Jack Lifton on the Economic Realities of Building a U.S. Rare Earth Supply Chain with Lessons from Lynas

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In order for the United States to foster a domestic rare earth permanent magnet industry, financiers behind prospective companies must focus on mitigating or eliminating financial risk. A common approach to achieving this is by socializing losses, essentially shifting the financial burden onto taxpayers. This practice can sometimes involve complicity from entities like the U.S. Department of Defense, which might obfuscate agreed prices for domestically produced rare earth permanent magnets, effectively covering up the financial realities.

When considering a supplier, a well-managed Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) conducts thorough due diligence on the supplier’s financial viability. The critical question is whether the supplier can deliver the product on time, to specification, in the agreed quantity, and at the agreed price, without requiring a financial bailout. Historically, OEMs have avoided direct purchases from non-producing junior miners, preferring suppliers who already produce at scale.

Globally, there are only a few non-Chinese miners producing significant volumes of rare earths. Lynas Corp of Australia, with its Mount Weld mine, is a seasoned producer having been in operation longer than others outside China. Lynas has ventured into downstream processing but has not fully integrated down to the production of rare earth permanent magnets.

Understanding the capital costs and economic viability of establishing a full supply chain for rare earth permanent magnets is complex and requires deep industry knowledge. Public estimates of these costs are often unreliable or non-existent. The lack of rigorous techno-economic due diligence in the non-Chinese world is a notable gap.

The key steps in establishing a rare earth supply chain include:

  1. Mining and production of rare earth-bearing minerals.
  2. Separation of rare earths into individual or combined products.
  3. Conversion into necessary chemical forms for producing metals and alloys.
  4. Manufacturing of specific rare earth alloys and metals.
  5. Processing these materials into forms required for making rare earth permanent magnets.

The example of Lynas is particularly instructive in understanding the challenges faced by rare earth processing companies. Initially, Lynas (ASX: LYC) processed its high-grade ore from Mount Weld at its Lynas Advanced Materials Plant (LAMP) in Kuantan, Malaysia. This location was chosen due to its existing chemical industry infrastructure and lower operational costs compared to Australia. The facility was designed to integrate ore processing (cracking and leaching) operations alongside rare earth separation and was built adjacent to a BASF-owned chemical plant.

However, Lynas faced significant environmental and regulatory challenges in Malaysia, particularly concerning the management of radioactive waste byproducts like thorium. The Malaysian government’s stringent environmental laws required that the LAMP retrofit its operations to eliminate the extraction and storage of radioactive materials within Malaysia. This regulation prompted Lynas to shift its extraction operations back to Australia, a move that involved substantial logistical challenges and financial overruns, reportedly costing up to one billion Australian dollars.

These challenges highlight the complexities and substantial costs involved in setting up and operating a rare earth supply chain. Such ventures are not merely about mining and processing but also about navigating economic, political, and environmental landscapes.

Ultimately, building a complete domestic rare earth permanent magnet supply chain in the U.S. is not just about securing a supply chain independent of Chinese dominance. It’s about ensuring that such a chain is economically viable and does not rely on market distortions like socialized losses. The U.S. needs to develop in-house expertise, economic acuity, and market awareness to support such a venture effectively. This is not about replicating the past but about innovating a sustainable and profitable future in the rare earth industry.

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3 responses

  1. Bill Horpyniuk Avatar
    Bill Horpyniuk

    Hi Jack,
    Initially, I would like to tell you that your articles are a pleasure to read. You have such a vast knowledge in this sector and others. Thanks for teaching rookies like me.
    You mentioned the key steps needed in establishing a Rare Earth supply chain. My query is whether a company like Energy Fuels is on the right track for a Rare Earth supply chain? Energy Fuels has deals with, Astron in Australia, Chemours and Neo Performance Materials. I believe that a mine to magnet chain has been established.
    Am I on track?
    Bill

    1. Rare Earths Investor Avatar
      Rare Earths Investor

      Agreed, Mr. Lifton’s articles are very informative and thought-provoking.

      His wannabee focus here is Lynas but several new potential RE value chains are apparently emerging.

      You mention Energy Fuels which appears to have several RE feedstock sources sited in AUS, the US and Brazil. However, they are presently self-funded. No strategic and or outside major private backing (again only according to public information). Nor outside of NEO (which apparently has its own Greenland potential mine in the background) does EF have any identified off-takers. Therefore, EF has several parts yet to be pulled together to identify a RE value chain within which it will emerge. This may come.

      However, EF appears to be behind the likes of the US-based MP (which again based on recent public information) seems to be moving towards full RE value chain establishment (not clear on their HRE needs supply). We may even see income identified next year from their GM magnet offtakes.

      Lynas’ new US chain may involve the likes of E-VAC (and more speculatively Less Common Metals).
      Then we could go on about the potential of Arafura with their 1 bill $ backing and connections to Hyundai/Kia (and maybe S. Korean Star Group).

      Just suggesting that the RE sector is a complex, frustrating minefield for RE retail investors and with the US Trump Admins’ arrival an even more fascinating sector in which to do serious DD.

      JLs writing helps to illuminate this complexity and investor challenge. GLTA – REI

  2. Simon Smith Avatar
    Simon Smith

    Thank you for your informative article Jack. I understand your point about socialized losses; effectively shifting financial burden onto taxpayers, or at least some of it.

    As I understand, the market is already distorted by the Chinese government. It has, on a massive scale, in a myriad of ways, supported their own RE producers right through their entire RE supply chain. Additionally, the Chinese government dictates/manipulates global REO prices through their quotas and other controls of their domestic RE industries. Keeping prices very low to the detriment of RE juniors in the west. Considering that it is not a level playing field when competing against China Inc., shouldn’t Western RE companies get government support in some form? New industries often do. And if so, what form should that be?

    I believe Lynas was backed by the Japanese government. Also, I understand that Lynas CEO, Amanda Lacaze, recently revealed plans to partner with customers in South Korea and Europe to expand into magnet manufacturing and so complete their own RE supply chain.

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