On the floor of PDAC 2026 in Toronto, InvestorNews host Tracy Hughes spoke with Dr. Mark Cooksey, Managing Director and CEO of ABx Group Limited (ASX: ABX), about the company’s unusual position in the global race to secure heavy rare earth supply.

Cooksey arrived at PDAC with a clear objective: meet potential customers for the mixed rare earth carbonate (MREC) product ABx intends to produce from its ionic clay deposits in Tasmania.

“We’re an Australian listed company focused on rare earths,” Cooksey said. “The goal of PDAC is really to meet with potential customers. We intend to produce a mixed rare earth carbonate and sell that to a separation plant, and many of the customers are here.”

The company’s opportunity rests on three key advantages. First, its rare earths occur in ionic clay deposits — a style of mineralization associated with relatively simple and lower-cost metallurgy. Second, those clays contain unusually high proportions of the heavy rare earth elements dysprosium and terbium, both essential for high-performance permanent magnets used in electric vehicles, wind turbines, and defense technologies. Third, the project sits in Tasmania, a mining jurisdiction with over a century of operating history and established infrastructure.

“Our ionic clay has some of the highest proportions of dysprosium and terbium of any clay worldwide,” Cooksey said. “And being located in Tasmania — only about 50 kilometers from a major town — means we have the potential to get into production relatively quickly and at relatively low cost.”

The company has also begun aligning itself with downstream processors. ABx signed a memorandum of understanding in 2024 with Ucore Rare Metals Inc. (TSXV: UCU | OTCQX: UURAF), which is developing a rare earth separation facility in Louisiana.

Cooksey described the relationship as a natural fit.

“Ucore is looking for mixed rare earth carbonate with high heavy rare earth content,” he said. “We’re producing exactly that and looking for the right separation plant to turn it into rare earth oxides.”

ABx’s development strategy also draws on the company’s earlier work as a bauxite explorer. The rare earth-bearing clay layer sits beneath a bauxite resource already advanced through parts of the regulatory approval process. Mining the bauxite could expose the rare earth clays beneath, potentially accelerating development.

“There are logistical synergies,” Cooksey said. “And we’ve already demonstrated in Tasmania that we can operate responsibly.”

The company is currently advancing engineering studies while continuing exploration and metallurgical work. Cooksey said the goal is to move toward production within a few years, even if initially at modest scale.

“When we talk to customers and ask how much volume they need, the answer is always the same,” he said. “Whatever you can get us.”

For Cooksey, that urgency reflects a broader structural gap in the rare earth supply chain.

“Customers and societies need more rare earths, particularly the heavies,” he said. “That’s the critical edge that ABx can deliver.”

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“A trillion here, a trillion here, pretty soon you’re talking about real money.” I’m paraphrasing the late great U.S Senator, Everett Dirksen, of Illinois, who presciently said, “A billion here, a billion there, pretty soon you’re talking about real money.”

Today’s administrators and bureaucrats in Washington no longer seem to care either about the foreseeable long-term consequences of their financial largesse or about any demonstrated ability of the recipients of that largesse to carry out the tasks for which they are being compensated in advance. This is politics, not economics.

It’s easy to attribute the financial actions of Washington’s power brokers to a lack of understanding of how to craft long-term fixes to immediate economic and social problems. Grand social schemes come out of Washington daily, but the detailed execution of the policies to implement and support such schemes is usually just of the moment, and not crafted after trial and error to see how they actually work in practice. Re-election is the goal of Washington’s aristocrats and their servants, not policy success in the long term.

One current “crisis” being addressed with a flood of borrowed capital is the critical minerals, metals, or materials secure domestic supply chains deficit. That is the subject of this discussion.

About a quarter of a century ago, in ancient history for elected officials, the U.S. government and the financial “industry,” two mistaken policies were adopted in concert. First, they discarded vertical integration in the heavy manufacturing industry as a standard policy, and second, they encouraged and supported Chinese entry into the World Trade Organization, WTO, as a “developing” country. Both of these “policies” were intended to increase American consumption by lowering the costs of goods for American consumers, thereby increasing the profits of the financiers of the nation’s trade and of the industries then focused on final assembly and distribution rather than on supply chain maintenance and raw material sourcing.

China, never a mercantilist nation, because it was always self-sufficient in resources and domestic markets for what it considered important to the maintenance of its society, quickly saw an opening and took it. It openly adopted a planned and measured industrial policy to secure self-sufficiency in raw materials and process technologies, making it independent of the rest of the world economically and allowing the foolishly blinded Western democracies to pay for it.

The Chinese domestic market evolved and Chinese foreign policy as it related to natural resources developed as Thomas Kreumer, the Rare Earth Observer, wrote recently:

Resource preservation: During the early 2000s experts began warning the Chinese government that China’s economic growth rates were unsustainable, if industries would base on domestic resources.

Chinese enterprises hastened abroad to secure overseas resources. Owing to lack of experience, the failure rate of subsequent overseas resource investments was absolutely spectacular until about 10 years ago.

Domestically, a host of more or less crude measures were taken. But unfortunately, this fell into the Hu Jin Tao era (2002-2012), arguably the most corrupt period in China since the late Qing Dynasty (1644-1912). Content of regulation would literally evaporate at Beijing city limits, because provincial bigwigs would view compliance with directives from Beijing being optional. So Beijing started “crack-down” campaigns (also the core reason of the rare earth crisis 2010-2011).

After Xi Jin Ping ascended to the presidentship in 2013, the age of obedience and compliance began, also known as rule of law and strict party discipline. After declaring ideological war on western values in his Document No. 9, began removing the old guard, while his devoted lieutenants Wang Qishan and Zhao Leiji hunted down corrupt officials at any level everywhere (tigers and flies). Finishing the job, Xi had his predecessor Hu Jin Tao thrown out of the closing session 20th National People’s Congress….

Also the key performance indicator for provincial officials was toned down. Local GDP growth went from being the No. 1 KPI to one among several KPIs.

Everything was systematically codified, ages-old, scattered regulation was folded into laws (e.g. the Rare Earth Law).

In 2016 the decades-old Resource Tax Law – a small tax applicable to all and any natural resources – was completely revamped. After successful pilots in selected provinces and selected resources it was finally fully implemented in 2020.

The law imposes ad-valorem taxation on domestic resources. It does not apply to imported resources. In mining, it has the effect that imported resource are cost-wise more attractive than domestic resources.

Here the resource tax applicable to rare earths:

While the definition of “light” rare earth and “heavy” rare earth elements is entirely arbitrary, for purposes of the Resource Tax the Chinese definition is the base. Promethium is missing because it is extinct.

Apart from the above, China has Comprehensive Resource Utilisation policy which, among other duties, compels miners to develop also by-products. It is about squeezing the lemon dry. Rules and regulations also apply tight, numerical emission standards. The enforcement is rigid. Overall, it is effective, but it drives up cost.

Anyway, problem solved, China’s imports of ores and concentrates were booming.”

The expansion of primary minerals production without a concomitant and contemporary expansion of downstream processing and end user product manufacturing is economically ignorant and destructive of pricing power. I see no difference between the old Soviet era policy of constantly increasing production goals and American announcements of the building of huge primary product capacities without regard, either then or now, to actual demand. As my colleague, Thomas Kreumer, the Rare Earth Observer, has shown above, the setting of production goals without regard to actual measured or rationally predicted demand is a specialty of academic economics and ideologies, such as Communism, Socialism, and state Capitalism.

Contemporary American predictions of future demand for rare earth permanent magnets are almost entirely fantasy projections based on the hope that the share prices of the companies whose production is to fill these imaginary demands will just go up and up.

Today’s politicians and their bureaucratic servants , whose education in historical capitalism is wanting, and who make judgments based solely on ideology will soon find out that Margaret Thatcher was right about the cause of the failure of socialist economies. They will run out of the ability to borrow other people’s money and waste it on fantasy investments in open-ended supply.

The critical minerals complex recently formed by the U.S. Government’s permanent bureaucracy in service to its elected elites is simply a waste of money until and unless it reaches out to America’s established production industries for information and advice on actual and projected demand and to identify the choke points in the necessary supply chains on an industry by industry basis and solicits further advice on how to ameliorate and remove the choke points.

My opinion on why the above industry advice has not been sought is that such conversations would reveal to the public the serious American financial and educational shortcomings caused by very poor policies in the recent past, promulgated by both political parties

The recent Wall Street Journal report on the Detroit automakers’ $50 billion reckoning over electric vehicles reads as though the story begins and ends with balance sheets. It does not. It begins in the mines and ends in the magnet factories.

The Journal chronicles the retreat of General Motors Company (NYSE: GM), Ford Motor Company (NYSE: F), and Stellantis from the mandated EV boom. It notes that U.S. EV sales fell more than 30% in the fourth quarter after the expiration of the $7,500 federal tax credit. It tallies the write-downs. What it does not mention is the immediate and profound consequence for the American critical minerals industry.

Let me state it plainly: if there is no mandated surge in EV production, there will be no surge in demand for rare earth permanent magnet motors. And if there is no surge in magnet motor production, then the demand for the heavy rare earths dysprosium and terbium collapses in tandem.

These two elements are not decorative additives. Dysprosium and terbium are used to allow neodymium-iron-boron magnets to operate at high temperatures—precisely the requirement of traction motors in electric vehicles and large wind turbines. Remove the exponential growth assumption in EVs and wind, and you remove the principal growth driver for heavy rare earth demand in the United States.

Wind turbine demand is also softening domestically. Thus, the two pillars upon which American projections for rare earth magnet growth were constructed—EVs and wind—are both weakening simultaneously.

Yet we have announced plans to build roughly 40,000 tons per year of rare earth permanent magnet capacity in the United States.

Forty thousand tons.

Against what demand?

Even with optimistic assumptions, the American EV market over the coming decade is unlikely to exceed 10% of total U.S. light-vehicle sales. Under such a scenario, total annual domestic demand for dysprosium and terbium for automotive traction motors would struggle to exceed 50 tons combined. For the light rare earths—primarily neodymium and praseodymium—the total demand for magnet production serving both internal combustion accessory motors and EV traction motors would likely aggregate around 15,000 tons per year. Of that, roughly 5,000 tons would represent contained neodymium and praseodymium metals.

