydroelectric transmission lines, rail, and port facilities at Prince Rupert. Tory, speaking from the operator’s side of the equation, emphasized the practicalities: Prince George is “an existing mining town,” with “an existing workforce,” plus “roads, rail, and access to hydroelectric power.” The rail line’s reach to Prince Rupert—“about 500 kilometres away”—matters not as a brochure detail, but as a cost and logistics lever in a business that can be undone by distance, permitting drag, and processing complexity.

Lifton, who has followed rare earth projects long enough to see hopeful flow sheets dissolve into reality, pressed Tory on why he took the helm. Tory’s answer was telling, and it wasn’t a romantic one. “I obviously did my due diligence on the project,” he said, before delivering the point that has become the quiet dividing line between paper deposits and bankable projects: “When you look at rare earth projects, you don’t necessarily focus only on the grade in the ground. You need to look at what it concentrates up to through a relatively simple beneficiation process.” What attracted him to Wicheeda, he said, is that the ore “goes from about 2.4% in the ground to a 50% concentrate grade,” a level he described as “in line with all the major producers around the world—Lynas, MP Materials, as well as the Chinese producers.” The implication is direct: a project that can upgrade material efficiently is a project that can credibly talk about economics—and, eventually, financing.

That upgrade path also shapes the way Defense Metals talks about product strategy. In the company’s Preliminary Feasibility Study (PFS), completed in 2025 (with news releases dated February 18 and April 7, 2025), Defense Metals outlined a high-purity product concept that reflects real downstream conversations rather than generic “mixed carbonate” ambiguity. “It’s a very high-purity product,” Tory said, “with cerium and lanthanum completely removed.” What remains, by his account, is a chemistry that markets tend to reward: “That leaves an 87% NdPr and about 12% heavies.” When Lifton clarified the figures, Tory confirmed: “Yes—in the carbonate.” He added a detail designed to resonate with pricing credibility: “When Argus reviewed the final product, it valued it significantly higher than any other project globally, including the heavies.”

In rare earths, however, purity narratives only matter if the processing pathway doesn’t become an engineering saga. Here, Tory and Lifton found common ground in an almost old-fashioned preference for simplicity. Lifton noted that the project’s hydrometallurgy appeared streamlined; Tory corrected the emphasis but strengthened the point: “That’s on the beneficiation side. It’s a simple crush-grind-float circuit. There’s no magnetic separation and no ore sorting—it’s purely crush, grind, and flotation to get to that 50% concentrate.” Lifton’s response was the kind of operational philosophy that investors wish more feasibility studies would tattoo on the cover: “I’m a fan of the least complicated processes. The only companies that survive long-term are the lowest-cost, most robust operations.”

The next question is always the same: can it be permitted, financed, and built within the decade investors and governments now talk about as if it were guaranteed? Tory was unusually specific. Defense Metals expects to start a bankable feasibility study in the first half of next year; Lifton put it plainly—“They brought you on board to get this thing off the dime, didn’t they?”—and Tory replied, “Absolutely.” The feasibility study itself, Tory said, will likely take “about 12 months,” targeting completion “around mid-2027 for a decision to invest.” Then comes what he called the “biggest timeline risk”: permitting. “We’re hoping for about two years to get through provincial and federal permitting,” he said, “which would take us toward the end of 2027.” If those gates open on schedule, he sketched the sequence: “construction in 2028, with production and ramp-up around 2029–2030.”

Money, in this market, is both a filter and a signal. Tory offered a data point that, if sustained, changes how the market reads the file. “We completed a capital raise a few weeks ago,” he said. “We were aiming for about $5 million and ended up raising $16.7 million—about 30% oversubscribed.” That raise, he added, funds early feasibility work and key drilling, but it doesn’t eliminate the bigger bill: “We will still need to raise more capital to complete the feasibility study, which Hatch has estimated will cost around $50 million.”