The remainder is commodity magnet material, currently selling into a China-dominated global market at approximately $50 per kilogram.

This is not a market that tolerates high cost structures. In a free-market economy, the business to supply 5,000 tons of neodymium-praseodymium and 50 tons of dysprosium-terbium will go to the lowest-cost producer. It always has. It always will.

The United States military’s demand for rare earth permanent magnet motors is classified, but the Department of War has given us a clue. It has financed a magnet facility in South Carolina with capacity under 2,000 tons per year. That figure suggests the true defense requirement is modest—measured, not monumental.

Yet federal agencies have underwritten substantial expansions of magnet and materials capacity, often taking equity stakes in companies that have no history of commercial production. These commitments were justified on the premise of a burgeoning domestic EV market. That premise is now visibly impaired.

One can understand why OEM automotive manufacturers invested aggressively in batteries and motors when regulatory mandates and subsidies signaled inevitability. What is harder to understand is why federal agencies guaranteed floor prices and extended capital to projects disconnected from demonstrable, durable demand—beyond the limited needs of defense procurement.

Meanwhile, the domestic battery build-out is retrenching. OEM demand for lithium, cobalt, nickel, and manganese is uncertain at best. Billions in previously announced EV and battery investments have already been cancelled. Plants designed for EV motors are pivoting back to V-8 engines.

This is not ideology; it is arithmetic.

A sharp reduction in projected U.S. EV penetration implies a commensurate reduction in domestic demand for rare earth permanent magnets and their constituent materials. The mining and refining sector will not be insulated from this recalibration. Projects justified on growth curves that no longer exist will face the discipline of markets.

There will be a Darwinian cull.

Only the lowest-cost, most technically competent, and financially disciplined producers will survive. That is not pessimism; it is the operating principle of every manufacturing and supply industry in history.

The end of the mandated EV boom is not merely an automotive story. It is a minerals story, a magnet story, and a capital allocation story. And it is one that the mining industry would do well to read—carefully.

The past two weeks have laid bare a quickening scramble for control of critical minerals. In Brazil, officials touted the nation’s status as holding the world’s second-largest, rare earth reserves, as the United States and China jostle for access and the European Union increasingly joins the fray. Domestic Brazilian mining ventures, flush with ionic clay rare earth deposits, are urging Brasília to back homegrown processing and value-add projects. Indeed, companies have sought government and multilateral support to develop Brazilian critical minerals infrastructure, aiming to convert buried wealth into industrial strength. That imperative has only grown as foreign powers circle: a Financial Times report notes the US, EU, and China are all eyeing Brazil’s rare earth bounty. In a sign of how geopolitics and industry intertwine, Washington just agreed to finance Brazil’s first rare earth oxides producer – privately-held Mineração Serra Verde – with a $565 million package and even an option to take an equity stake [Source]. The deal, announced by U.S. Vice President JD Vance, comes as part of a broader push to create a “preferential trade bloc” for critical minerals and establish price floors to counter China’s market sway [Source]. Serra Verde’s heavy rare earth mine, now ramping up output, offers a Western alternative to Chinese supply chains, especially after the firm cut short its processing contracts with China to free up output for new buyers. By bankrolling Serra Verde’s expansion, the U.S. is effectively buying a foothold in Brazil’s rare earth sector – and by extension, tilting the global balance of these strategic elements back toward the Americas.

Parallel efforts to fortify non-Chinese supply networks unfolded across multiple fronts. In Washington, a high-profile Critical Minerals Ministerial convened delegations from 54 countries to coordinate strategy [Source]. As part of that summit, the United States inked a flurry of bilateral agreements – 11 new critical-mineral accords – including a framework with the United Arab Emirates to accelerate secure supply chains [Source]. Under that UAE–US framework, American strategic stockpiles and Emirati reserves will be leveraged to speed up production and processing, buttressed by public-private investment to expand refining capacity [Source]. The message: supply security is a shared priority. A similar Memorandum of Understanding was signed with the United Kingdom to “intensify cooperative efforts” in mining and processing, aligning economic policy tools and coordinated investment to build diversified, resilient markets[Source]. Across the Atlantic, Canada’s western provinces and northern territories struck their own pact – a Western Canada Critical Minerals Strategy – pledging to make the region a global hub of sustainable critical mineral development and to co-invest in infrastructure for new mines and processing plants [Source]. And in North America’s southern flank, the U.S. and Mexico rolled out a 60-day action plan to harmonize critical mineral trade policies, including exploring border-adjusted price floors for imports [Source]. This U.S.-Mexico plan will identify specific mining and processing projects for joint support, aiming to shore up vulnerable supply chains without explicitly naming China. Taken together, these alliances – from London to Abu Dhabi to Mexico City – underscore a rapidly coalescing Western front in the minerals race.

No initiative, however, has drawn as much debate as Washington’s flirtation with price controls. In early February, Vice President Vance stood before ministers in D.C. and floated a bold vision: a critical minerals trading bloc “protected from external disruptions through enforceable price floors” [Source]. Under this plan, allied nations would jointly guarantee minimum prices for key minerals at each stage of production, preventing state-subsidized competitors from undercutting producers and then “jacking up prices to a completely unfair level” later [Source]. The price floors would be upheld via adjustable tariffs, effectively insulating mines and refiners within the bloc from the boom-bust swings of a China-dominated market. It was a striking proposal – but one that came just days after signs of internal hesitation. On January 29, Reuters reported that the Trump administration was quietly stepping back from plans to fix minimum prices for U.S. projects, citing lack of congressional funding and the complexity of setting fair benchmarks [Source]. At a closed-door meeting with mining executives, officials bluntly said companies must prove financially viable without government props: “We’re not here to prop you guys up… Don’t come to us expecting that,” a Department of Energy official was quoted as saying [Source]. Instead, Washington indicated it might use trade tools – such as Section 232 tariffs – to impose broader market-wide price floors on imports [Source]. That nuance suggests a pivot from individual backstops (company deals like one granted last year to MP Materials) to a collective mechanism via a trade alliance. Allies appear amenable: prior to Vance’s February pitch, Group of Seven partners had been discussing joint price-support measures of their own [Source]. Australia, for one, took the U.S. wavering in stride. Canberra’s resources minister affirmed that America’s retreat from guaranteeing prices “won’t stop Australia pursuing our critical minerals strategic reserve programme” [Source]. Australia is plowing ahead with a A$1.2 billion strategic stockpile – prioritizing metals like antimony, gallium and rare earth elements – and even contemplating its own price-floor schemes through offtake agreements [Source]. By week’s end, it appeared the U.S. had not fully abandoned the concept so much as re-scoped it: the preferential trade zone floated by Vice President JD Vance would shift price support from a unilateral backstop to a multilateral framework, enforced through coordinated trade measures rather than direct subsidies. Whether the proposal ultimately hardens into policy or remains diplomatic signaling, Washington’s posture—seeking to catalyze new mines while resisting the perception of underwriting them—highlights the narrow path between industrial strategy and market discipline.

We also spoke with Critical Minerals Institute (CMI) Co-Chair Jack Lifton in an interview whose title stands on its own: Trump’s Critical Minerals “Project Vault”: Jack Lifton Calls It “Theater” https://bit.ly/4a8RZ4U

Even as governments hash out rules and alliances, industry players are repositioning for this new era. In a notable reset of the electric-vehicle supply chain, automaker Stellantis N.V. (NYSE: STLA) agreed to sell its entire 49% stake in a Canadian battery plant joint venture to partner LG Energy Solution Ltd. (KRX: 373220) – for a nominal $100 [Source]. The Windsor, Ontario “NextStar Energy” factory, a C$5 billion investment launched in 2022 to supply EV batteries, will now be wholly owned by LG, which says it will repurpose the site to focus on energy storage systems while continuing to supply Stellantis and other automakers. Stellantis, for its part, is taking a massive €22.2 billion charge and scaling back its EV ambitions amid faltering demand [Source]. That demand slump is directly tied to politics: EV sales have stagnated after the Trump administration scrapped consumer purchase incentives last year [Source]. The Stellantis-LG disentanglement thus signals a strategic retreat – one accelerated by shifting U.S. policy – even as overall battery investment in North America remains high. Meanwhile, in the energy sector, a new dynamic is unfolding at the intersection of digital infrastructure and power supply. NextEra Energy, Inc. (NYSE: NEE), the largest U.S. utility, revealed it is in advanced talks to deliver up to 9 gigawatts of electricity to data centers by expanding its nuclear fleet [Source]. With Big Tech’s ravenous data centers driving U.S. power demand to record highs, NextEra has even moved to restart a previously shuttered reactor (Iowa’s Duane Arnold plant) to serve Google’s servers [Source]. On an investor call, NextEra said it could add about 6 GW of new nuclear – potentially including small advanced reactors on existing sites – and is considering greenfield sites for more, all aimed at tech clients [Source]. This marks a revival of nuclear energy’s fortunes, framed not only as a clean energy move but as critical infrastructure for the information age. It’s no coincidence that the U.S. Department of Energy is simultaneously hustling to rebuild the nuclear fuel supply chain. On January 28, DOE invited states to host new “Nuclear Lifecycle Innovation Campuses” – essentially one-stop hubs for uranium enrichment, fuel fabrication, reprocessing and even advanced reactor deployment – in a bid to modernize the full nuclear fuel cycle domestically [Source]. Energy Secretary Chris Wright cast it as unleashing a “next American nuclear renaissance” to meet future power needs and regain technological leadership [Source]. Yet even as the administration promotes nuclear growth, investigative reports reveal it has also been quietly loosening safety rules to speed things along. NPR broke the news that last year the Department of Energy secretly rewrote its nuclear safety and security directives, “slashing hundreds of pages of detailed requirements” and replacing them with vaguer standards that give reactor developers more leeway [Source]. This stealth deregulation – done without public announcement – was intended to fast-track an experimental fleet of reactors for AI data centers and other uses. Watchdogs like the Union of Concerned Scientists warn that gutting decades-old safeguards in the name of expedience is a risky gambit [Source]. For the companies poised to benefit, however, time is of the essence: the race to build next-generation nuclear (and secure the uranium to fuel it) is now part and parcel of the critical minerals contest, intersecting with the tech industry’s hunger for reliable, carbon-free power.