If financing is one half of the credibility test, the other half is local consent—especially in Canada, where critical minerals strategy is now inseparable from Indigenous partnership and visible political alignment. Defense Metals’ most recent news release, dated November 24, 2025, describes Tory meeting Canadian government officials in Ottawa during the week of November 20 alongside Chief Harley Chingee of the McLeod Lake Indian Band. Tory also referenced that trip in the interview as a demonstration of local support: “One of the real advantages we have is that the local community is very supportive. They want to see this project up and running as quickly as possible. I actually took the Chief of the McLeod Lake Indian Band with me to Ottawa a few weeks ago to meet with the federal government, just to demonstrate that support directly.”

The news release frames the same moment as both partnership and strategy—rare earths as industrial policy, and permitting as national choreography. “We greatly appreciate the Government of Canada’s ongoing commitment to strengthening Canada’s critical minerals ecosystem,” Tory said in the release, adding: “Our partnership with the McLeod Lake Indian Band is central to the responsible advancement of the Wicheeda Project and we immensely value [their] leadership, their stewardship perspective, and their commitment to building transparent, mutually beneficial pathways for development.” Chief Chingee, in turn, put the local thesis in human terms: “The Wicheeda Project has the potential to create meaningful economic opportunities for our people while respecting our land and values.”

For Tory, the decision to move across the world seems less like corporate relocation than personal investment in execution. “My wife, dog, and I moved over because of the quality of the project,” he told Lifton. “I want to see this up and running. I spend a lot of time with government, and the project is high on their lists both provincially and federally.” And when Lifton offered the kind of endorsement that rare earth executives rarely receive from someone who knows where the bodies are buried—“With your background and the quality of this deposit, your probability of success is quite high”—Tory didn’t pivot to poetry or prediction. He stayed in the job description: “I appreciate that, Jack. I’m always here to talk about Defense—that’s my job—and I’ll continue promoting it as much as I can.”

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InvestorNews.com is pleased to announce an upcoming InvestorTalk scheduled for tomorrow, Tuesday, December 16, at 9:00 AM EST, featuring Nicole Brewster, President, CEO, and Director, Renforth Resources Inc. (CSE: RFR). To participate in this engaging discussion, please click here

Renforth Resources is a junior exploration and development company advancing gold and polymetallic assets in Québec’s Abitibi mining district. Its wholly owned Parbec Gold Deposit, located adjacent to Agnico Eagle’s Canadian Malartic mine, hosts 265,800 ounces of gold in the Measured and Indicated categories and 97,000 ounces Inferred, based on an open-pit model using a US$2,100/oz gold price. Renforth also controls the district-scale Malartic Metals Package, which includes the Victoria Polymetallic Deposit. In 2025, the company reported an initial NI 43-101-compliant inferred resource at Victoria of 125 million tonnes grading 0.15% NiEq, highlighting an open-pit system prospective for nickel, copper, zinc, cobalt and PGEs. With strong infrastructure access, including roads and hydroelectric power, Renforth is well positioned to advance its assets and build shareholder value.

In preparation for tomorrow’s InvestorTalk, here are some recent news releases from Renforth Resources for your review, which are listed below:

• December 9, 2025 – Renforth Issues Gold & PGE Exploration Update in Quebec & Financing Announcement — click here
• December 1, 2025 – Renforth Collaborates with CTRI to assess sustainability opportunities at Victoria nickel polymetallic open pit deposit – click here
• November 13, 2025 – Renforth Completes Final Financing Closing – click here
• November 11, 2025 – Renforth Files Malartic Metals Package Critical Minerals NI 43-101 Technical Report, Including Initial Victoria Nickel Sulphide Polymetallic Deposit Inferred Mineral Resource Estimate  — click here

We found the December 9^th news release titled, “Renforth Issues Gold & PGE Exploration Update in Quebec & Financing Announcement” particularly noteworthy and here are 5 key data points from it:

• Parbec Underground Bulk Sampling Advances – Renforth has initiated permitting for an underground bulk-sample program at the Parbec Gold Deposit, targeting metallurgical testing via rehabilitation of an existing decline, with initial approvals expected by late Q1 2026.
• Key Gold Structure Identified at Parbec – Recent surface stripping exposed a hinge-fold zone linked to gold emplacement near the Cadillac Break; follow-up stripping and washing are planned for Spring 2026.
• PGE Work Underway at Victoria Deposit – Field and analytical work has begun to test for platinum and palladium at the Victoria polymetallic deposit, with plans to incorporate PGEs into the next NI 43-101 resource update.
• Private Placement Financing Announced – Renforth plans to raise up to C$500,000 via a non-brokered offering, including flow-through shares at C$0.02 and hard-dollar units at C$0.02 with warrants exercisable at C$0.05 over 24 months.
• Robust 2026 Drill Plans – The company plans ~7,500 m of drilling at Parbec and ~10,000 m at Victoria in 2026, alongside updated technical reports, resource updates, and continued permitting and metallurgical work.

For more information on Renforth Resources Inc., click here

For more information on the InvestorTalk pre-market series, go to InvestorTalk.com.

This past week made something plain that the industry has been circling for years: we are no longer talking about “critical minerals” as a niche corner of financing. We are living inside a new critical mineral economy — one in which permitting, processing, export licenses, quotas, stockpiles, and even merger ballots are treated as macro instruments. The clearest tell was the language now coming out of governments themselves. The Pax Silica Declaration — signed in Washington by Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States — frames artificial intelligence as a force that is “increasingly reorganizing the world economy” and explicitly links that reordering to historic demand for “energy, critical minerals, … minerals refining and processing,” and the rest of the technology stack.

The concept arrived in the same news cycle as the Trump administration’s decision to permit Nvidia Corporation (Nasdaq: NVDA) to export its H200 AI chips to China under Commerce Department oversight—paired with a 25% fee—reopening a debate about whether “managed access” preserves U.S. leverage or accelerates Chinese capability (Reuters). In critical minerals, the relevance is direct: chip policy and critical mineral policy are becoming interlocked bargaining instruments, and the market is learning to price that linkage in real time.

The G7 finance ministers, under Canada’s chair, put a cleaner macroeconomic gloss on the same problem: export controls and non-market interventions in critical minerals can amplify price volatility and weaken growth prospects (Reuters). That language matters because it implicitly treats supply disruptions not as isolated industrial incidents, but as systemic risks—akin to energy shocks—capable of spilling into inflation expectations, industrial output, and national security planning. The policy stance is also revealing: rather than calling for a single “critical minerals OPEC,” the G7’s framing is closer to rules-of-the-road—diversify, derisk, and build buffers—while still accepting that controls are now part of the competitive toolkit.

Nowhere was that more visible than in rare earths. China’s post-April export control architecture continued to evolve from friction to selectivity. Reuters reported that some of Ford Motor Company’s (NYSE: F) magnet suppliers received China’s new streamlined “general licences,” intended to allow larger, year-long shipments for specific customers—while European manufacturers watched closely for signs they would be treated similarly (Reuters). A separate Reuters report pointed to additional Chinese magnet producers securing streamlined licences, including Ningbo Jintian Copper (Group) Co., Ltd. (SHSE: 601609), JL Mag Rare-Earth Co., Ltd. (SZSE: 300748) (HKEX: 6680), Ningbo Yunsheng Co., Ltd. (SHSE: 600366), and Beijing Zhong Ke San Huan High-Tech Co., Ltd. (SZSE: 000970) (Reuters). The strategic message is difficult to miss: the control regime is not being dismantled; it is being operationalized in ways that can privilege certain counterparties, sectors, or negotiating tracks.

For Europe, Germany’s diplomacy in Beijing offered a clear illustration of how rare earth export permissions have moved from technical compliance into the realm of state-to-state bargaining. The foreign minister described rare earths as a core business concern and indicated that Beijing was open to prioritizing relief for European manufacturing bottlenecks—even as he conceded that translating signals into actual approvals would require further work. In other words, export licences have become a diplomatic lever, negotiated alongside the familiar instruments of tariffs, sanctions, and security policy.

The same dynamic—controls translating into industrial vulnerability—showed up in a less discussed rare earth: yttrium. GE Vernova Inc. (NYSE: GEV), a major gas-turbine manufacturer, said it is working with the U.S. government to build stocks of yttrium after Chinese export restrictions tightened supply; Reuters noted that yttrium prices outside China surged roughly 4,400% between January and November 2025 (Reuters). I read this as a useful corrective to the tendency to treat rare earth risk as primarily a “magnet story.” In modern power systems—especially those feeding AI-intensive load growth—materials risk extends into specialized ceramics, coatings, and alloy pathways that can halt equipment delivery just as surely as the “Core Four” [Dysprosium (Dy), Neodymium (Nd), Terbium (Tb), & Praseodymium (Pr)] shortage.

Against that backdrop, Vietnam’s parliament moved in the opposite direction—toward tighter state control. It approved revisions to its mineral law restricting exports of refined rare earths and reaffirming a ban on rare earth ore exports, with an explicit aim of forcing more domestic value creation. The constraint is practical: Vietnam still lacks sufficient refining infrastructure, so near-term market impact may be limited even if the policy intent is clear (Reuters). Still, for Western diversification narratives that have leaned heavily on Vietnam’s geological potential, the story is now more complicated: policy is trying to pull investment into processing, but capital will demand clarity on permitting, enforcement, and the commercial terms of “mandatory upgrading.”

Japan’s experience, highlighted widely this week, offers a different model: treat refining as the hard part, subsidize it patiently, and accept higher costs in exchange for security. Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC) and Sojitz Corporation (TSE: 2768) have supported Lynas Rare Earths Limited (ASX: LYC) through financing structures going back to the post-2010 shock, explicitly aimed at stabilizing non-Chinese supply into Japan (JOGMEC). The lesson for today’s policymakers is not that Japan “solved” rare earth dependence—China remains central—but that credible diversification is built over a decade, not a news cycle, and it often requires state-anchored offtake and financing to bring processing online.

If Asia’s story was licensing and industrial policy, the Atlantic’s was processing geography—who gets to convert concentrates into separated oxides, metals, and components. In Europe, Critical Metals Corp. (Nasdaq: CRML) said it will form a joint venture with Romania’s Fabrica de Prelucrare a Concentratelor de Uraniu (FPCU)—a subsidiary of Societatea Națională Nuclearelectrica S.A. (BVB: SNN)—to process rare earth minerals from CRML’s Tanbreez project in Greenland. The choice of partner is telling: FPCU’s legacy is nuclear-fuel-cycle metallurgy, not consumer-electronics supply chains, but that is precisely the point. Europe is increasingly comfortable repurposing strategic industrial capabilities—especially in EU/NATO jurisdictions—toward critical minerals processing.

North America, meanwhile, kept building the scaffolding for a magnet-and-heavy-rare-earth narrative that is finally becoming contractual. Saskatchewan Research Council’s agreements with REalloys Inc. are anchored by offtake for neodymium-praseodymium metal and dysprosium and terbium oxides from SRC’s Saskatoon facility, with Reuters reporting REalloys’ planned investment and long-term offtake structure. The market significance is less about Saskatchewan specifically and more about what it signals: governments and quasi-public institutions are now starting to underwrite metallization, purification, specification control—the “middle” of the supply chain.

The U.S. defense establishment is approaching the same middle layer from a different direction: portability. The U.S. military, working with Idaho National Laboratory and Perpetua Resources Corp. (Nasdaq: PPTA) (TSX: PPTA), is developing small, containerized refineries—starting with antimony trisulfide—to reduce reliance on Chinese supply for materials used in ammunition and armor. This is not a substitute for industrial-scale refining, but it is a revealing hedge: if the risk is acute disruption, the response can be modular capacity designed for redundancy, not only efficiency.

Cobalt was the other metal where the “state as market-maker” theme sharpened. The Democratic Republic of Congo—responsible for more than 70% of global cobalt supply—continued implementing its quota regime, including new export conditions requiring pre-payment of royalties and additional compliance certificates. Glencore plc (LSE: GLEN) became the first producer to ship cobalt under the new system via a pilot cargo, in what one news agency described as a test of procedures after a long export ban that had tightened markets; cobalt prices were cited around $24 per pound, up from roughly $10 earlier in the year. For battery supply chains, the key question is whether Congo’s system stabilizes into predictable rule-based exports—or whether iterative rule changes become a recurring source of price spikes and procurement uncertainty, pushing buyers toward chemistry substitution and jurisdictional diversification.