Commodity markets have registered these strategic undercurrents in real time. Copper, often dubbed “Dr. Copper” for its economic barometer role, suddenly spiked to an all-time high above $14,000 per metric ton in late January [Source]. In a single session, LME copper jumped 11% – the biggest one-day leap in 15 years – hitting $14,527 before profit-taking pulled it back to a still-record $13,612 [Source]. Traders described a frenzy of speculative buying, stoked by expectations of robust demand from electrification and data infrastructure, plus a weaker U.S. dollar and a backdrop of geopolitical tension. The rally defied soft physical demand in China (Chinese copper premiums have sunk to two-year lows) and high inventory levels in U.S. warehouses [Source], suggesting financial flows – perhaps betting on longer-term supply tightness – drove the surge. Analysts noted a “dilemma for investors” as such prices far outstrip current fundamentals [Source]. By contrast, tungsten, a niche but vital metal, has been on a more fundamentally driven tear. Prices for tungsten’s main intermediate, ammonium paratungstate (APT), rocketed to record highs around $1,125 per metric ton unit in China and $1,100 in Europe [Source]. The catalyst is clear: China, which produces the lion’s share of the world’s tungsten, imposed export controls a year ago that have slashed its overseas shipments by ~40% [Source]. With ex-China production fragmentary and unable to fill the gap, consumers from aerospace to tooling are scrambling for supplies in what was already a tight market [Source]. “There are a lot of reasons for tungsten to go up,” one trader noted – strong demand from defense and industrial sectors, declining ore grades at mines, and on top of that, China’s export permits squeezing availability  [Source]. Beijing recently moved to centralize tungsten export licensing to just 15 companies, reinforcing an expectation that overseas buyers will face continued scarcity [Source]. The tungsten pinch illustrates how export policy is now a strategic lever – a mirror image of Western stockpiling or trade agreements – with immediate impacts on prices. Each spike in these markets, whether speculative or supply-driven, underscores the stakes: critical minerals can swing wildly in value when nations and investors play tug-of-war with access.

As the U.S. retools its own supply lines, it is also striking new deals to “friend-shore” minerals from abroad. On January 29, Washington signed a reciprocal trade agreement with El Salvador that, for the first time, opens the tiny country’s mining sector to U.S. companies [Source]. El Salvador had banned metals mining for years on environmental grounds, but under President Nayib Bukele the ban was lifted in 2024, and now a 10-year critical minerals pact is on the table. The deal will allow U.S. firms to explore for and extract lithium, rare earths and more in El Salvador, with the Salvadoran side agreeing to provide necessary energy and infrastructure support on terms at least as favorable as those offered to other investors [Source]. In return, El Salvador gains better access to U.S. markets and a commitment of U.S. collaboration on export controls and defense trade [Source]. Bukele hailed it as the Western Hemisphere’s first “reciprocal trade” deal of its kind, emphasizing it aligns his country with U.S. standards on everything from vehicle emissions to mineral sourcing [Source]. Farther afield in Africa, a major coup was announced: the Democratic Republic of Congo will ship 100,000 metric tons of copper to the United States this year from its Chinese-operated Tenke Fungurume mine [Source]. The arrangement, coordinated via DRC’s state miner Gécamines, essentially redirects a chunk of Congolese copper – currently produced under Chinese investment – toward U.S. supply chains. Congolese officials cast it as part of a plan to diversify partnerships and strengthen ties with Washington [Source]. The move is telling: for years China has had a lock on DRC’s copper-cobalt output through long-term deals, but now Kinshasa is leveraging that output as a bargaining chip with the West. It mirrors an overall “friend-shoring” strategy where the U.S. is using offtake agreements and financing to pry resources away from China’s orbit [Source]. Indeed, a new U.S.-Africa minerals strategy seems to be emerging. At the D.C. ministerial, African mining powers – from Morocco and Guinea (key bauxite sources) to Zambia and the DRC (copper-cobalt) – were prominently represented [Source]. And in Latin America, a quiet realignment is afoot: Bolivia’s new government just canceled a $350 million zinc smelter contract that had been awarded to a Chinese consortium, citing “terrible overpricing,” and is demanding a Chinese firm remedy serious flaws at a recently built steel mill [Source]. The Bolivian mining minister bluntly said Chinese partners failed to meet commitments and that “China’s prestige is at stake” in these projects [Source]. La Paz’s pivot reflects not only frustration with project performance but a broader openness to non-Chinese investors; officials there hinted they want to court companies from Canada and Australia to replace “looting” deals with more equitable partnerships [Source]. Even U.S. allies are diversifying supply: Canada is reportedly close to finalizing a C$3 billion (~$2.8 billion) uranium supply agreement with India, a ten-year deal likely to be signed in March when Prime Minister Mark Carney visits New Delhi [Source]. That pact would secure a new long-term export market for Canadian uranium (beyond its traditional buyers like the U.S.), while helping India fuel its expanding nuclear reactor fleet. It shows that critical mineral diplomacy isn’t strictly a West-vs.-China game; it increasingly involves a mosaic of bilateral tie-ups linking resource-rich nations with high-tech and energy-importing economies across the globe.

All these strands – geopolitical deals, corporate shifts, market gyrations – weave into a common narrative: the world’s industrial powers are repositioning supply chains in real time, and the critical minerals sector is in the throes of rapid strategic change. A few years ago, China’s dominance in rare earths, battery metals, and processing capacity seemed unassailable. Now, each week brings announcements aimed at chipping away at that dominance, whether through U.S.-led alliances, huge public-private investments, or policy gambits like stockpiling and price floors. (Notably, President Trump is launching a $12 billion strategic mineral reserve called “Project Vault,” pairing $1.67 billion in private capital with a $10 billion Export-Import Bank loan to procure and store supplies of cobalt, gallium and more [Source]. The idea is to buffer U.S. manufacturers against supply shocks and reduce vulnerability to Chinese export bans [Source].) It is an environment of both unprecedented collaboration among allies and fierce competition between rival spheres of influence. For investors and industry professionals, the implications are profound. We are likely to see continued government intervention – in financing, regulation and trade – as well as heightened market volatility whenever policy shifts catch the market by surprise. But in the medium term, these maneuvers could begin to alleviate the West’s import dependence. New production projects from Saskatchewan to South Africa may get the political tailwinds they need, while once-skeptical financiers take comfort in guaranteed offtakes or insurance-like price floors. Already, rare earth magnet factories are springing up outside China, and idled mines (for instance in the U.S. and Australia) are being reconsidered for reopening. In short, the critical minerals ecosystem is being rewired. And the coming months will test how effectively the emerging partnerships and initiatives can translate talk into tonnage – and whether the delicate balance of market forces and government support can ultimately deliver the stable, diversified critical mineral supplies that the green and digital transitions demand. All that is certain is that the race is on and accelerating fast.

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InvestorNews Critical Minerals Institute (CMI) Directorial Headline Picks for the Past Two Week:

• February 7, 2026 – The three-way race for Brazil’s rare earths heats up (Source)
• February 6, 2026 – UAE and US sign critical minerals and rare earths framework (Source)
• February 6, 2026 – Stellantis selling its stake of Ontario battery factory to South Korea’s LG Energy Solution (Source)
• February 5, 2026 – US provides rare earths miner Serra Verde with $565 million financing, stake option (Source)
• February 5, 2026 – UK and US sign Memorandum of Understanding on critical minerals (Source)
• February 4, 2026 – US proposes critical minerals trade bloc aimed at countering China (Source)
• February 4, 2026 – US, Mexico to develop coordinated trade policies on critical minerals (Source)
• February 4, 2026 – Vance says US will establish price floor system for critical minerals (Source)
• February 4, 2026 – US nuclear power regulator plans changes in line with Trump’s goals on reactors (Source)
• February 2, 2026 – Trump to Launch $12 Billion Critical Mineral Stockpile to Blunt Reliance on China (Source)
• February 1, 2026 – Canada Nears $3 Billion Uranium Deal With India, May Be Inked In March (Source)
• February 1, 2026 – US, UK, EU, Australia and more to meet to discuss critical minerals alliance (Source)
• January 30, 2026 – Australia says US price floor backdown won’t derail its critical minerals strategy (Source)
• January 29, 2026 – US moves away from critical mineral price floors, sources say (Source)
• January 29, 2026 – US to Seek Rare Earth Price Mechanism During Meetings With Allies, Official Says (Source)
• January 29, 2026 – Tungsten rises to record highs as export curbs turn up supply heat (Source)
• January 29, 2026 – Copper hits record high above $14,000 as speculators pile in (Source)
• January 29, 2026 – US, El Salvador sign trade agreement to boost critical minerals investment (Source)
• January 29, 2026 – DR Congo set to export 100,000 tons of copper from Chinese-run mines to the United States (Source)
• January 29, 2026 – Critical minerals projects in Brazil seek governments support (Source)
• January 28, 2026 – The U.S. at a Strategic Crossroads with China — and the Industrial Policy Lifeline (and Relationships) That Could Save Us. (Source)
• January 28, 2026 – Department of Energy announces new efforts to boost nuclear fuel supply chain (Source)
• January 28, 2026 – The Trump administration has secretly rewritten nuclear safety rules (Source)
• January 27, 2026 – Bolivia Cancels Chinese Zinc Project, Demands Steel Plant Fixes (Source)
• January 27, 2026 – NextEra eyes nuclear power expansion as data center pipeline grows (Source)
• January 27, 2026 – Western provinces and territories sign pact to develop critical minerals strategy (Source)
• January 26, 2026 – US–China mineral race heats up as Africa’s top mining nations head to Washington (Source)

InvestorNews.com Media Updates:

• February 8, 2026 – Follow the Money: The U.S. Government Funding Hit List for Critical Minerals Companies (2023–2026) https://bit.ly/4cfe9Fb
• January 28, 2026 – The U.S. at a Strategic Crossroads with China — and the Industrial Policy Lifeline (and Relationships) That Could Save Us. https://bit.ly/4riWoJx