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InvestorNews Critical Minerals Institute (CMI) Directorial Headline Picks for the Week:

• December 12, 2025 – US to launch ‘Pax Silica’ coalition to secure AI and critical mineral supply chains amid China rivalry (Source)
• December 12, 2025 – Brazil’s Minas Gerais state outlines strategy for rare earth projects (Source)
• December 12, 2025 – China to ease import and export rules on certain lithium thionyl chloride batteries from 2026 (Source)
• December 11, 2025 – Vietnam curbs exports of refined rare earths, reaffirms ban on ore trade (Source)
• December 10, 2025 – Anglo American and Teck shareholders vote in favour of $50bn merger (Source)
• December 10, 2025 – Ford suppliers receive China’s new streamlined rare-earth licenses (Source)
• December 10, 2025 – GE Vernova working with US government to boost stocks of rare earth yttrium (Source)
• December 10, 2025 – Brazil considers law requiring local processing of critical minerals (Source)
• December 10, 2025 – Glencore to ship first cobalt cargo under Congo’s new quota system (Source)
• December 9, 2025 – US military developing small refineries for critical minerals (Source)
• December 9, 2025 – Critical Metals partners with Romania’s FPCU to set up rare earth processing plant (Source)
• December 8, 2025 – Saskatchewan Research Council and REalloys Sign Historic Rare Earth Partnership Agreements, Advancing North American Independence in Rare Earths and Positioning the Province as a Global Critical Minerals Hub (Source)
• December 8, 2025 – G7 Finance Ministers call for responsible production and supply of critical minerals (Source)
• December 8, 2025 – Trump gives green light to Nvidia to ship powerful AI chips to China despite national security fears (Source)
• December 8, 2025 – How Japan Built a Rare-Earth Supply Chain Without China (Source)
• December 7, 2025 – German foreign minister to discuss rare earths, steel in China visit (Source)
• December 7, 2025 – Congo sets new export conditions to keep tight grip on cobalt (Source) 
• December 5, 2025 – US vows over $1 billion for Congo critical minerals supply chain (Source)

InvestorNews.com Media Updates:

• December 11, 2025 – The Dark Side of Solar Glass: Antimony, Geopolitics and the Energy Transition https://bit.ly/3XRUVNH

InvestorNews.com News Release Updates:

• December 12, 2025 – Homerun Resources Inc. Files for Closing of $3m Private Placement Financing https://bit.ly/497spxR
• December 12, 2025 – ReeXploration Announces Field Program Results Confirming Large-Scale Uranium Target at Eureka, Namibia https://bit.ly/48Qxd9s
• December 11, 2025 – CVMR Corporation and the Central African Republic (CAR) Sign Landmark Mining and Refining Partnership https://bit.ly/48yNktC
• December 11, 2025 – Ucore Readies for Louisiana 2026 Heavy Rare Earth Element Processing https://bit.ly/4q8Quu1
• December 11, 2025 – Homerun Resources Inc. Announces Positive Results of Confirmation Testing by Minerali Industriali Engineering on the Santa Maria Eterna Silica Sand for the Manufacture of Antimony-Free Solar Glass https://bit.ly/3KFA1hO
• December 11, 2025 – Volta Completes Inaugural Drill Program at Springer REE Project in Ontario, Canada https://bit.ly/3KKZmqC
• December 10, 2025 – Nano One Closes $6.96 Million Overnight Marketed Offering https://bit.ly/4iLXF8Q
• December 9, 2025 – Appia Announces Drilling Updates on ULTRA HARD ROCK Target and Auger Drilling on ULTRA IAC Target in Goias, Brazil https://bit.ly/3MrFhGj
• December 9, 2025 – Rockland Resources Financing Fully Subscribed https://bit.ly/4j5cVOx
• December 9, 2025 – Spartan Metals Identifies Two New Tungsten-Silver-Rubidium Targets at its Eagle Project, Nevada https://bit.ly/44UQtkY
• December 9, 2025 – Renforth Issues Gold & PGE Exploration Update in Quebec & Financing Announcement https://bit.ly/4oEf19b
• December 9, 2025 – Homerun Resources Inc. Announces Multi-Process Testing Results for Santa Maria Eterna High-Purity Silica Sand Project https://bit.ly/48skStp
• December 8, 2025 – Rockland Resources Arranges Financing https://bit.ly/3XI9ymM
• December 8, 2025 – Appia Rare Earths & Uranium Corp. Issues Reminder for December 9, 2025 Presentation at the “John Tumazos Very Independent Research Conference” https://bit.ly/4pYaSho
• December 8, 2025 – Romios Proposes Name Change and Share Consolidation, Annual General and Special Meeting Scheduled for January 16, 2026 https://bit.ly/4iICnsJ
• December 8, 2025 – Coniagas Announces Amended and Restated LIFE Offering Document https://bit.ly/44doCfH
• December 8, 2025 – Homerun Resources Inc. Closes $6M Financing with Institutional Investor Sorbie Bornholm LP https://bit.ly/4rQRpkv
• December 8, 2025 – American Rare Earths Appoints Mark Wall as Chief Executive Officer to Lead Next Phase of U.S. Growth https://bit.ly/48Y4JMf