InvestorNews (YouTube) Interview Updates:

• February 04, 2026 – Trump’s Critical Minerals “Project Vault”: Jack Lifton Calls It “Theater” https://youtu.be/uN3-WYNQouc
• February 03, 2026 – Jack Lifton with Guy Bourassa on North America’s Largest Primary Source of Scandium https://youtu.be/knaZ59En_es
• February 03, 2026 – How Wicheeda’s Progress Positions Defense Metals in the Global Rare Earth Supply Chain — Mark Tory with Jack Lifton https://youtu.be/IG5bO4nh7B0
• February 02, 2026 – CMI Masterclass: The Global Economic War for Rare Earths https://youtu.be/UzX6KNCzgao
• February 02, 2026 – Homerun’s 582-Hectare Bet: Turning a Brazilian Silica District Into a Solar-Glass Stronghold https://youtu.be/lC7TygYFADM
• January 29, 2026 – The Critical Minerals Blind Spot Between Washington and Canada https://youtu.be/8xt2L5szvKo
• January 27, 2026 – The Silver Market Bull Run — Silver Bullet Mines’ Peter Clausi Reveals What’s Driving the Market https://youtu.be/95olje59M-Q

InvestorNews.com News Release Updates:

• February 6, 2026 – Oreterra Announces Engagement of Generation IACP Inc. to Provide Market Making Services and Engagement of Investing News Network to Provide Advertising and Investor Awareness Services https://bit.ly/3NYgJWc
• February 5, 2026 – Spartan Metal’s New Land Package includes Past Producing Yellow Jacket Tungsten Mine https://bit.ly/4ajWJVD
• February 5, 2026 – Silver Bullet Mines Corp. Announces Major Acquisition of Two Past Producing Mines https://bit.ly/4tySG0q
• February 4, 2026 – Trinity One Metals Closes Acquisition of “Silver-1” Historic Silver Mine in Southern Ecuador https://bit.ly/4a00rVi
• February 4, 2026 – Scandium Canada Announces that Mr. Jeff Swinoga has Joined its Board of Directors as Chairman https://bit.ly/4ti17wM
• February 3, 2026 – Happy Creek Announces Intended Name Change to Fox Tungsten Ltd. https://bit.ly/4abF8yL
• February 3, 2026 – Antimony Resources Corp. (ATMY) (ATMYF) (K8J0) Discovers New Massive Stibnite Mineralization at the Marcus (West) Zone and Have Exposed the Mineralization in Bedrock over a Distance of 25 Meters https://bit.ly/4rxcbEP
• February 3, 2026 – Grid Metals Continues to Expand Cesium Mineralization at Falcon West https://bit.ly/3Zh5RoN
• February 2, 2026 – Homerun Resources Inc. Completes District Control Strategy with Purchase Agreement for 582 Hectares of Land and Surface Rights over Santa Maria Eterna High Purity Silica Sand District, in Belmonte, Bahia, Brazil https://bit.ly/4qWJFMW
• January 30, 2026 – Silver Bullet Mines Corp. Announces First Payment From Arizona Operations https://bit.ly/3M8jZgW
•  January 30, 2026 – Australian Strategic Materials Limited: Quarterly Activities Report to 31 December 2025 https://bit.ly/4qVGR2G
• January 29, 2026 – Romios to Commence Trading Post Consolidation as Oreterra Metals Corp. Under Ticker OTMC on Monday, February 2, 2026 https://bit.ly/3Md9dGj
• January 28, 2026 – Homerun Resources Inc. Announces Five-Fold Increase in Solar Glass Offtake with Sengi Solar from 20,000 to 100,000 Tonnes per Year Priced at USD 750 per Tonne https://bit.ly/4rifLCo
• January 28, 2026 – American Rare Earths Limited: Quarterly Activities Report for the Period Ending 31 December 2025 https://bit.ly/4t9Y6yM
• January 27, 2026 – Quantum Secures Claim Covering Historic Silver Workings at Babine South, British Columbia https://bit.ly/45yAf1z
• January 26, 2026 – West High Yield (W.H.Y.) Resources Ltd. Advances Processing Pilot Program, and Announces Permitting Advancement and Closing of Non-Brokered Private Placement https://bit.ly/4qA2qWa
• January 26, 2026 – Antimony Resources Corp. (ATMY) (ATMYF) (K8J0) Reports More Massive Antimony-Bearing Stibnite (“Sb”) of 5.10% Sb over 4.0 meters, 2.15% Sb over 6.85 meters and 2.38% Sb over 9.60 meters https://bit.ly/49Fg6Jx
• January 26, 2026 – Homerun Resources Inc. 100% Owned Subsidiary Homerun Energy Reaches Stability Breakthrough in Large-Area Perovskite Modules Retaining More than 95% Efficiency After >5000 Hours https://bit.ly/4r5AlWs
• January 26, 2026 – Allied Critical Metals Launches 20,000 Meter 2026 Drill Program at its Borralha Tungsten Project in Northern Portugal https://bit.ly/3ZuV8XN
• January 26, 2026 – Volta Intersects High-Grade Gallium Mineralization at the Springer REE Project in Ontario, Canada https://bit.ly/3ZjvbKZ

About the Critical Minerals Institute (CMI):
The Critical Minerals Institute (CMI) is a global brain trust for the critical minerals economy, serving as a hub that connects companies, capital markets, and policymakers. Through CMI Masterclasses, the weekly Critical Minerals Report (CMR), bespoke research, and board-level advisory services, CMI delivers actionable intelligence spanning exploration finance, supply chains, and geopolitics.

CMI also convenes the flagship Annual Critical Minerals Institute Summit, a global gathering of government leaders, institutional investors, and industry executives. The next event, CMI Summit V, themed “The New Critical Minerals Economy,” will take place May 13–14, 2026, in Toronto, Canada.
For more information, visit CriticalMineralsInstitute.com or contact CMI Executive Director Tracy Hughes at +1 647-289-7714 or [email protected].

The rare earth industry has stopped being a supply chain and started behaving like a lever of power. In a recent Critical Minerals Institute (CMI) Masterclass, Melissa “Mel” Sanderson framed the moment with the kind of blunt historical bookends that turn policy talk into something closer to strategy: in 2011, she argued, “today began” when China curtailed Japan’s access to rare earths—an early signal that minerals could be used as statecraft, not commerce. A decade later, she said, COVID exposed a different vulnerability: “the longer your supply chain, the more fragile it is.” Put those shocks together and you get what Sanderson called “a geopolitical landscape in flux not seen since World War II,” with the world—whether it admits it or not—slipping into “a global economic war.”

She opened with a deceptively simple question, limited to four countries: Brazil, India, the United States, and Canada. Which one is on track to “success” over the next decade—defined as national security, the well-being of citizens, and control of a critical mineral supply chain?

Constantine Karayannopoulos—the former President, CEO and Chairman of Neo Performance Materials Inc. (TSX: NEO | OTCQX: NOPMF)—began with a warning that sounded less like punditry than scar tissue: “there are no guarantees of success. There are no magic bullets.” Still, he said he “really like[s] what Brazil is doing,” describing advisory work with the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) and a “billion-dollar fund” structure he characterized as unusually practical: a pool of public and private capital—he cited contributions including a “couple hundred million dollars” from Vale—allocated not by political ministry, but by “two arms-length financial institutions… private equity companies.” In his account, the design mattered as much as the size: grants, equity, and debt deployed across the chain “all the way down to EVs and motors and magnets,” with professional managers forced to price risk instead of slogans.

Sanderson’s follow-up to Jack Lifton sharpened the problem: if you were picking winners in a sector dominated by juniors, what criteria would you use? Lifton answered in three words—“Competence, experience, prior success”—then accused northern governments of funding in the dark. “National governments… have very little technical due diligence competence,” he said, arguing that private capital avoids the space because it can’t see a credible path to profit. When he looked at U.S. award decisions, he said, “I cannot believe they’ve done that. I don’t see companies with experienced people with a record of success.”

Then Lifton broke from Karayannopoulos’s country pick. “I would pick India,” he said, not because the ore is easy, but because the labor is deep: a vast reservoir of engineers, a huge internal market, and long-standing industrial know-how across the “enabled-product supply chain.” He claimed India is often omitted from popular lists of separation capacity despite an operating plant he said was funded by Toyota and Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL), and he noted—pointedly—that India had “prohibited the export of finished rare earths.” Sanderson translated Lifton’s core thesis into a single phrase: “the knowledge gap,” the element that “takes the longest to develop.”

That knowledge gap fed her next provocation: is every country chasing “soup to nuts” supply chains doomed, and will today’s blocs—she name-checked BRICS—collapse into a new specialization model? Lifton’s reply was immediate: “No.” Globalization, he said, is ending; the world is “fracturing into regional and even national-focused powerhouses.” The United States, in his view, will be “self-sufficient” in what it needs in rare earths within 10 years, but not a competitive exporter because “our costs will be too high.” He mocked the breezy rhetoric of “redeveloping” capacity: “That’s like bringing back your teeth. They don’t come back.”

Karayannopoulos countered with lived experience from the last rare earth shock, the 2010 China–Japan episode. He recalled “containers… stuck” in Shanghai en route to a Japanese client; when Japan’s chipmakers stopped shipping components back, factories in southern China shut down and “150,000 people were out on the street.” The crisis ended, he argued, because there was a functioning rules system: the World Trade Organization ultimately found against China’s export restrictions, and China moved to comply. Then came the whiplash: “prices collapsed,” buyers “forgot about… resilience,” and the marquee U.S. rare earth bet—Molycorp—filed for Chapter 11 in 2015. It is hard to design industrial strategy, he implied, when the incentive structure resets every time a crisis fades.

Where Lifton saw mercantilism as destiny, Karayannopoulos warned it would produce a “Hobbesian world,” and insisted globalization can still “be a force for good” under enforceable rules. He also disputed the casual inflation of defense demand. “Less than 2% of global rare earth demand goes into defense applications,” he said, calling the “920 pounds… per F-35” claim “complete and total bunk,” and cautioning that you “cannot build an industrial rare earth supply chain on the back of military demand alone.”