About the Critical Minerals Institute (CMI):
The Critical Minerals Institute (CMI) (CriticalMineralsInstitute.com) is a brain trust for the global critical minerals economy, serving as a hub that connects companies, capital markets, and policymakers. Through CMI Masterclasses, the weekly Critical Minerals Report (CMR), bespoke research, and board-level advisory services, CMI delivers actionable intelligence spanning exploration finance to geopolitics. CMI also organizes the flagship Annual Critical Minerals Institute Summit, a global gathering of government leaders, institutional investors, and industry executives. The next event, CMI Summit V, will be held May 13–14 in Toronto, Canada; for more information, visit CriticalMineralSummit.com.

In Washington, “peace” is being marketed like a term sheet. In eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, it is still a battlefield. In the critical minerals economy, ambiguity is always expensive.

In a new InvestorNews.com interview for the Critical Minerals Institute (CMI), Tracy Hughes speaks with Melissa “Mel” Sanderson, CMI’s co-chair, about a Trump-brokered Rwanda–DRC peace deal signed in Washington on December 4, 2025. Sanderson’s verdict is blunt: “This is a pipe dream.”

Her first objection is procedural. The deal’s economic promises hinge on a ceasefire and the withdrawal of M23—yet M23 wasn’t in the talks. That omission, she argues, “is an implicit acknowledgement” of what U.N. experts have alleged: Rwanda exercises command and control over the rebel movement.

Then came the map. This week, Reuters and the Associated Press reported that M23 fighters entered and then consolidated control over Uvira, a strategic town in South Kivu, even as diplomacy pressed forward.

Sanderson notes why Uvira matters: it sits on routes that connect Congo to Tanzania—“an alternative route for shipping out illegally obtained mineral wealth,” as she put it—beyond the traditional flows through Rwanda.

The second objection is capacity. President Trump, Sanderson says, invoked “huge U.S. players” eager to build mines. But big operators avoid active war zones; she points to Freeport-McMoRan’s 2016 exit from its Tenke Fungurume position as a reminder of how quickly exposure can be cut when risk and politics swell. Would-be entrants today are more likely to be juniors—too small to fund Congo-scale projects without insurance, lenders, and security that is not on offer.

Her third objection is physical: infrastructure. Eastern Congo’s transport and power systems, battered across decades of conflict, still complicate routine logistics—never mind industrial mining.

What should Washington do instead? Sanderson offers a fork. If the goal is peace, “you need… targeted sanctions” and leverage on Kigali, not investment cheerleading—an argument echoed this week as U.S. officials accused Rwanda of violating the deal. If the goal is supply chains, she says, assemble financing and risk coverage—and stop confusing “creating peace” with “making a deal.”

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