Yet mercantilism kept reappearing—this time through energy, capital, and the ambitions of Saudi Arabia. Sanderson dragged the conversation toward the Middle East and Central Asia: if self-sufficiency is the ideology of the decade, who wins besides China and the United States? Karayannopoulos argued Saudi Arabia’s industrial push is “real money” and “real,” citing the kingdom’s automotive and minerals plans, including investment in Lucid, interest from Hyundai, a rare earth project mandate involving Ma’aden, and the role of the Public Investment Fund in building downstream capacity. Lifton, for his part, described a China that has turned mercantilism into architecture—“Belt and Road,” he said, is an empire of ports, loans, and captive trade flows.

Even the electric vehicle debate—once a proxy for optimism—became a dispute over realism. Lifton argued flatly there will not be an EV revolution in America; Karayannopoulos refused to “bet against” China’s EV ascendancy, and pointed to the way Chinese consumer products have forced themselves into Western executives’ imaginations, referencing the widely reported Ford Motor Company CEO Jim Farley who imported a Xiaomi SU7 from China and commented that he “didn’t want to give it up.”

By the end, Sanderson returned to the only question that survives every ideological argument: what is real demand, and who can profitably meet it without subsidies becoming a business model? Lifton’s irritation crystallized into a line that sounded like a diagnosis of the entire decade’s critical-minerals boom: “The simple issue… that’s not addressed is: what is the actual demand right now? What will it be in 10 years?” He paused, then dared the room to do the boring work that history rewards: “Just tell me what the demand is.”

About the Critical Minerals Institute (CMI):
The Critical Minerals Institute (CMI) is a global brain trust for the critical minerals economy, serving as a hub that connects companies, capital markets, and policymakers. Through CMI Masterclasses, the weekly Critical Minerals Report (CMR), bespoke research, and board-level advisory services, CMI delivers actionable intelligence spanning exploration finance, supply chains, and geopolitics.

CMI also convenes the flagship Annual Critical Minerals Institute Summit, a global gathering of government leaders, institutional investors, and industry executives. The next event, CMI Summit V, themed “The New Critical Minerals Economy,” will take place May 13–14, 2026, in Toronto, Canada.
For more information, visit CriticalMineralsInstitute.com or contact CMI Executive Director Tracy Hughes at +1 647-289-7714 or [email protected].

The debate over American economic hegemony is not an abstraction. It is grounded in a concrete truth: industrial power rests on access to natural resources and the means to convert them into the technologies and infrastructure of prosperity. The United States and China are now engaged — whether consciously or by consequence — in a competition defined by how each nation secures the foundations of its productive capacity.

China’s rise to industrial power was not accidental. It was precipitated by the radical transformation of a largely agrarian society under Mao Zedong and perpetuated by the strategic priorities of his successors. The architects of modern China understood that industrialization demands an unbroken supply of raw materials — metals, minerals, energy — and a workforce capable of harnessing them. They also recognized that these resources are not uniformly located; they are scattered across a global landscape of supply and demand. To rectify this mismatch, China inserted itself into the world trading system, joining the World Trade Organization in 2001 and scaling its export-oriented industrial base.

In exchange, Western — particularly American — firms saw an opportunity: access to a vast labor pool and an expanding market. What China offered was simple in concept but profound in consequence: manufacturing capacity at scale and cost. Western capital, technology, management, and intellectual property flowed in. Finished goods flowed out. The world’s assembly line was born. Over time, this arrangement conferred enormous advantages on Chinese industry — advantages that are structural, not cyclical.

The Strategic Structure of Resource Dependence

Today, China dominates the production chains for many critical minerals. These are the elements essential to clean energy technologies, advanced electronics, defense systems, and high-speed communications. While their name implies rarity, they are abundant — but difficult to process economically outside of China due to capital intensity, environmental constraints, and specialized technological expertise.

By one authoritative measure, China today accounts for roughly 70% of rare earth mining, more than 90% of rare earth processing, and over 90% of the world’s rare earth magnet production — the latter being essential in electric vehicles, drones, and precision guidance systems.

These figures are not anomalies. China’s rare earth oxide output in 2024 was approximately 270,000 tonnes, about 75% of global production.

The implications are clear: even when the U.S. or its allies possess resource endowments, the midstream processing capabilities — refining, separation, alloying, magnet manufacture — are overwhelmingly situated in China. This structural dominance means that the United States is not merely a consumer of foreign materials; it is dependent on foreign systems to convert raw inputs into strategic outputs.

In fact, as of 2024, the U.S. was 100% net-import reliant for 12 critical minerals, and 50% or greater net-import reliant for 29 more. Even where domestic extraction exists, without domestic processing, the end products remain foreign-sourced.

This is not a matter of temporary imbalance; it is a strategic configuration wrought by decades of policy choices: the embrace of “free markets” absent a coherent industrial plan, the outsourcing of manufacturing, and an assumption that global markets would reliably self-adjust to supply strategic needs.

China’s Policy Advantage

China’s national strategy has been unapologetically industrial: secure resource chains, build processing capacity, and leverage state coordination to achieve scale. It is not “market capitalism” in the Western sense; it is state-supported economic mobilization toward national priorities. A 2025 analysis by the Council on Strategic and International Studies highlighted how China’s control — approximately 70% of rare earth mining and 90% of refining capacity — poses enduring competitive and security challenges.

The West has responded with a patchwork of initiatives and diplomatic alignments — agreements with Australia on critical mineral development totalling over $8.5 billion in strategic project pipeline commitments, for example. Yet the nature of these efforts remains reactive rather than foundational. They do not, by themselves, constitute an integrated industrial policy that places resource access, processing, and advanced manufacturing at the core of economic strategy.

The Stakes Are Economic, Not Merely Commercial

The challenge posed by China is not a military one first and foremost. It is economic. It is the competition of one resource-rich, policy-driven industrial state against a Western model that has underinvested in its own industrial backbone. The weapon in this contest is not a battleship, but control of supply chains that underpin future technologies and security capabilities.

For all its political self-assurance, Europe too has found itself unable to mount a unified industrial response. Fragmented policy, divergent energy and environmental priorities, and dependence on external sources for critical inputs have left it without a coherent strategy commensurate with the scale of the challenge.

Beyond One-Off Measures: The Need for Industrial Coherence

The question before American policymakers and industry leaders is simple: can the United States articulate and execute an industrial policy capable of defending and advancing its economic primacy? That policy must be comprehensive, aligning trade measures, research and development funding, education and workforce initiatives, and resource security strategies into a coherent national framework.

Is Washington bureaucratically capable of such transformation? The answer, in truth, depends less on individual personalities than on whether there is the political will to reconceive economic policy as a strategy rather than as a residual of market orthodoxy.

Conclusion: The Clock Is Ticking

The United States faces a stark strategic choice. It can continue to react to individual symptoms of industrial decline as discrete policy problems. Or it can grasp the broader reality that industrial power depends on sovereign access to essential materials and the ability to convert them into the technologies that define economic and national strength.

The United States today remains highly dependent on foreign sources for the materials that underpin future industries. As of 2024, the country was 100% net-import reliant for 12 critical minerals and more than 50 percent net-import reliant for nearly 30 additional ones, even where domestic resources exist, because the means to process them are largely offshore.

This dependence is not merely a commercial vulnerability — it is a strategic one. It speaks to a failure of industrial foresight, where market ideology supplanted national strategy and ceded control of supply chains to states that have shown greater willingness to align policy with long-term industrial objectives.

To meet this challenge, American decision-makers must embrace a practical, coherent industrial policy — one that recognizes not only the imperative of domestic capacity but also the opportunities inherent in solid partnerships with like-minded neighbors. Canada, for example, has articulated a comprehensive Critical Minerals Strategy aimed at growing its supply of responsibly sourced metals and fostering secure supply chains for the advanced technologies of tomorrow.

The United States and Canada have already taken steps toward cooperation through initiatives such as the Canada-U.S. Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals Collaboration, explicitly designed to secure the raw materials needed for aerospace, communications, clean energy, and defense applications.

Recognizing that industrial destiny is shaped by choices, not inevitabilities, the U.S. must act with urgency and clarity of purpose. If it fails to do so, it will not be global markets that define its future — but the strategies of those who have already made industrial power a national priority.

The clock is ticking.

The rare earth supply chain just moved a step closer to Western self-sufficiency. In a landmark deal, Australian Strategic Materials Ltd. (ASX: ASM) will be acquired by Energy Fuels Inc. (NYSE American: UUUU | TSX: EFR), creating what ASM CEO Rowena Smith calls a “rare earth mine all the way through to alloy champion.” The transaction, valued at approximately A$447 million, brings together ASM’s metallisation and alloying capabilities with Energy Fuels’ rare earth separation and uranium production infrastructure, offering vertically integrated production across Australia, Korea, and the United States.

The deal, valued at approximately A$447 million, would see Energy Fuels acquire 100% of ASM, including its flagship Dubbo Project and its Korean metals plant. As outlined in the January 21st announcement, ASM shareholders are set to receive an implied value of A$1.60 per share, a 121% premium to ASM’s last closing price. “It was really important for our shareholders that there was an opportunity for ASM shareholders to participate in the value that we were creating,” Smith emphasized during her interview with Tracy Hughes, host at InvestorNews.com.

The implications of the deal reach far beyond shareholder value. Smith underscored the strategic synergy between the two companies, particularly the vertical integration of their capabilities. “This is also about acquiring the metallisation and alloying capability that we’ve established,” she noted. That capability, developed in ASM’s Korean facility, includes advanced metallisation for heavy rare earths like dysprosium and terbium, as well as rare earth alloy strip casting.

For Energy Fuels, the acquisition offers a fast track into downstream value creation. “Energy Fuels is making a 100% acquisition of ASM and all our subsidiaries. That includes our Korean metals plant…and our dedicated technology team,” said Smith. The Dubbo Project, long considered a cornerstone of Australia’s critical minerals potential, becomes a crucial asset. “We’ve got a polymetallic orebody… with light rare earths, heavy rare earths, and a number of other critical minerals including zirconium, hafnium and niobium,” she explained.

Beyond the operational synergies, there is a clear geopolitical dimension. With Australia and the U.S. aligning policies through the Critical Minerals Framework, the combined entity stands to benefit. “We know that this combination of assets… is really in the sweet spot for what that policy is aiming to enable,” said Smith, noting ongoing conversations with both governments and detailed due diligence underway in Utah for a potential U.S. metals plant.

As for the collaboration itself, it was no overnight decision. “In truth, I probably went ‘aha’ before Mark did,” Smith laughed, referring to Energy Fuels CEO Mark Chalmers. “The industry has shifted in the last 12 months to being much more open to working in partnership.”

The integration is expected to proceed over the coming months, with government approvals, including Australia’s FIRB process, and a shareholder vote targeted for mid-2026. “I’m very committed to making sure the transition is successful for both businesses and for the teams,” said Smith, who will lead the transition. “We can see how well these two teams are going to work together.”

And what happens after the vote? For now, the focus is on integration and execution. “One of the pieces we’ll be looking at is how to integrate those teams together to have an integrated office for Energy Fuels in Perth,” she added. As for the industry response: “We really are going to create a near-term Western ‘mine all the way through to alloy’ rare earth champion. We’re going to be leveraging the established capability we have collectively across all steps of that supply chain.”

That supply chain may soon span continents, governments, and technologies—but it began with a simple idea: cooperation with purpose.

To access the complete interview, click here

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As governments from Beijing to Washington tighten control over critical minerals, and supply chains harden along national lines, InvestorNews spoke with Jack Lifton, Co-Chair of the Critical Minerals Institute (CMI), to understand what the past two weeks really signal. Lifton’s answers cut past headlines to reveal a deeper reality: this is no longer about markets—it is about sovereignty, leverage, and survival.

On Venezuela and the illusion of critical minerals opportunity.

InvestorNews: You sent me an article on Venezuela and critical minerals. Hallgarten’s Christopher Ecclestone has said no one really knows what Venezuela has. How do you interpret U.S. and Venezuelan incentives around critical minerals?

Jack Lifton:
“There is no point in thinking about Venezuela as a source of critical minerals. Venezuela is the world’s largest repository of oil, and that is what everyone is after — particularly the United States.

What people may not realize is that the President of the United States recently convened the heads of the major American and British oil companies in Washington. Those companies made it very clear that Venezuela is uninvestable. In other words, they see no credible way to get their money back.

The President has talked about investing $100 billion to restart Venezuela’s oil industry, assuming the oil companies would step in. That is not an unimaginable sum for them — but they refuse to do it. They believe Venezuela is a place where capital is at permanent risk.

So if the world’s largest oil companies will not invest in the world’s largest oil repository, why would any mining company — let alone a junior miner — risk capital there? Especially when we don’t know Venezuela has critical minerals in quantities we cannot obtain elsewhere, in jurisdictions that are more stable and far less prone to nationalization.”

China curbs rare earth exports to Japan: why now?

InvestorNews: China has restricted rare earth exports to Japanese companies after Japan’s dual-use ban. What’s going on?

Jack Lifton:
“The Japanese are far more advanced than most people realize in building non-Chinese rare earth supply chains. They already source all of their light rare earth needs — neodymium, praseodymium, cerium — from outside China. In fact, their supplier produces more than Japan consumes.

Where Japan still has exposure is in heavy rare earths, which are required for specialized, high-performance magnets. To address that, Japan has invested heavily in what is expected to be the world’s largest heavy rare earth separation plant in France. They are also investing in deep-sea mining within their own territorial waters, where deposits are rich in heavy rare earths.

China understands this is a timing issue. If Japan continues on its current path, within five to ten years it will no longer need China for rare earth sourcing. That would mean Japanese companies now joint-venturing in China to make magnets would bring that manufacturing back home.

China is applying pressure to slow or stop that process. That’s what this is really about.”

U.S. awards $2.7 billion to boost uranium enrichment

InvestorNews: The U.S. awarded $2.7 billion to boost uranium enrichment capacity. Your take?

Jack Lifton:
“Right now, the United States depends on Russia for roughly 40% of its nuclear fuel. Russia takes uranium and processes it into enriched fuel, while the U.S. operates the world’s largest fleet of civilian nuclear reactors.

We allowed our nuclear fuel processing industry to disappear because it was cheaper to outsource. That was a mistake.

What the U.S. government is doing now — rebuilding domestic enrichment — is, in my view, the right move. At present, nuclear fuel processing in the U.S. is largely controlled by European companies. Washington wants American companies to take over and reshore the industry.

This will take a long time. It will take a great deal of money. It will not be profitable anytime soon. That is why subsidies are essential. This is a case where Washington had to step in — and did — for the long-term stability of the U.S. electricity system.”

China restricts silver exports.

InvestorNews: China is moving to restrict silver exports. Why silver?

Jack Lifton:
“The Chinese have figured out what hurts the West most as it tries to claw back manufacturing capability. Silver is something we have ignored, and now it’s time to pay attention.

China’s objective is simple and long-standing: to remain the world’s manufacturing center and, by 2049, to become the world’s richest country. Everything they do supports that objective.

Silver has always been money in China. Gold is something they store; silver is something they historically used as currency. The Chinese value precious metals deeply — and silver is their favorite. Why, from their perspective, should they send it to us?”

France, aerospace, and the weaponization of supply chains.

InvestorNews: French aerospace leaders are warning about the weaponization of supply chains. How do you see this?

Jack Lifton:
“The French are not worried about whether the United States can secure critical minerals. They are worried about whether France can.

The Germans are worried about Germany. The British about Britain. Each of these countries has long-standing relationships in Africa, Asia, and South America, and they are actively sourcing critical minerals for their own benefit — often in the same regions the United States is targeting.

This is not coordinated. This is not aligned. It’s a free-for-all.

The Europeans will likely remain broadly aligned with the U.S. rather than China, but they are looking out for themselves first. This is not an EU strategy — it is national strategy. The critical minerals crisis is exposing the limits of European integration.

Defense industries illustrate this clearly. France is building its own nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Germany’s arms industry is expanding rapidly and expects to be paid for supplying Ukraine. These countries are not waiting for Brussels — and they are certainly not waiting for Washington.

The world is reverting to form. Globalization is over. It is now every nation for itself.”

Energy Fuels and Madagascar.

InvestorNews: Any thoughts on the recent news around Energy Fuels Inc.‘s (NYSE American: UUUU | TSX: EFR) Madagascar project?

Jack Lifton:
“This is very good news. Madagascar has long been politically unstable, and there were legitimate concerns following its recent internal upheaval. The new government has now come out in strong support of the project, which materially de-risks it.

That support was reflected in the company’s share price last week.”

Copper prices surge: justified or overdone?

InvestorNews: Copper prices have risen sharply. Your view?

Jack Lifton:
“I’ve been saying for at least 15 years that copper is the most important critical metal. Electricity in your home, guided missiles, electric vehicles — it all runs through copper.

That said, I think prices are being driven too much by internet commentary and a very shallow understanding in the mainstream press. Copper is in demand, but it is not scarce.

The United States has deliberately delayed two massive copper projects — one in Arizona and one in Alaska — largely due to legal and regulatory barriers. Those projects will come online. By the end of this decade, the U.S. may no longer need to import copper at all.

Copper is not gold. Prices cannot rise indefinitely without affecting the cost of everything else, and no government will allow that.”

China’s manipulation of the rare earths market isn’t a policy glitch — it’s a geopolitical weapon. In a wide-ranging discussion with InvestorNews host Tracy Hughes, Jack Lifton, Co-Chair of the Critical Minerals Institute (CMI), portrayed 2026 as a year in which “more of the same” from Beijing will keep Western planners off balance, with China “playing us” through erratic export permissions that turn production planning in North America into “chaos.” Lifton’s blunt verdict on China’s tactics underscores a deeper truth: the world remains structurally dependent on Chinese control of rare earths and processing, even as that dominance becomes a tool in geopolitical competition rather than simple commerce.

Lifton did not mince words on the broader strategic landscape either. On the question of Canada versus the United States in rare earth development, he highlighted a paradox: Canada “has the largest number of rare earth discoveries of any country in the world” and many “excellent” deposits, yet what these resources lack is “capital,” a gap that leaves Canadian projects more promising in geology than in execution. He quipped about his long tenure observing Washington policy, saying, “I’ve only been in this country for 85 years — I haven’t figured out how Washington works yet,” signaling a frustration with U.S. governmental inertia.

His critique of Washington’s approach to rare earth policy was withering. Lifton characterized government investments as “a total waste,” arguing that policymakers “don’t understand the details of rare earth supply chains” and are naively “throwing money against the wall, predominantly at mining.” In his view, that focus misses the true chokepoint: downstream processing. “Separation, metals, alloys, magnet manufacturing — that’s where the problem is,” he said, warning that current initiatives are driven by superficial impressions rather than a grasp of complex technical and economic bottlenecks.

On recycling — often touted as a strategic hedge — Lifton was equally skeptical. “Recycling only makes sense when the recycled product costs less than the new product,” he stated, contending that none of the ventures he’s reviewed meet that basic criterion. His dismissal highlights a broader theme of economic realism over policy wish-fulfillment that ran through the interview.

Lifton also turned a critical eye toward international partnerships. He described U.S.–Australia collaboration as stuck in a “Mexican standoff,” noting that Australian projects with massive government backing — such as Iluka Resources Ltd.’s (ASX: ILU) magnet supply chain investment — wait for U.S. capital to step up before they proceed. Africa’s wealth of critical minerals, he observed, is undermined by instability, and in the Middle East he sees “money” but “no brains” for developing the needed infrastructure beyond oil and gas. He predicted that Brazil, though rich in resources, won’t be a meaningful supplier for “five to ten year window” given the pace of project development.

Lifton’s assessment of various prospects was candid: Greenland’s rare earth aspirations are “a rare earth joke,” deep-sea mining could be a frontier to watch as Japan invests heavily in sediment extraction, and Russia’s magnet industry plans are unlikely to materialize because of systemic economic constraints. In the United States, the legacy magnet market “won’t grow much” as electric vehicle demand softens and manufacturers rethink electrification strategies. On defense supply chains, he noted that rare earth magnet production capacity is limited and unprofitable given the tiny quantity of heavy rare earths like dysprosium available domestically. For stockpiling, his advice was practical: oxides, not metals or alloys, which degrade, are suitable for reserve storage. Through it all, Lifton returned to a central refrain about markets and policy: “Pay attention to the market. Stop decreeing outcomes,” a warning that underscores his broader critique of government attempts to dictate industrial outcomes without a grounded understanding of how complex supply chains actually function.

To access the complete interview, click here

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Apologies for the delay in this edition of the Critical Minerals Report (CMR); the past two weeks, from Saturday, November 8th through this morning — November 23rd, have been unusually intense with policy moves, strategic finance decisions, and market signals that all point in the same direction: critical minerals are now being treated as core national security infrastructure, not just commodities.

The most explicit statement of that came from Washington today. On November 23rd, the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) signalled that it plans to deploy up to US$100 billion to secure U.S. and allied supply chains for critical minerals, nuclear energy and liquefied natural gas. The bank’s chair described a pipeline of projects in Europe, Egypt and Pakistan and framed the move as a response to an “over-reliance” on suppliers whose terms are “no longer fair.” The important point for investors is not just the headline number, but the shift in EXIM’s role: from a transaction-support lender to a central instrument of mineral and energy security policy. It effectively adds a quasi-sovereign backstop to large-capex projects that might otherwise stall on funding or political-risk constraints.

That macro signal lands in the same week that a specific U.S.–Central Asia supply-chain play came into sharper focus. On November 10th, the U.S. Embassy in Kazakhstan released a fact sheet describing an agreement under which U.S. firm Cove Capital LLC and the Government of Kazakhstan plan to build a tungsten mining and processing plant with roughly US$1.1 billion in U.S. financing.  The project targets the Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty deposits and is structured around a joint venture between Cove Capital LLC and Kazakhstan’s state mining company JSC Tau-Ken Samruk, with Cove holding a 70 % interest and Tau-Ken Samruk 30 %. Although the commercial joint-venture documentation dates from early November, the diplomatic framing over the past two weeks makes it clear this is being treated as a strategic tungsten reserve play aimed at diluting Chinese dominance in a metal that is central to armour-piercing munitions, drill bits, and high-temperature alloys.

Here are 2 interviews with Cove Capital’s Pini Althaus on the tungsten deal that Jack Lifton and I did on Wednesday:

• November 21, 2025 – Washington Announces Strategic Initiative to Secure U.S. Tungsten Supply Through Kazakhstan Partnership https://youtu.be/P5MQv8SeAiM
• November 21, 2025 – Jack Lifton with Cove Capital’s Pini Althaus on the Largest Tungsten Project in the World https://youtu.be/zs-zIcO6l6s

FYI: Market pricing is starting to reflect that renewed focus on tungsten. Chinese data show wolframite concentrate at about RMB 325,000 per tonne and ammonium paratungstate (APT) around RMB 482,000 per tonne as of November 19th, up sharply from levels seen earlier this year (Source).

Across the Atlantic, the United Kingdom chose the same fortnight to formalise its own critical minerals strategy. This weekend (November 22-23^rd), the government published a plan that targets 10% of domestic demand from U.K. production and 20% from recycling by 2035, and – more importantly – sets a hard ceiling so that no more than 60 % of any one critical mineral comes from a single foreign supplier (Source). The strategy is backed by up to £50 million in new funding and explicitly highlights lithium and tungsten assets in Cornwall, positioning them as European-scale resources for batteries and defence-grade alloys (Source). At present the U.K. sources only about 6% of its critical-mineral needs domestically, so the targets are ambitious and will require accelerated permitting, recycling build-out and midstream processing capacity, not just new mines.

In Brussels, the European Union spent the week of November 17-21 convening Raw Materials Week 2025, the annual gathering of policymakers, industry and financiers. This year’s programme, built around the theme “Choose Europe,” focused on implementation of the EU Critical Raw Materials Act and previewed a forthcoming “ResourceEU” platform, scheduled for announcement on December 3rd, which will act as a matchmaking and risk-sharing mechanism for raw-materials investments, storage and offtake (Source). One notable side-event on November 19th highlighted Canada–EU cooperation in raw materials, underscoring how Ottawa is positioning Canadian critical-mineral assets as part of a transatlantic security-of-supply architecture (Source). The direction of travel is clear: Europe is trying to solve its raw-materials exposure with institutional architecture – regulation, joint platforms and cross-border partnerships – rather than relying predominantly on national industrial strategies.

While policy makers were re-drawing the strategic map, capital markets were reminding participants that bottlenecks and policy risk can still dominate the narrative, even when they sit in relatively small corners of the periodic table. Recent volatility in niche rare earth products, including yttrium oxide, has been less about fundamentals and more about Chinese export licensing, U.S.–China tariff tensions, and the way thin markets amplify regulatory signals. The episode has been a useful stress test: it reinforced that supply-chain vulnerability is real, but also that not every price spike reflects a durable shift in underlying demand.

It is important, however, to separate signal from noise. Industry experts continue to push back on headlines that frame yttrium as an irreplaceable semiconductor input, noting that substitutes exist in many applications and that a large share of demand is outside the chip sector entirely. By contrast, more mainstream benchmarks such as neodymium and praseodymium-neodymium oxide have been comparatively stable in recent weeks, with modest firming rather than explosive moves. The capital markets takeaway is less about chasing spot moves and more about recognising where genuine structural tightness exists versus where liquidity and regulation are doing most of the work.

Lithium, in contrast, offered a clear reminder of how quickly regulatory action can whipsaw speculative positioning in a mainstream battery metal. On November 21st, the most-traded lithium carbonate contract on the Guangzhou Futures Exchange hit its daily limit down after a strong run-up, following exchange moves to raise transaction fees and tighten position limits for certain traders. At the same time, reports that Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Limited (CATL) is preparing to restart the Jianxiawo lithium mine in Yichun, with meaningful incremental supply, added a fundamental reason for speculative length to come out of the market. The sequence underscored how exchange rules, not only supply-demand forecasts, can drive short-term price action in critical minerals futures.

Equity markets across the lithium value chain reflected that tension between long-term demand optimism and near-term volatility. On November 17th, Albemarle Corporation (NYSE: ALB) led the S&P 500 after commentary from a major competitor pointed to strong expected lithium demand growth in 2026, citing grid-scale storage and AI-driven data-centre loads as key drivers. The same session saw outsized percentage gains across several peers, including Sociedad Química y Minera de Chile S.A. (NYSE: SQM; Santiago Stock Exchange: SQM-B, SQM-A), Lithium Americas Corp. (NYSE: LAC | TSX: LAC), Lithium Argentina AG (NYSE: LAR | TSX: LAR), and Sigma Lithium Corporation (NASDAQ: SGML | TSXV: SGML). Since then, trading in these names has remained choppy: most have bounced off their lows, but they continue to trade at substantial discounts to 2022–2023 peaks, reflecting both uncertainty about the next leg of the price cycle and a more disciplined attitude toward growth assumptions.

Investor positioning is also responding to a growing perception that rare earths now offer more policy-backstopped upside than lithium. Reporting over the past week highlighted that Australian investor Gina Rinehart has been reducing positions in several lithium names, including Albemarle Corporation, Lithium Americas Corp., Lithium Argentina AG and Sociedad Química y Minera de Chile S.A., while significantly increasing her stake in MP Materials Corp. (NYSE: MP). MP Materials, a key U.S. producer of rare earth oxides that is developing downstream magnet capacity, has benefited from U.S. Department of Defense support and government-linked offtake frameworks. That rotation is a concrete example of capital following the perceived direction of government guarantees and long-term procurement, rather than simply tracking spot commodity moves.

Against this backdrop, broader commodity benchmarks have been relatively subdued but broadly supportive. As of November 21st, the S&P GSCI Copper Index was up roughly 24% year-to-date and the S&P GSCI North American Copper Index had gained about 25% year-to-date, while the headline S&P GSCI composite index was essentially flat over the prior month, with only marginal week-on-week movement. In other words, the sharper moves investors are observing in selected critical mineral equities are not part of a broad-based commodity super cycle, but are instead being driven by sector specific policy decisions, technology shifts and capital allocation themes (tracking government investments) rather than an across-the-board surge in critical mineral prices.

Taken together, the last two weeks show three converging trends. First, state-backed finance is scaling up: the EXIM commitment, the U.K.’s targeted funds and the EU’s forthcoming ResourceEU platform all point toward a more interventionist model in which public balance sheets are actively used to de-risk critical-mineral projects. Second, security-driven partnerships such as the Cove Capital LLC–Tau-Ken Samruk tungsten joint venture in Kazakhstan are becoming central tools of bilateral diplomacy, not just commercial ventures, with tungsten prices moving accordingly. Third, market microstructure – particularly in thinly traded or policy-sensitive materials like yttrium oxide and lithium futures – is increasingly where geopolitical risk is first reflected, often with price moves that far exceed underlying fundamental shifts.

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InvestorNews Critical Minerals Institute (CMI) Directorial Headline Picks for the Week:

• November 21, 2025 – CATL Aims to Restart Key Chinese Lithium Mine by Early December (Source)
• November 20, 2025 – Xi risks global blowback if China cuts off rare earths for Japan (Source)
• November 20, 2025 – Norwegian firm to spend $3.2B on building North America’s largest synthetic graphite plant in Ontario (Source)
• November 20, 2025 – South Africa, EU sign critical minerals deal, vow to defend multilateralism (Source)
• November 19, 2025 – MP Materials to build Saudi rare earths refinery with Pentagon, Maaden (Source)
• November 19, 2025 – Chile’s SQM expects 25% lithium demand growth in 2025 (Source)
• November 19, 2025 – EU plans minerals stockpile centre to stop US snapping up supplies (Source)
• November 19, 2025 – Australia expects more allies to sign up to its critical minerals reserve (Source)
• November 19, 2025 – Trump officials announce $1bn loan to restart Three Mile Island nuclear plant (Source)
• November 19, 2025 – Japan Pushes to Secure Rare Earths Beyond China (Source)
• November 19, 2025 – US secures $1 trillion Saudi spending commitments spanning nuclear energy to F-35s (Source)
• November 17, 2025 – China deal buys US time to build critical minerals supply chain (Source)
• November 17, 2025 – EU’s EIB to work with Australian government on critical raw materials (Source)
• November 16, 2025 – Congo, Cobalt and Children — A Tailings Dam Fails in Kolwezi  (Source)
• November 14, 2025 – Canada Plans Mining, Rare-Earths Stakes to Combat China (Source)
• November 14, 2025 – Energy Department Announces $355 Million to Expand Domestic Production of Critical Minerals and Materials (Source)
• November 13, 2025 – Carney unveils major projects he wants fast-tracked, including new mines, LNG and hydro development (Source)
• November 13, 2025 – Rio Tinto to Shelve $2.4 Billion Serbian Lithium Project (Source)
• November 13, 2025 – Chinese battery material makers push for higher prices as cobalt rally hits supply chain (Source)
• November 12, 2025 – Noveon and Solvay Forge Partnership For Light & Heavy Rare Earth Materials Supply (Source)
• November 12, 2025 – US House report accuses China of minerals market interference  (Source)
• November 12, 2025 – DR Congo Suspends Chinese-Owned Cobalt Mine After Dam Collapse Devastates Major City  (Source)
• November 12, 2025 – Australia’s MinRes inks $765 million deal with POSCO for lithium JV stake, shares surge (Source)
• November 12, 2025 – Japan to help firms secure critical minerals as China curbs exports (Source)
• November 11, 2025 – China plans to block rare earth shipments to US military contractors: report (Source)
• November 11, 2025 – How the world’s biggest mining project is a win for China (Source)
• November 11, 2025 – Carmakers’ battery deals with miners face delays as commodity prices drop (Source)
• November 11, 2025 – Red Sky at Morning, Copper Warning (Source)
• November 10, 2025 – Canada’s finance minister says critical minerals refining is the ‘name of the game’ (Source)
• November 10, 2025 – US energy secretary says biggest use of loan office will be for nuclear power plants (Source)
• November 9, 2025 – China suspends some critical mineral export curbs to the U.S. as trade truce takes hold (Source)

InvestorNews.com Media Updates:

• November 16, 2025 – Congo, Cobalt and Children — A Tailings Dam Fails in Kolwezi https://bit.ly/485aNkJ
• November 11, 2025 – Red Sky at Morning, Copper Warning https://bit.ly/4oA6sgp

InvestorChannel.com (YouTube) Interview Updates:

• November 21, 2025 – Washington Announces Strategic Initiative to Secure U.S. Tungsten Supply Through Kazakhstan Partnership https://youtu.be/P5MQv8SeAiM
• November 21, 2025 – Jack Lifton with Cove Capital’s Pini Althaus on the Largest Tungsten Project in the World https://youtu.be/zs-zIcO6l6s
• November 20, 2025 – Peter Clausi on Silver Bullet Mines’ Second Commercial Shipment of Gold and Silver https://youtu.be/DmgySxk8aNo
• November 19, 2025 – Christopher Berlet on NRCan’s Selection of Canuc Resources’ McLaren Lake Fault Zone for a Seismic Survey in Canada’s Critical Minerals Search https://youtu.be/k9OwkyTQeRc
• November 19, 2025 – ReeXploration’s Christopher Drysdale on the ‘Metallurgy-First’ Strategy for Rare Earths at the Eureka Project in Namibia https://youtu.be/7CUhAz4Hr7s
• November 18, 2025 – Bald Hill’s High Grades Point to Antimony Resources Advancing a Top North American Antimony Prospect https://youtu.be/K7y5_VCoMok
• November 18, 2025 – Homerun’s Brian Leeners on the Silica That Could Change Solar Glass Forever https://youtu.be/ZvO-RcG5zYI
• November 17, 2025 – Grid Metals Drilling Targets Cesium, One of the Rarest Elements on Earth https://youtu.be/Box3dmM5r7Q
• November 13, 2025 – Ucore’s Pat Ryan on Defense Grade Rare Earths for North America https://youtu.be/xre-38sMJhE

InvestorNews.com News Release Updates:

• November 20, 2025 – Rockland Resources Closes Private Placement https://bit.ly/4phzKQG
• November 20, 2025 – American Rare Earths Expands Relationship With Tetra Tech to Include Exploring US Government Funding Opportunities https://bit.ly/3K5omZa
• November 20, 2025 – Grid Metals Intersects High-Grade Cesium at the Falcon West Cesium Project including 14.0% Cs2O over 3.01m https://bit.ly/4ievEGO
• November 20, 2025 – Panther Metals PLC: Appointment of drilling contractor https://bit.ly/4ppOrS2
• November 19, 2025 – Coniagas Announces Appointment of New Director https://bit.ly/3Kb6Pik
• November 19, 2025 – American Tungsten Announces Key Strategic Appointments https://bit.ly/4rfLwwX
• November 19, 2025 – Mineral Resource Estimate Updated for the Cowboy State Mine Area at Halleck Creek https://bit.ly/44bMsIB
• November 18, 2025 – Stakeholder Closes Private Placement https://bit.ly/3KaE3OQ
• November 18, 2025 – Antimony Resources Corp. Lists on the OTCQB Venture Market in the US Under Ticker Symbol ATMYF https://bit.ly/4i4RGMd
• November 18, 2025 – American Tungsten: Investor Update https://bit.ly/3K0NsIO
• November 18, 2025 – Homerun Resources Inc. Engages Minerali Industriali Engineering for Third Party Confirmation Testing and Reporting on the Santa Maria Eterna Silica Sand for the Manufacture of Antimony-Free Solar Glass as a Key Deliverable Under the Solar Plant Bankable Feasibility Study https://bit.ly/3JGN9Tv
• November 17, 2025 – Spartan Metals Commences Trading on the OTCQB under Symbol SPRMF https://bit.ly/3X2UD6i
• November 17, 2025 – Silver Bullet Mines Announces Second Shipment of Commercial Gold/Silver Concentrate https://bit.ly/43xOp1R
• November 17, 2025 – Scandium Canada announces the sale of its La Ronciere gold project to Barrick https://bit.ly/4iad170
• November 14, 2025 – Neo Performance Materials Reports Third Quarter 2025 Results https://bit.ly/4r0KTac
• November 13, 2025 – Rockland Resources Financing Fully Subscribed https://bit.ly/4qYOky8
• November 13, 2025 – Renforth Completes Final Financing Closing https://bit.ly/47Eos33
• November 13, 2025 – Coniagas Announces Results of Annual General Meeting https://bit.ly/442Spr9
• November 13, 2025 – Quantum Announces 93% Gallium Recovery https://bit.ly/3LvzrmZ
• November 13, 2025 – Homerun Resources Inc. Engages DTEC Engineering to Advance Bankable Feasibility Study for the First Antimony-Free Solar Glass Project in the Americas https://bit.ly/47GbGRL
• November 13, 2025 – Resouro Strategic Metals and Rare Earth Technologies Sign MOU for Rare Earth Element Extraction and Processing Collaboration https://bit.ly/4pbUXvu
• November 12, 2025 – Rockland Resources Arranges Financing https://bit.ly/47D7li7
• November 12, 2025 – Happy Creek Appoints Marketing and Promotion Consultants https://bit.ly/4rcjGBI
• November 12, 2025 – Coniagas Battery Metals Launches HTDEM Survey at Copper-Nickel-Cobalt Graal Property https://bit.ly/3WOBy7J
• November 12, 2025 – American Tungsten Announces Updates on Its IMA Project and Investor Relations Efforts https://bit.ly/49ggQF9
• November 12, 2025 – Volta Drills Widest TREO-Mineralized Interval to Date 0.95% TREO over 438.9m, Including 1.06% TREO over 358.6m, at Springer REE Project in Ontario, Canada https://bit.ly/47HO6Ta
• November 12, 2025 – ReeXploration Identifies Large-Scale Uranium Target at Eureka Project, Namibia https://bit.ly/4hRpYCe
• November 11, 2025 – Renforth Files Malartic Metals Package Critical Minerals NI 43-101 Technical Report, Including Initial Victoria Nickel Sulphide Polymetallic Deposit Inferred Mineral Resource Estimate https://bit.ly/3LrdnKd
• November 11, 2025 – Canuc Announces Seismic Survey on East Sudbury Project (ESP) https://bit.ly/3WP551a
• November 11, 2025 – Grid Metals Corp. Announces Exploration Programs Underway https://bit.ly/3JtTBgx
• November 11, 2025 – Nano One Provides an Update on Recent Corporate Developments & Reports Third Quarter 2025 Results https://bit.ly/4qUI62a
• November 10, 2025 – Stakeholder Extends Closing Date for Private Placement https://bit.ly/47zGCmv
• November 10, 2025 – American Rare Earths Announces Strong Initial Beneficiation Optimization Results and Updated Preliminary Mineral Processing Flowsheet https://bit.ly/3LCjwmB
• November 10, 2025 – Appia Announces the Discovery of Several High-Priority REE Drill Targets from Recent Ground Gravity Survey https://bit.ly/49bM28A
• November 10, 2025 – Romios Sells Claims in British Columbia’s Golden Triangle to Enduro Metals Corp. for $300,000 https://bit.ly/3JELttA

About the Critical Minerals Institute (CMI):
The Critical Minerals Institute (CMI) (CriticalMineralsInstitute.com) is a brain trust for the global critical minerals economy, serving as a hub that connects companies, capital markets, and policymakers. Through CMI Masterclasses, the weekly Critical Minerals Report (CMR), bespoke research, and board-level advisory services, CMI delivers actionable intelligence spanning exploration finance to geopolitics. CMI also organizes the flagship Annual Critical Minerals Institute Summit, a global gathering of government leaders, institutional investors, and industry executives. The next event, CMI Summit V, will be held May 13–14 in Toronto, Canada; for more information, visit CriticalMineralSummit.com.